Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 8%
This is the full report. Condensed version here.
Perplexity response:
{think}
The user is asking me to provide research context about whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to all international maritime LNG traffic before May 31, 2026. The question was created on May 14, 2026, and we’re looking at a very near-term resolution (17 days from now).
Let me analyze what I need to know:
- Current status of the Strait of Hormuz – is it closed or partially open?
- Current LNG traffic levels
- What would constitute “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” vs “halted or severely restricted”
- Recent geopolitical developments that might affect reopening
- Expert opinions on timeline for reopening
From the search results provided:
- As of mid-May 2026, there’s an ongoing crisis that started in late February
- Iranian forces have restricted transits since late February
- Commercial flows are roughly 5% of pre-conflict averages
- A ceasefire was agreed “last month” (so around April 2026)
- After ceasefire, ships transiting increased to max ~25/day, but recently dropped to ~10/day
- In peacetime, 150-170 vessels transit daily
- LNG/gas carrier movements are particularly constrained – only 2 LNG crossings recorded in April
- There’s “no indication of a broad-based recovery” for gas carriers
- A Polymarket (prediction market) shows 54.5% implied probability AGAINST traffic returning to normal by July 31
- By May 15: 0.5% YES probability of return to normal
- By May 31: 9.5% YES probability of return to normal
The search results indicate:
- There was a conflict that started in late February 2026
- A ceasefire was agreed in April 2026
- Traffic has only marginally improved since the ceasefire
- LNG traffic specifically remains severely restricted (only 2 crossings in all of April)
- Various geopolitical conditions need to be met for full reopening
- Market expectations suggest very low probability of full normalization by end of May
I should search for more granular data on current LNG movements through the strait, the latest diplomatic negotiations, and expert forecasts on when full reopening might realistically occur. I need recent shipping statistics from May 2026, any new geopolitical developments since the ceasefire, and assessments from analysts on what conditions would need to be met for “all international maritime LNG traffic” to resume normal operations.
Research Context: Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic Reopening Before May 31, 2026
Step-by-Step Analysis of Information Needed:
- Current LNG traffic levels as of mid-May 2026
- Definition calibration – what constitutes “all international maritime LNG traffic” vs current “halted or severely restricted” status
- Timeline context – we have only 17 days for resolution
- Geopolitical developments – status of ceasefire and negotiations
- Expert assessments – shipping industry views on reopening prospects
- Market signals – prediction market implied probabilities
- Pre-conflict baseline – normal LNG traffic volumes for comparison
10 Key Citations:
[1] Polymarket – Strait of Hormuz Traffic Returns to Normal by July 31 (May 11-14, 2026)
- Description: Prediction market with resolution criteria tied to IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of transit calls reaching 60+
- Key Data: Market prices show 54.5% implied probability AGAINST normalization by July 31; $72.8K total trading volume
- Summary: The market reflects a closely contested balance with Iranian restrictions in place since late February 2026. Commercial flows have dropped to roughly 5% of pre-conflict averages. The resolution mechanism requires 60 transit calls (7-day average) to confirm “normal” operations, suggesting current levels are substantially below this threshold.
[2] Cyprus Mail – “Strait of Hormuz remains open in name, constrained in practice” (May 12, 2026)
- Description: Shipping analysis of April 2026 transit data from AXSMarine
- Key Data: LNG movements “particularly limited” with only 2 crossings in entire April; approximately 900 commercial vessels west of Hormuz by month-end; pre-conflict normal rates: 15-20 million barrels/day
- Summary: Despite a ceasefire in April, the Strait remained operationally fragmented with gas carriers showing “no indication of a broad-based recovery.” Vessel movements are driven by security conditions rather than normal commercial patterns. LNG traffic specifically remains among the most constrained segments, contradicting any narrative of full reopening.
[3] Wood Mackenzie – Energy Trade Flows Rerouted; Strait Remains Mostly Closed (Recent, May 2026)
- Description: Energy sector analysis of current disruptions and diplomatic status
- Key Data: Post-ceasefire maximum transit: ~25 ships/day; current transit rate: ~10 ships/day; peacetime normal: 150-170 vessels/day
- Summary: Even after ceasefire agreement, transits dropped back to only 10/day (roughly 6-7% of normal). Iranian demands include end to hostilities, sanctions lifting, nuclear deal, and Strait reopening – conditions not yet met. The possibility of continued conflict and renewed attacks raises prospect of prolonged closure.
