Phil: Will the Strait of Hormuz reopen to all LNG traffic before 31st July 2026?

This is its condensed report. Full version here.

Grok response:

No major news outlets have reported a full, stable reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to all international maritime LNG traffic as of July 9, 2026. Traffic remains severely restricted or effectively halted amid ongoing conflict, with recent attacks and escalations preventing normalization.[1][1]

The strait has been closed or heavily disrupted since late February 2026 due to the Iran conflict (Iran declared it closed around Feb. 27–March 4, 2026, following US/Israeli strikes). A mid-June 2026 US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) led to a temporary partial resumption of some tanker traffic (including limited LNG movements from Qatar), but this unraveled with renewed attacks.[2][3]

Key recent developments (as of early July 2026):

On July 7, Iran reportedly struck multiple commercial vessels near the strait, including the Qatari LNG tanker Al Rekayyat (or similar naming), a Saudi crude tanker, and others. This prompted “severe” maritime risk warnings, vessel turnbacks, and US retaliatory strikes on Iranian targets.[4][5]
Live trackers (updated July 9) show the strait status as “CLOSED” (131+ days), with daily throughput at ~31% of normal (~3.2M DWT vs. 10.3M average) and only ~34 transits (57% of normal). War risk insurance remains extreme (8% premiums).[1][1]
Some LNG tankers (e.g., Qatari vessels) have made limited or attempted transits in June/early July, but activity is selective, risky, and concentrated on certain routes; many have turned back.[6][7]
Broader context: Partial traffic recovery in late June after the MOU was short-lived. Renewed fighting, mine concerns, and failed de-escalation mean full, unrestricted international LNG access has not been restored or reported by major outlets.[8][9]

Resolution hinges on major news reporting a full reopening (no longer halted or severely restricted) before July 31, 2026. With only ~22 days left and active escalation/diplomatic fragility, current conditions show no such development. Limited/conditional traffic does not meet the criteria of reopening “to all international maritime LNG traffic.”[10]

Citations (10 sources with titles, dates, and summaries):

Strait of Hormuz Live Tracker (hormuzstraitmonitor.com, updated July 9, 2026): Real-time dashboard declares strait CLOSED since Feb. 27 (131 days); 34 transits/day (57% normal), 31% throughput, extreme insurance; notes MOU collapse after July 7 attacks.[1]
Qatari LNG Tanker Reportedly Struck in Hormuz (Bloomberg TV, ~July 7, 2026): Reports attack on Qatari LNG tanker near strait amid resurgent tensions, raising oil prices and energy supply concerns.[11]
Tanker traffic through Hormuz picks up after slower flows (Reuters, June 22, 2026): Notes some Qatari LNG tankers entering via Iranian route post-MOU, first since war start, but with ongoing concerns.[10]
Strait of Hormuz reopening gradually as tanker traffic resumes (Yeni Şafak, June 18, 2026): Early signs of recovery post-US-Iran deal, including Qatar LNG tanker movements, but cautious and limited.[3]
Qatar LNG Ship Traffic Through Hormuz Resumes After Brief Pause (Bloomberg, July 3, 2026): First visible LNG passage in a week amid efforts to restart exports, but signal issues and uncertainty.[7]
Hormuz Vessel Traffic Grinds to Halt Amid Renewed Fighting (Natural Gas Intel, ~July 8, 2026): Traffic nearly ceases due to US-Iran attacks and fragile ceasefire collapse.[8]
2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis (Wikipedia, updated ~July 2026): Timeline of closures, partial June reopening via MOU, re-closures, and July escalations including vessel attacks.[2]
With Hormuz reopened, has the oil shortage turned into a glut? (Al Jazeera, July 2, 2026): Discusses faster-than-expected partial reopening post-MOU but highlights ongoing uncertainty and price effects.[12]
Hormuz shipping risk raised to severe after tankers hit (Reuters, July 7, 2026): Details July 7 attacks on Qatari LNG and Saudi tankers; risk raised to severe, vessels diverting.[4]
The Strait of Hormuz Already Faces a Tough Recovery… (CFR, ~July 8, 2026): Analyzes MOU collapse, persistent barriers (mines, aggression, mistrust) blocking full recovery despite nominal June efforts.[9]

No authoritative resolution source (e.g., specific tracker or official declaration) shows full LNG reopening. Data reflects severe ongoing restrictions.

=== Forecast Result ===

Current Situation (July 9, 2026)

The evidence paints a clear picture of active conflict and severe disruption:

Strait officially tracked as “CLOSED” (131+ days), ~31% normal throughput
July 7: Iran attacked multiple commercial vessels including a Qatari LNG tanker (Al Rekayyat)
July 7-8: U.S. struck ~80 Iranian military targets in retaliation
President Trump declared the interim agreement “over”
~6,000 seafarers stranded; extreme war risk premiums (~8%)
Only ~34 transits/day vs. 100-130 pre-war

Resolution Criteria Bar

The criteria requires: “LNG traffic through the strait is no longer halted or severely restricted.” This is a very high bar — even partial or conditional traffic doesn’t meet it. Major news outlets must explicitly report a full reopening.

Key Assumptions and Their Failure Probabilities

Assumption 1: The conflict cannot achieve a ceasefire AND full normalization within 22 days

Even if a ceasefire happened tomorrow, mine clearing, insurance normalization, crew confidence, and logistics rebuilding would take weeks to months
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~5%

Assumption 2: The current escalatory trajectory (Trump declaring MOU “over,” fresh U.S. strikes) continues or prevents rapid resolution

Historical base rate: major maritime chokepoint conflicts (Suez 1956, Gulf crises) take months to resolve
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~8%

Assumption 3: A full reopening declaration requires more than exists now

The resolution criteria explicitly distinguishes from partial traffic
Current routing is fragmented (Iran-approved vs. U.S. corridor), inconsistent with “all international” traffic
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~3%

Timeline Probability Distribution

Resolves YES within 1 week (by July 16): ~1%
Resolves YES within 22 days (by July 31): ~3%
Resolves YES within 3 months (by October 2026): ~15-20%
Resolves YES within 12 months: ~40-50%

Conclusion

The situation as of July 9 shows active escalation — not de-escalation. A full normalization sufficient to be reported as a complete reopening of all international LNG traffic within 22 days would require an extraordinary reversal that is nearly unprecedented in comparable historical conflicts. The specific, high-bar resolution criteria further reduces the chance of a YES outcome.