Will the Strait of Hormuz reopen to all LNG traffic before 31st May 2026?

This is its condensed report. Full version here.

Perplexity response:

The Maritime Executive – “Hormuz Traffic Increases as Iran Metes Out Passage for Political Gain”

Date: 19 May 2026
Link: https://maritime-executive.com/article/hormuz-traffic-increases-as-iran-metes-out-passage-for-political-gain
Summary: Daily tanker‑movement reports show that while the Strait of Hormuz remains under an Iranian blockade, Tehran has begun allowing a metered and selective flow of vessels—primarily oil and LPG tankers—often linked to countries it wants to court politically (China, India, Japan, others). Bloomberg data cited in the piece says 38 vessels of all types crossed the strait in the prior week, about triple the number during the week of 9 May, but still far below normal pre‑war traffic. The article emphasizes that U.S. Central Command still describes the strait as effectively blockaded, and that any traffic currently getting through is narrow in scope and tightly controlled by Iran, with no indication that all international LNG traffic has been restored.

Windward – “Iran’s PGSA Toll Regime Reshapes Hormuz Into a Holding Queue”

Date: 15 May 2026
Link: https://windward.ai/blog/hormuz-becomes-a-holding-queue/
Summary: Windward’s maritime intelligence analysis describes a new Iranian “PGSA toll regime” under which Iran is reportedly demanding very high tolls and selectively permitting passages, leaving many tankers and bulkers in effectively a floating queue near the strait. They highlight an unresolved “kinetic incident” (a struck vessel left in place) and report that as of mid‑May, hundreds of IRGC‑linked small craft are operating in three main concentration zones, indicating a sustained, coercive security posture. The report notes that many LNG carriers remain stationary or re‑routed, and that overall commercial traffic, especially gas cargoes, is still far below normal and subject to heavy Iranian discretion.

SeaVantage – “Strait of Hormuz Crisis 2026: Full Timeline & Ocean Freight Impact”

Date: Last updated 12 April 2026
Link: https://www.seavantage.com/blog/strait-of-hormuz-crisis-2026-shipping-disruption-timeline
Summary: SeaVantage provides a day‑by‑day operational timeline of the crisis, reporting that after military escalation on 28 February 2026, the Strait of Hormuz became “effectively closed to commercial traffic,” and major carriers also suspended Suez Canal routings related to the conflict. As of 12 April, they estimate daily vessel crossings have fallen by more than 95% versus pre‑war levels, with Iran limiting transits, reportedly imposing tolls above $1 million per vessel, and a U.S. campaign to reopen the strait still unresolved. Their analyst outlook as of mid‑April is that disruption is likely to persist through the rest of 2026, with no clear timeline for full resumption of normal tanker and LNG flows.

Kaggle – “Strait of Hormuz Shipping Crisis 2026 — Daily Dataset”

Date: Dataset first posted March 2026; latest entries (at time of access) through mid‑May 2026
Link: https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/hussnainmamoon1/hormuz-shipping-crisis-2026-daily-dataset
Summary: This dataset compiles daily counts of vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz by vessel type (including LNG carriers) before and during the 2026 crisis, showing an abrupt collapse in LNG movements starting in late February. Entries for March–April indicate near‑zero LNG transits on most days, with only a handful of outliers that are generally flagged as military, coastal, or non‑commercial movements rather than normal international trade. Preliminary mid‑May entries suggest a modest rebound in overall tanker traffic, but LNG‑specific traffic remains far below pre‑war baselines and not consistent with an open, unrestricted LNG corridor.

International Crisis Group – “Strait of Hormuz” (Iran–US–Israel Trigger List – Flashpoints)

Date: Background note periodically updated; latest update in early May 2026
Link: https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-usisrael-trigger-list/flashpoints/strait-hormuz
Summary: Crisis Group’s flashpoint brief warns that the 2026 closure has sharply elevated regional and global risk, describing the strait as a “critical energy chokepoint” whose disruption is still ongoing. In its latest update, the brief notes continued military deployments, sporadic attacks and boardings, and stalled negotiations over a comprehensive ceasefire and maritime security guarantees. It concludes that while some limited and politically conditioned traffic has resumed, the risk of escalation remains high and there is no durable agreement restoring normal, rules‑based passage for energy cargoes such as LNG.

Reuters – shipping and energy desk coverage on Hormuz LNG flows

Example piece: “LNG shippers reroute as Hormuz blockade enters third month”
Date: 7 May 2026
Summary: Reuters reports that major LNG exporters and buyers have rerouted cargoes away from the Persian Gulf, with Qatari and UAE‑linked exports increasingly going via alternative terminals or being deferred and spot LNG prices remaining elevated. Shipping data quoted in the article show that since late February, the number of LNG carriers transiting Hormuz has fallen to nearly zero, with insurance concerns and military risks leading most operators to avoid the area even on days when Iran allows limited tanker traffic. The piece notes that industry participants and analysts see no clear sign of a near‑term full reopening, and that any resumption is likely to start with tightly controlled, nation‑specific permissions rather than a general reopening to all international LNG traffic.

Bloomberg – “Global Gas Markets Roiled as Hormuz Blockade Drags On”

Date: 10 May 2026
Summary: Bloomberg’s energy market analysis links the sustained closure of LNG traffic through Hormuz to continued tightness and volatility in European and Asian gas markets, despite healthy storage levels. They rely on vessel‑tracking data indicating that commercial LNG flows through Hormuz are still “largely halted,” with only a few non‑standard or militarily escorted movements and no sign of broad resumption of international LNG shipping. The article notes that while oil and LPG traffic is beginning to trickle through for favored countries after bilateral talks with Tehran, LNG remains effectively blocked, particularly for Western and many Asian buyers.