[4] Crypto Briefing – Iran Expands Control Over Strait of Hormuz (May 2026)
- Description: Prediction market data compilation on Strait reopening probabilities
- Key Data: May 15 probability: 0.5% YES for traffic return to normal; May 31 probability: 9.5% YES
- Summary: Market-implied probabilities show very low confidence in reopening by May 31 (only 9.5% probability). The extremely low May 15 probability (0.5%) suggests markets assign minimal probability to imminent resolution within the next 24 hours.
[5] Mezhа – Iran Tightens Control Over Strait; US Warns of Disruption (May 2026)
- Description: Geopolitical analysis of strategic standoff
- Key Data: Strategic standoff between Iran and US continues; major oil routes disrupted
- Summary: The confrontation remains unresolved with Iran maintaining control restrictions. Alternative pipelines are being developed as market participants prepare for prolonged disruption, suggesting no near-term full reopening is anticipated.
Critical Assessment for May 31 Resolution:
Current Status (as of May 14, 2026):
- LNG traffic: Severely restricted with only 2 crossings recorded in entire April
- Overall traffic: ~10 ships/day (versus 150-170 normal) = ~6-7% of baseline
- Geopolitical conditions: Ceasefire in place since April, but underlying demands unmet
Gap to Resolution:
The resolution criteria requires “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” with traffic “no longer halted or severely restricted.” Current data shows:
- Only 2 LNG transits in 30 days (April) = 0.067 per day
- Pre-conflict normal would involve dozens of LNG carriers monthly
- Gas carriers specifically show “no indication of broad-based recovery”
Market Signal:
Prediction markets assign only 9.5% probability to normalization by May 31 – 17 days away. This reflects market participants’ assessment that current diplomatic/military conditions will not permit full reopening in this timeframe.
Remaining Unknowns Requiring Additional Research:
- Latest diplomatic negotiations status (ceasefire held? negotiations advancing?)
- Whether any major LNG carriers have signaled intent to resume transit
- Updated May 14 transit call data from IMF Portwatch
- Any recent statements from major shipping lines about Strait resumption plans
- Current status of US Navy operations and Iranian restrictions
Grok response:
List of 10 Citations:
- Title/Description: “Strait of Hormuz Closure 2026: What It Means for Your …” (carraglobe.com)
Date: ~May 8, 2026 (6 days before current date)
3-sentence summary: The article reports that as of May 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to commercial traffic, stranding 1,550 vessels and trapping 22,500 mariners, with no Suez alternative available. It notes QatarEnergy declared force majeure on LNG shipments after Iranian attacks, removing 20% of global LNG supply overnight. Traffic data shows the waterway, normally carrying 20% of global oil and LNG, has seen near-total shutdown since March. - Title/Description: “Shipping in Strait of Hormuz at a standstill despite US-Iran …” (aljazeera.com)
Date: April 10, 2026
3-sentence summary: Despite a US-Iran ceasefire, only 5-7 vessels transited daily versus a normal 120-140, with over 600 vessels (including 325 tankers) stranded. Analysts from Kpler warn that safe transit capacity will remain constrained at 10-15 passages per day even if the ceasefire holds. The strait normally handles one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies. - Title/Description: “Strait of Hormuz Shipping Disruptions: 2026 Crisis” (discoveryalert.com.au)
Date: ~May 7, 2026 (7 days before current date)
3-sentence summary: As of early May 2026, the strait has experienced 69+ days of effective commercial shutdown with traffic reduced 90-93% from the normal ~138 daily vessels to near-zero. A brief reopening attempt on April 21-22 collapsed within 24 hours. Over 150 ships remain stranded amid ongoing Iran conflict impacts. - Title/Description: “LNG ships move toward Hormuz after Iran says Strait is open” (m.economictimes.com)
Date: April 18, 2026
3-sentence summary: Iran declared the strait open, prompting Qatari LNG tankers to approach, with vessels like Al Hamra and Mraweh pausing near Fujairah. Ship-tracking data showed loaded LNG carriers moving toward the strait in hopes of resuming flows. This followed earlier Iranian announcements amid the ongoing conflict. - Title/Description: “Hormuz Traffic at Standstill as US Vessel Seizure Widens …” (gcaptain.com)
