Phil: Will the Strait of Hormuz reopen to all LNG traffic before May 2026?

This is the condensed version. Full version here.

Grok response:

1. Hormuz at near standstill as Iran warns ships to keep to its … (Reuters)
   Published: April 9, 2026
   Ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz stood at well below 10% of normal volumes despite a recent ceasefire.[1] Iran has warned ships to adhere to specific protocols, limiting passages primarily to Iranian-linked vessels. No significant resumption of international LNG traffic reported.
2. Iranian ships continue to cross Strait of Hormuz despite US blockade (The National)
   Published: April 15, 2026
   Data shows Iranian vessels moving through the waterway amid US claims of control, but overall traffic remains minimal. Non-Iranian commercial ships largely avoid the area. International LNG transits are absent from recent tracker data.
3. US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: What do the numbers show? (France24)
   Published: April 15, 2026
   Only 388 commodity carriers passed through between March 1 and April 15, with 255 being oil and gas tankers, most Iranian-affiliated. This is far below pre-war averages of thousands monthly. No reports of unrestricted LNG traffic.
4. How many ships have passed the Strait of Hormuz and how many were attacked? (Al Jazeera)
   Published: April 15, 2026
   Kpler ship-tracking data shows 279 ships transited from February 28 to April 12, drastically below pre-war levels. LNG tankers have faced halts or reversals, with none completing unrestricted international passages recently. Risks from mines and blockades persist.
5. Traffic Through the Strait of Hormuz, April 11, 2026 (Institute for the Study of War)
   Published: April 11, 2026
   Mapped traffic between April 10 PM ET and April 11 2 PM ET shows sparse activity, dominated by limited tanker movements. No evidence of normalized LNG flows. Updates highlight ongoing restrictions post-ceasefire.
6. Why US-Iran Ceasefire Hasn’t Led to Hormuz Reopening (Bloomberg)
   Published: April 9, 2026
   A 14-day truce conditional on Iran unblocking the strait has not increased shipping meaningfully. Just a handful of vessels tested passages, primarily Chinese. LNG exporters like Qatar report continued halts.
7. The Iran war created a global natural gas shortage (NPR)
   Published: April 14, 2026
   Troubles in the Strait continue with US naval blockade on Iranian ports exacerbating LNG shortages. Qatar’s supplies disrupted, no full reopening. Global markets face ongoing volatility.
8. Iran halts two Qatar LNG tankers it previously cleared to transit Strait of Hormuz (Reuters)
   Published: April 6, 2026
   Loaded Qatar LNG vessels retreated after nearing the strait per ship-tracking data. This follows earlier failed attempts by Japanese and other LNG tankers. Highlights severe restrictions on international LNG.
9. Windward Daily Intelligence: Strait of Hormuz (Windward.ai)
   Published: April 15, 2026
   On April 15, 15 vessels transited—8 inbound, 7 outbound—with tankers dominating inbound but no unrestricted international LNG noted. Traffic steady but low compared to pre-war 100+ daily. Blockade and warnings limit broader access.
10. US Blockade of Iranian Ports | Strait of Hormuz traffic barely affected first day (The Daily Star)
    Published: April 15, 2026
    Strait traffic remains far below pre-war levels despite US blockade start. Industry sources confirm minimal change, with LNG passage halted. Updates as of April 15 show no normalization.

Current Status of Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic

As of April 16, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for international maritime traffic, particularly LNG tankers, due to the ongoing Iran war that began in late February 2026 with US-Israeli strikes.[2][3] Iran initially blocked the strait, followed by a US naval blockade on Iranian ports starting around April 13, which has not led to increased non-Iranian traffic.[4][5] Ship-tracking data from sources like Kpler, ISW, and Windward indicate daily transits at 10-15 vessels recently (e.g., 15 on April 15), mostly Iranian-linked tankers, compared to pre-war averages of over 100 merchant ships daily, with ~20% of global LNG previously flowing through.[6][7][1]

Recent Traffic Data and LNG-Specific Incidents

• March 1 – April 15, 2026: Only 388 commodity carriers total, 255 oil/gas tankers (mostly Iranian), per France24 analysis.[8]
• April 6: Two Qatar LNG tankers halted and turned back despite prior clearance; similar for Japanese LNG earlier.[9]
• April 11: ISW tracker shows limited traffic, no LNG breakthroughs.[10]
• April 15: Windward reports 15 transits, inbound tankers but no confirmed international LNG; US blockade minimally impacted already low flows.[6][11]
  Pre-war (2025 EIA data): Strait handled ~20% global LNG, with peaks from Qatar/UAE; current flows near zero for non-Iranian LNG.[12]