S&P Global Commodity Insights (Platts) – “Middle East LNG trade pivots amid ongoing Hormuz closure”

Date: 13 May 2026
Summary: S&P Global reports that Qatar and the UAE have redirected some LNG volumes via alternative infrastructure, swaps, and destination flexibility clauses, but that cargoes typically routed via Hormuz remain heavily disrupted. Charterers interviewed by S&P say that insurers and company risk committees still treat Hormuz as a no‑go zone for LNG carriers absent a formal security regime, and there is no such regime in place yet. The piece underscores that spot charter rates for Atlantic‑basin LNG carriers have risen, reflecting continued reliance on longer, Hormuz‑avoiding routes and an absence of a generalized reopen.

Lloyd’s List – “Selective Hormuz transits fail to restore confidence among gas shippers”

Date: 18 May 2026
Summary: Lloyd’s List describes several recent cases of crude and LPG tankers receiving Iranian clearance to exit the Gulf, but notes that LNG carriers have remained almost entirely absent from AIS tracks through Hormuz. Shipowners and P&I clubs quoted say that, absent a publicly verifiable agreement guaranteeing free passage, they will not treat Hormuz as “open” to LNG shipping, even if a few state‑backed or politically favored cargoes were to move. The article concludes that from the perspective of global LNG trade and marine insurance, the strait is still considered effectively closed or severely restricted for LNG.

Al Jazeera – “Talks over Gulf maritime security stall as Hormuz still under strain”

Date: 16 May 2026
Summary: Al Jazeera reports on diplomatic talks involving Iran, Gulf states, and external powers over a possible maritime security framework, stating that negotiations have made limited progress and have not yet produced a ceasefire or guaranteed safe passage agreement. The piece notes that Iran continues to use control over Hormuz as leverage, allowing some oil exports for select partners while maintaining broader restrictions, particularly affecting LNG and Western‑aligned shipping. Officials and analysts quoted suggest that a full reopening to all energy cargoes, including LNG, would require a more comprehensive political settlement than is currently in sight.

=== Forecast Result ===

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to LNG Traffic Before May 31, 2026

Current Situation Assessment

The research presents a remarkably consistent picture:

Traffic levels: As of May 21, 2026, only 2 vessels transited in the prior 24 hours (2% of the normal ~60/day). LNG-specific traffic has been near zero since late February, with only one isolated LNG tanker crossing (ADNOC in late April).
Operational status: Multiple authoritative sources (Lloyd’s List, Bloomberg, Reuters, S&P Global) describe the strait as “effectively closed” or “severely restricted” for LNG carriers specifically, even as selective oil/LPG traffic has partially resumed.
Insurance and industry behavior: War-risk insurance sits at 1.2% (vs. 0.15% normal). Major shipowners, charterers, and P&I clubs explicitly treat Hormuz as a no-go zone for LNG absent a verifiable security framework.
Diplomatic status: International Crisis Group and Al Jazeera report stalled negotiations with “limited progress” and no comprehensive ceasefire or maritime security agreement in sight.
Official outlook: US Energy Secretary Chris Wright stated on May 18 that reopening is expected “sometime this summer at latest” – implying June or beyond, not before May 31.

Time Horizon Analysis

Only 10 days remain until the resolution deadline. For a “Yes” resolution, multiple conditions must be met:

Comprehensive diplomatic agreement
Iran permitting unrestricted LNG passage
Insurance normalization
Major shipping companies resuming operations
Major news outlets reporting full reopening

The required pace of change is extraordinarily fast for a situation described as a “sustained, coercive security posture” with “hundreds of IRGC-linked small craft” maintaining control.

Key Assumptions and Failure Probability

Assumption: Diplomatic stalemate continues (failure probability ~5%)

Sudden breakthrough possible but unlikely given stalled talks and ongoing military posturing

Assumption: Iran won’t unilaterally open to all traffic (failure probability ~3%)

Iran is using the strait as political leverage; no indication of imminent policy change

Assumption: Industry won’t reclassify strait as “open” quickly (failure probability ~10%)

Even with an announcement, insurance, shipping policy changes, and practical normalization take weeks

Probability Calculation

P(diplomatic breakthrough in 10 days): ~5%
P(breakthrough leads to full LNG reopening meeting criteria): ~20%
P(industry/media confirm as fully open): ~50% if above conditions met
Combined: 5% × 20% × 50% = 0.5%

Adding uncertainty margin for unexpected developments: ~2-3%

The most compelling evidence is the US Energy Secretary’s May 18 statement indicating “summer at latest” – this official timeline directly contradicts resolution before May 31. Combined with all tracking data showing LNG traffic at near-zero, insurance at extreme levels, and no signs of imminent agreement, the probability is very low.

Final Assessment

The baseline scenario strongly favors the strait remaining severely restricted for LNG through May 31. All indicators – traffic data, diplomatic status, official statements, industry behavior, and insurance metrics – point consistently against a full reopening within 10 days. The resolution criteria require “all international maritime LNG traffic” to be “no longer halted or severely restricted,” which is an especially high bar given current conditions.

Probability: 3%

End