Date: April 20, 2026
3-sentence summary: Commercial traffic through the strait dropped to a virtual standstill after a brief confused reopening over the weekend collapsed due to a US seizure of an Iranian vessel. LNG tankers that had approached ultimately U-turned or idled awaiting clarity. The article highlights seven weeks of war-related disruptions. - Title/Description: “Hormuz at near standstill as Iran warns ships to keep to its …” (reuters.com)
Date: April 9, 2026
3-sentence summary: Traffic stood well below 10% of normal volumes, with just seven ships passing in 24 hours versus 140 normally. Iran asserted control by directing ships through its territorial waters despite the ceasefire. Hundreds of tankers remain stuck, cutting 20% of global oil and LNG supply. - Title/Description: “Qatar Sends First LNG Shipment Through Hormuz Since …” (youtube.com, Bloomberg data)
Date: May 10, 2026
3-sentence summary: The Al Kharaitiyat tanker loaded at Ras Laffan exited the strait toward Pakistan, marking Qatar’s first LNG export since the war began. It navigated the Tehran-approved northern route hugging the Iranian coast. This represents limited progress amid otherwise restricted conditions. - Title/Description: “Hormuz may not fully open until second half of 2026, Baker …” (cnbc.com)
Date: April 24, 2026
3-sentence summary: Baker Hughes assumes in its guidance that the strait will not fully reopen until the second half of 2026 due to the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict. The firm expects conflict to continue through June. This reflects industry expectations of prolonged disruption. - Title/Description: “Reopening strait of Hormuz would have limited impact on …” (theguardian.com)
Date: May 7, 2026 (7 days before current date)
3-sentence summary: Maersk’s CEO stated that reopening, whether in days or months, would have limited impact on cargo flows due to persistent high energy costs. The article notes ongoing industry challenges from the disruption. It highlights that full normalcy remains distant. - Title/Description: “Trump-Xi summit could produce ‘something substantial’ on …” (cnbc.com video)
Date: May 14, 2026 (today)
3-sentence summary: Analysts view May 2026 as a potential turning point but note businesses cannot sustain destocking if the Hormuz blockade continues. The summit is seen as key for progress on reopening amid severe supply pain. Current traffic remains sharply reduced.
Key Context Summary (as of May 14, 2026):
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed or severely restricted to commercial LNG (and other) traffic since late February/early March 2026 following the start of the Iran conflict. Brief Iranian announcements of openness in mid-April led to minimal transits (often <10% of normal), with traffic quickly reverting to standstill levels due to ongoing blockades, seizures, and warnings. A single limited Qatari LNG shipment occurred on May 10 via a restricted northern route, but no major news outlets report full reopening to all international maritime LNG traffic. Industry forecasts (e.g., Baker Hughes) and recent analyses indicate full reopening is unlikely before the second half of 2026, with no imminent signs of resolution by May 31. No authoritative sources show today’s traffic levels returning to pre-crisis norms of 120-140 daily transits.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
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Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning and Analysis
Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research, as of May 14, 2026:
- The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to commercial LNG traffic since late February/early March 2026 following the start of the Iran war
- Overall vessel traffic is at ~10 ships/day (versus normal 120-170 vessels/day) – only about 6-7% of normal
- LNG specifically: Only 2 crossings recorded in all of April 2026, and one limited Qatari LNG shipment on May 10 via a restricted northern route
- This single May 10 transit was through an Iranian-approved special route, not normal open operations
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires:
- Major news outlets reporting the strait has “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic”
- Traffic “no longer halted or severely restricted”
This is a high bar – not just occasional restricted transits, but full open access for all LNG traffic.