A ceasefire around early April failed to reopen the strait fully, with traffic briefly rising to “highest in weeks” (e.g., April 7) but still <10% normal and no LNG normalization.[13][14] Iran issued protocols for “alternative routes” hugging its coast, but shippers report GPS jamming, mines, and warnings deterring use.[15][16][17]

War Context and Disruptions

The conflict escalated after US-Israeli strikes on Iran (March 2026), prompting Hormuz closure; Iran retaliated against Qatar LNG facilities indirectly.[18] Recent US blockade aims to pressure Iran but risks further LNG shortages, with global prices up and fertilizer/chemical exports halted (urea via Hormuz affected).[19][20] Trackers like HormuzTracker and MarineTraffic show stranded vessels and cautious tests (e.g., Chinese tankers April 9).[21][22]

Expert and Industry Views

Shipping firms seek “clarity” post-ceasefire but remain optimistic only cautiously; no major outlet reports full LNG reopening.[23][24] Analysts note US blockade backfire risks but highlight minimal traffic change.[25] Recent X posts (April 15-16) confirm closures persist, with tankers turning back.[26][27]

No major news (Reuters, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, etc.) has reported the strait “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” as of April 16; restrictions continue with no clear path to full access before May 1.[1][5]

=== Forecast Result ===

Forecasting Rationale

1. Assessment of the Current Situation (as of April 16, 2026):
The Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed to international LNG traffic. All available evidence points to a state of severe restriction.

• Traffic Volume: Daily vessel transits are down by approximately 90% from the pre-war baseline of 100-138 vessels to just 10-15 vessels per day. This minimal traffic consists overwhelmingly of Iranian-affiliated vessels.
• LNG-Specific Blockade: International LNG tankers, particularly from major exporters like Qatar, have been explicitly blocked or have retreated after attempting transit. There are no reports of any successful international LNG transits since the conflict escalated.
• Active Military Conflict: The situation is not a passive blockade but an active war zone, now in its seventh week. Iran is employing mines, GPS jamming, and drone threats, while the U.S. has instituted its own naval blockade of Iranian ports. This creates a high-risk environment that insurers and shipping companies are avoiding.

2. Analysis of the Path to a “Yes” Resolution:
For the strait to reopen to “all international maritime LNG traffic” and be “no longer… severely restricted” by May 1, 2026 (a 15-day window), an extraordinary and rapid series of events would need to unfold:

1. Comprehensive Ceasefire/Peace Agreement: A durable political resolution to the US-Israel-Iran war would be a prerequisite.
2. Military De-escalation & Guarantees: Both the US and Iran would need to lift their respective blockades and provide credible security guarantees to international shipping.
3. Mine Clearance and Safety Verification: The strait would need to be swept for mines and declared safe, a process that takes time.
4. Resumption of Insurance Coverage: Maritime insurers, who have effectively red-lined the area, would need to restore coverage at reasonable premiums.
5. Traffic Normalization: LNG fleets would have to be re-routed, and traffic would need to resume at a scale that could no longer be described as “severely restricted.”

3. Key Factors Influencing the Forecast:

• Extremely Short Timeline: A 15-day window is exceptionally short for resolving a major international conflict and its complex logistical aftermath. The default assumption in forecasting is that the immediate future will resemble the present, and the present is a state of severe disruption.
• Failed Precedent: A ceasefire in early April failed to reopen the strait meaningfully. Despite a diplomatic effort, traffic remained under 10% of normal, and LNG did not resume. This is a powerful signal that even a halt in fighting does not immediately translate to commercial reopening.
• High Bar of Resolution Criteria: The criteria demand a reopening for “all international maritime LNG traffic” and an end to “severe” restrictions. The passage of a single symbolic LNG tanker would be insufficient to meet this threshold.

4. Identification and Weighting of Assumptions:

• Primary Assumption: The core assumption is that there is no secret, imminent peace deal that will be announced and implemented in the next 15 days. The probability of this assumption failing (i.e., a surprise peace deal materializes) is the primary source of any upside probability. Given the lack of any supporting intelligence or rumors of de-escalation, the probability of this assumption failing is very low.
• Secondary Assumption: I assume the resolution will be judged on a substantive return to normalcy, not a minor technicality. The phrasing “no longer…severely restricted” supports this, making a “Yes” resolution based on one or two ships passing highly unlikely.

Conclusion:
The path to reopening the Strait of Hormuz in the next 15 days is fraught with military, political, and logistical obstacles that are nearly insurmountable in such a short timeframe. The state of active conflict, the demonstrated failure of a recent ceasefire to restore traffic, and the high bar set by the resolution criteria all point overwhelmingly toward a “No” resolution. The probability, while not absolute zero to account for unforeseeable “black swan” diplomatic events, is extremely low.

Probability: 3%

End

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