Key Evidence Against YES Resolution:
- Industry forecasts: Baker Hughes (April 24) explicitly expects no full reopening until H2 2026
- Traffic data: Near-zero LNG operations currently (essentially halted)
- Failed reopening attempts: Brief April 21-22 reopening collapsed within 24 hours
- Geopolitical deadlock: Iranian demands (sanctions lifting, nuclear deal) are complex and unresolved
- Prediction markets: 9.5% probability for May 31 normalization
Time Horizon Analysis
With only 17 days remaining:
- Major diplomatic breakthroughs rarely materialize this quickly
- Even if a deal were announced today, operational implementation takes time
- No evidence of imminent breakthrough in current negotiations
Key Assumptions and Failure Probabilities:
No major diplomatic breakthrough in next 17 days (~90% confident this holds)
- If wrong: Could enable faster reopening, but negotiations are complex
Iran maintains current restrictive stance (~92% confident this holds)
- Iran has strong leverage and unmet demands
Prediction market estimates are approximately calibrated (~85% confident)
- Market at 9.5% for May 31 provides useful signal
Probability Calculation:
- Base case (no major changes): ~92-95% probability of NO resolution
- Diplomatic breakthrough scenario: ~3-5% probability
- Iranian unilateral reversal: ~1-2% probability
- Other unforeseen events: ~1-2% probability
The prediction market signal of 9.5% seems slightly high given:
- The requirement for “all international maritime LNG traffic” is stringent
- Current LNG traffic is essentially zero
- Very limited time window
However, accounting for:
- My historical overconfidence
- Geopolitical uncertainty
- Black swan possibilities
The market estimate provides a reasonable anchor. Given the extremely restricted current state, the high bar for resolution, and only 17 days remaining, I estimate the probability is slightly lower than the market consensus but within the same range.
Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%
Anthropic Binary response:
Analysis: Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic Reopening by May 31, 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of May 14, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted following the Iran conflict that began in late February 2026. The key data points are:
- LNG traffic: Only 2 LNG crossings recorded in all of April 2026
- One limited crossing on May 10: A single Qatari tanker (Al Kharaitiyat) transited via a restricted northern route along the Iranian coast
- Overall traffic: ~10 ships/day vs. normal 150-170 (approximately 6-7% of baseline)
- QatarEnergy: Declared force majeure on LNG shipments
- 1,550+ vessels stranded, 22,500 mariners trapped
Timeline Constraint
We have only 17 days remaining until May 31, 2026. This is an extremely short window for a major geopolitical shift.
Key Events and Failed Attempts
- April ceasefire: Agreed but didn’t lead to full reopening
- April 21-22 reopening attempt: Collapsed within 24 hours
- Mid-April Iranian “open” declaration: Only resulted in partial, controlled passage
- Post-ceasefire traffic: Briefly reached ~25 ships/day but dropped back to ~10/day
Expert and Market Signals
- Baker Hughes (April 24): Expects strait not to fully reopen until H2 2026
- Prediction markets: 9.5% probability for May 31 reopening
- Analysts: Iranian demands (sanctions lifting, nuclear deal) remain unmet
- Maersk CEO: Notes ongoing challenges even if reopening occurs
Critical Assumptions Analysis
| Assumption | Probability of Failure | Impact on Forecast |
|---|---|---|
| No major diplomatic breakthrough in 17 days | ~8-10% failure rate | High – would completely change outlook |
| Ceasefire doesn’t lead to rapid normalization | ~5% failure rate | High – current pattern shows this already failed once |
| Iran maintains strategic restrictions | ~5% failure rate | High – Iran has leverage incentive |
Probability Breakdown by Timeline
- By May 15 (1 day): ~0.5% (nearly impossible)
- By May 31 (17 days): ~8% (question target)
- By July 31 (78 days): ~45% (prediction market consensus)
- By December 2026 (230 days): ~70-75%
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires major news outlets to report that LNG traffic is “no longer halted or severely restricted.” Current status shows:
- Only 2 LNG transits in 30 days (April) = 0.067 per day
- Pre-conflict: dozens of LNG carriers monthly
- Gas carriers show “no indication of broad-based recovery”
This is clearly “severely restricted” and would need dramatic change to resolve YES.
Factors Arguing for Higher Probability (~12-15%)
- Trump-Xi summit could produce breakthrough
- Strategic pressure on all parties is high
- Economic pain is severe
- Unpredictable nature of conflict resolution
Factors Arguing for Lower Probability (~5-7%)
- Structural nature of Iranian demands
- Multiple failed reopening attempts
- Only 17 days remaining
- Historical overconfidence tendency
- Industry consensus points to H2 2026
Final Reasoning
Given:
- Extremely short timeframe (17 days)
- Current LNG traffic at near-zero levels
- Multiple failed reopening attempts
- Unresolved underlying geopolitical demands
- Industry expectations for H2 2026 reopening
- Prediction market at 9.5%
- My historical tendency toward overconfidence
The probability should account for small chance of unexpected diplomatic breakthrough while recognizing the structural barriers. The prediction market’s 9.5% seems reasonable, but given the very short window and multiple failed attempts, I’ll be slightly more conservative.
Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%
Anthropic Binary response:
Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to All International Maritime LNG Traffic
Current Situation Assessment
As of May 14, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted to LNG traffic:
- Traffic levels: ~10 ships/day vs. normal 150-170 ships/day (6-7% of baseline)
- LNG specifically: Only 2 crossings in all of April 2026; one limited Qatari shipment on May 10 via a restricted northern route hugging the Iranian coast
- Timeline: 17 days remain until May 31 resolution date
- Conflict status: Ceasefire in place since April, but traffic hasn’t normalized
Key Evidence Points
- Industry expectations: Baker Hughes explicitly assumes the strait will NOT fully reopen until second half of 2026 (after May 31)
- Prediction markets: Only 9.5% probability assigned to traffic normalization by May 31
- Resolution criteria analysis: The question requires traffic to be “no longer halted or severely restricted” – current conditions clearly fail this threshold with LNG traffic at <5% of normal levels
- Iranian demands remain unmet: Sanctions lifting, nuclear deal, and other conditions that take months, not days, to negotiate
- Implementation lag: Even if a diplomatic breakthrough occurred tomorrow, reopening all international LNG traffic requires safety assessments, insurance restoration, and shipping company coordination – processes that take weeks minimum
Critical Assumptions & Failure Probabilities
Assumption: No radical geopolitical breakthrough in 17 days
- Failure probability: ~8%
- Even if breakthrough occurs, implementation timeline extends beyond May 31
Assumption: Iranian restrictions continue without surprise deal
- Failure probability: ~6%
- Core demands (sanctions relief, nuclear deal) are substantial diplomatic undertakings
Assumption: “All international maritime LNG traffic” requires near-normal operations, not symbolic transits
- This interpretation appears correct based on resolution language
- The May 10 restricted-route Qatari shipment doesn’t constitute “reopening”
Timeline Analysis
- May 15 probability (per prediction markets): 0.5% – essentially zero
- May 31 probability (per prediction markets): 9.5%
- H2 2026 probability (industry consensus): Much higher, likely 50-70%
The probability distribution is heavily weighted toward later timeframes. Even optimistic scenarios place full reopening beyond May 31.
Base Rate Consideration
Historical precedent for rapid resolution of major maritime chokepoint closures due to active military conflict is extremely rare. The 2024 Houthi Red Sea disruptions have continued for over a year without full resolution. Major strait closures typically last months to years, not weeks.
Weighing Against Overconfidence
While conditions strongly suggest no reopening by May 31:
- Fast-moving geopolitical events can surprise
- The prediction market at 9.5% reflects genuine uncertainty
- I should not be overconfident in the “no” direction
However, the strict resolution criteria (“all international maritime LNG traffic” no longer “halted or severely restricted”) creates a high bar. Even significant easing would likely not trigger resolution.
Final Assessment
The combination of:
- Current severe restrictions (LNG at <5% of normal)
- Short 17-day window
- Industry consensus on H2 2026 reopening
- Substantial diplomatic requirements remaining unmet
- Implementation lag even after hypothetical breakthrough
…strongly suggests resolution is unlikely.
I’m weighing the prediction market signal (9.5%) but adjusting slightly downward due to the strict “all international maritime LNG traffic” requirement, which the current limited transits clearly don’t meet.
Probability: 7%
The extracted probability is: 7%
Gemini Binary response:
Forecasting Rationale
1. Analysis of the Current Situation (as of May 14, 2026)
The core of this forecast rests on the vast gap between the current state of affairs at the Strait of Hormuz and the conditions required for a “Yes” resolution. All available research indicates that while not hermetically sealed, the strait is operating under a “severe restriction.”
- Traffic Volume: Overall commercial traffic is down by over 90%, from a pre-conflict baseline of 150-170 vessels per day to a current rate of approximately 10.
- LNG Specifics: The situation for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers is even more dire. Data from April 2026 showed only two LNG crossings for the entire month. While a single Qatari LNG tanker, the Al Kharaitiyat, successfully transited on May 10, 2026, this appears to be an isolated and controlled event, using a specific Tehran-approved route, rather than a sign of a general reopening. This single transit does not negate the overall “severely restricted” status.
- Geopolitical Context: A ceasefire agreed to in April 2026 has failed to restore normalcy. In fact, after a brief and marginal increase in traffic, the numbers have fallen again. Iran’s conditions for a full reopening—including the lifting of sanctions and a revived nuclear deal—are substantial political hurdles unlikely to be cleared in the 17 days remaining until the resolution date. A previous attempt at reopening in mid-April collapsed within 24 hours, highlighting the situation’s extreme fragility.
2. The High Bar of the Resolution Criteria
The resolution criteria are strict and require two conditions to be met before May 31, 2026:
- Major news outlets must report the reopening.
- The traffic must be “no longer halted or severely restricted.”
A few test runs or a trickle of state-sanctioned vessels (like the May 10 Qatari tanker) would almost certainly not be reported by major outlets like Reuters or Bloomberg as a full reopening to “all international maritime LNG traffic.” Such reporting would only follow a clear, verifiable, and durable change in policy and a subsequent, significant ramp-up in commercial vessel transit.
3. Expert & Market Indicators
External indicators strongly support a low probability of resolution:
- Industry Forecasts: An executive from Baker Hughes, a major energy services firm, stated the company’s guidance assumes the strait will not fully reopen until the second half of 2026, reflecting deep industry skepticism about a near-term solution.
- Prediction Markets: A prediction market on the related question of traffic returning to normal (defined as 60+ daily transits) gives only a 9.5% probability for resolution by May 31. While the metric is different, the sentiment is clear and serves as a strong quantitative anchor. My forecast is slightly lower due to the stricter “all LNG traffic” wording of this specific question.
4. Key Assumptions & Probabilities
My forecast is based on three key assumptions:
- No Imminent Diplomatic Breakthrough (90% probability of being correct): I assume that the deep-seated political issues between Iran and the West will not be resolved in the next 17 days. The probability of this assumption being wrong (i.e., a sudden deal is struck) is my primary source of upside risk, estimated at 10%.
- Logistical & Insurance Lag (95% probability of being correct): I assume that even if a political deal were announced tomorrow, it would take more than the remaining time for insurers to restore coverage, for shipping companies to gain confidence, and for a significant volume of LNG traffic to physically resume. The failure of this assumption is highly unlikely.
- The Status Quo Persists (85% probability of being correct): I assume the current state of extremely limited, sporadic transits represents the baseline reality, and the May 10 transit was not the leading edge of a rapid reopening. The chance this is wrong and it was the start of a quick ramp-up is estimated at 15%.
Combining these factors, the path to a “Yes” resolution is exceptionally narrow. It would require a sudden, comprehensive political agreement that is immediately implemented and trusted by the global shipping industry. Given the evidence, this scenario is highly improbable within the specified timeframe. A forecast in the high single digits correctly balances the overwhelming evidence for ‘No’ with the small, non-zero chance of a rapid, unexpected geopolitical development.
Probability: 7%
The extracted probability is: 7%
Task failed with error: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 213, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 203, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 199, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 114, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1026, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
Task failed with error: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 213, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 203, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 199, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 114, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1026, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
Task failed with error: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 213, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 203, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 199, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 114, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1026, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 404 Client Error: Not Found for url: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
All predictions: [7, 7, 8, 8]
Filtered predictions: [7, 8]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning and Analysis
Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research, as of May 14, 2026:
- The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to commercial LNG traffic since late February/early March 2026 following the start of the Iran war
- Overall vessel traffic is at ~10 ships/day (versus normal 120-170 vessels/day) – only about 6-7% of normal
- LNG specifically: Only 2 crossings recorded in all of April 2026, and one limited Qatari LNG shipment on May 10 via a restricted northern route
- This single May 10 transit was through an Iranian-approved special route, not normal open operations
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires:
- Major news outlets reporting the strait has “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic”
- Traffic “no longer halted or severely restricted”
This is a high bar – not just occasional restricted transits, but full open access for all LNG traffic.
Key Evidence Against YES Resolution:
- Industry forecasts: Baker Hughes (April 24) explicitly expects no full reopening until H2 2026
- Traffic data: Near-zero LNG operations currently (essentially halted)
- Failed reopening attempts: Brief April 21-22 reopening collapsed within 24 hours
- Geopolitical deadlock: Iranian demands (sanctions lifting, nuclear deal) are complex and unresolved
- Prediction markets: 9.5% probability for May 31 normalization
Time Horizon Analysis
With only 17 days remaining:
- Major diplomatic breakthroughs rarely materialize this quickly
- Even if a deal were announced today, operational implementation takes time
- No evidence of imminent breakthrough in current negotiations
Key Assumptions and Failure Probabilities:
No major diplomatic breakthrough in next 17 days (~90% confident this holds)
- If wrong: Could enable faster reopening, but negotiations are complex
Iran maintains current restrictive stance (~92% confident this holds)
- Iran has strong leverage and unmet demands
Prediction market estimates are approximately calibrated (~85% confident)
- Market at 9.5% for May 31 provides useful signal
Probability Calculation:
- Base case (no major changes): ~92-95% probability of NO resolution
- Diplomatic breakthrough scenario: ~3-5% probability
- Iranian unilateral reversal: ~1-2% probability
- Other unforeseen events: ~1-2% probability
The prediction market signal of 9.5% seems slightly high given:
- The requirement for “all international maritime LNG traffic” is stringent
- Current LNG traffic is essentially zero
- Very limited time window
However, accounting for:
- My historical overconfidence
- Geopolitical uncertainty
- Black swan possibilities
The market estimate provides a reasonable anchor. Given the extremely restricted current state, the high bar for resolution, and only 17 days remaining, I estimate the probability is slightly lower than the market consensus but within the same range.
Probability: 8%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.075,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning and Analysis
Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research, as of May 14, 2026:
- The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to commercial LNG traffic since late February/early March 2026 following the start of the Iran war
- Overall vessel traffic is at ~10 ships/day (versus normal 120-170 vessels/day) – only about 6-7% of normal
- LNG specifically: Only 2 crossings recorded in all of April 2026, and one limited Qatari LNG shipment on May 10 via a restricted northern route
- This single May 10 transit was through an Iranian-approved special route, not normal open operations
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires:
- Major news outlets reporting the strait has “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic”
- Traffic “no longer halted or severely restricted”
This is a high bar – not just occasional restricted transits, but full open access for all LNG traffic.
Key Evidence Against YES Resolution:
- Industry forecasts: Baker Hughes (April 24) explicitly expects no full reopening until H2 2026
- Traffic data: Near-zero LNG operations currently (essentially halted)
- Failed reopening attempts: Brief April 21-22 reopening collapsed within 24 hours
- Geopolitical deadlock: Iranian demands (sanctions lifting, nuclear deal) are complex and unresolved
- Prediction markets: 9.5% probability for May 31 normalization
Time Horizon Analysis
With only 17 days remaining:
- Major diplomatic breakthroughs rarely materialize this quickly
- Even if a deal were announced today, operational implementation takes time
- No evidence of imminent breakthrough in current negotiations
Key Assumptions and Failure Probabilities:
No major diplomatic breakthrough in next 17 days (~90% confident this holds)
- If wrong: Could enable faster reopening, but negotiations are complex
Iran maintains current restrictive stance (~92% confident this holds)
- Iran has strong leverage and unmet demands
Prediction market estimates are approximately calibrated (~85% confident)
- Market at 9.5% for May 31 provides useful signal
Probability Calculation:
- Base case (no major changes): ~92-95% probability of NO resolution
- Diplomatic breakthrough scenario: ~3-5% probability
- Iranian unilateral reversal: ~1-2% probability
- Other unforeseen events: ~1-2% probability
The prediction market signal of 9.5% seems slightly high given:
- The requirement for “all international maritime LNG traffic” is stringent
- Current LNG traffic is essentially zero
- Very limited time window
However, accounting for:
- My historical overconfidence
- Geopolitical uncertainty
- Black swan possibilities
The market estimate provides a reasonable anchor. Given the extremely restricted current state, the high bar for resolution, and only 17 days remaining, I estimate the probability is slightly lower than the market consensus but within the same range.
