Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 3%

This is the full report. Condensed version here.

Perplexity response:

{think}
Let me analyze this carefully. The user is asking whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to all international maritime LNG traffic before May 1, 2026. Today is April 16, 2026, so that’s only 15 days away.

Looking at the search results provided:

From S&P Global (April 14 report): A dozen vessels transited the Strait on April 13, down from 19 the day before. This is during an active US blockade of Iran’s ports.
From Atlas Institute: This appears to be a policy analysis document discussing the 2026 US-Israel-Iran war, which is in its seventh week. Before the conflict escalated in late February 2026, there were 120-138 vessels/day. As of April 1, this had dropped to 16 vessels/day (an 88% decrease).

Key facts:

The conflict started escalating in late February 2026
By April 1, traffic was down 88% to only 16 vessels/day
By April 13-14, traffic was even lower (12-19 vessels/day)
Iranian forces are using mines, drones, fast-attack craft
There’s a US blockade of Iran’s ports
This is described as the “seventh week” of a US-Israel-Iran war
The situation is described as “heavily disrupted”

The question asks if the strait will “reopen to all international maritime LNG traffic” – meaning traffic is “no longer halted or severely restricted” – before May 1, 2026.

That’s 15 days from April 16. Given:

We’re in week 7 of an active military conflict
Traffic has dropped 88%
Iranian forces are actively employing mines, drones, and other military means
There’s a US blockade in place
The situation is described as “heavily disrupted”

The search results don’t indicate any resolution to the conflict is imminent.

The available information suggests ongoing military operations and sustained disruption. I should note that I have only two search results here, but my role typically calls for providing 10 citations with detailed context for superforecasters. The instructions indicate I should analyze what these specific search results show rather than conduct additional searches.

From these sources, I can identify the current situation and what factors would need to shift for resolution. However, there are significant gaps—the results don’t cover diplomatic initiatives, ceasefire discussions, expert timelines, or projections about when the conflict might conclude. I’ll work with what’s available while flagging these limitations.

Analysis of Available Information

Planning Note: To adequately answer this forecasting question, I would typically need sources covering: (1) current military/political status of the US-Israel-Iran conflict; (2) diplomatic negotiations or ceasefire prospects; (3) expert assessments of timeline for strait reopening; (4) latest vessel transit data; and (5) assessments from maritime insurance and shipping industry observers. The two search results provided offer limited coverage of these dimensions.

Summary of Provided Sources

Source	Title	Date	Key Content
[1] S&P Global	Strait of Hormuz traffic dips as US enacts blockade	April 14, 2026	As of April 13, only 12 vessels transited the Strait (down 7 from April 12). US blockade of Iran’s ports is in effect. First non-Iranian LPG cargo loads since March reported.
[2] Atlas Institute	Securing the Strait After the Storm: Policy Options for a GCC-Led Maritime Defence Coalition	April 2026 (date not specified)	The US-Israel-Iran conflict is in its seventh week. Pre-conflict baseline: 120-138 vessels/day. As of April 1: 16 vessels/day (88% decrease). Iranian forces employ mines, drones, fast-attack craft causing ongoing disruption. GCC seeking UN Security Council resolution for defensive measures.

Current Status Assessment

The most recent data indicates the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted with minimal LNG traffic[1][2]. As of mid-April 2026, daily transits have collapsed to approximately 12 vessels (compared to pre-conflict baseline of 120-138 vessels/day)[1][2]. The conflict is actively ongoing in its seventh week, with Iranian forces maintaining military pressure through mines, drones, and selective vessel interference[2]. A US blockade of Iranian ports is currently in effect[1].

The resolution criteria require the strait to be “no longer halted or severely restricted” before May 1, 2026—only 15 days away from the search date of April 16.

Critical Gaps in Available Information

The provided sources do not contain:

Current status of US-Israel-Iran conflict negotiations or ceasefire prospects
Expert assessments of likely timeline for conflict resolution
Recent statements from US, Israeli, or Iranian leadership regarding the strait
Updates from April 15-16, 2026
Shipping industry or maritime insurance sector assessments of reopening probability
Information on whether Iranian military assets maintaining the blockade remain active

To effectively forecast this question, additional sources on diplomatic developments, military status updates, and expert opinion from the past 24-48 hours would be essential.

Grok response:

[web:25] Hormuz at near standstill as Iran warns ships to keep to its … (Reuters)
Published: April 9, 2026
Ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz stood at well below 10% of normal volumes despite a recent ceasefire.[1] Iran has warned ships to adhere to specific protocols, limiting passages primarily to Iranian-linked vessels. No significant resumption of international LNG traffic reported.
[web:82] Iranian ships continue to cross Strait of Hormuz despite US blockade (The National)
Published: April 15, 2026
Data shows Iranian vessels moving through the waterway amid US claims of control, but overall traffic remains minimal. Non-Iranian commercial ships largely avoid the area. International LNG transits are absent from recent tracker data.
[web:43] US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: What do the numbers show? (France24)
Published: April 15, 2026
Only 388 commodity carriers passed through between March 1 and April 15, with 255 being oil and gas tankers, most Iranian-affiliated. This is far below pre-war averages of thousands monthly. No reports of unrestricted LNG traffic.
[web:42] How many ships have passed the Strait of Hormuz and how many were attacked? (Al Jazeera)
Published: April 15, 2026
Kpler ship-tracking data shows 279 ships transited from February 28 to April 12, drastically below pre-war levels. LNG tankers have faced halts or reversals, with none completing unrestricted international passages recently. Risks from mines and blockades persist.
[web:26] Traffic Through the Strait of Hormuz, April 11, 2026 (Institute for the Study of War)
Published: April 11, 2026
Mapped traffic between April 10 PM ET and April 11 2 PM ET shows sparse activity, dominated by limited tanker movements. No evidence of normalized LNG flows. Updates highlight ongoing restrictions post-ceasefire.
[web:65] Why US-Iran Ceasefire Hasn’t Led to Hormuz Reopening (Bloomberg)
Published: April 9, 2026
A 14-day truce conditional on Iran unblocking the strait has not increased shipping meaningfully. Just a handful of vessels tested passages, primarily Chinese. LNG exporters like Qatar report continued halts.
[web:81] The Iran war created a global natural gas shortage (NPR)
Published: April 14, 2026
Troubles in the Strait continue with US naval blockade on Iranian ports exacerbating LNG shortages. Qatar’s supplies disrupted, no full reopening. Global markets face ongoing volatility.
[web:53] Iran halts two Qatar LNG tankers it previously cleared to transit Strait of Hormuz (Reuters)
Published: April 6, 2026
Loaded Qatar LNG vessels retreated after nearing the strait per ship-tracking data. This follows earlier failed attempts by Japanese and other LNG tankers. Highlights severe restrictions on international LNG.
[web:21] Windward Daily Intelligence: Strait of Hormuz (Windward.ai)
Published: April 15, 2026
On April 15, 15 vessels transited—8 inbound, 7 outbound—with tankers dominating inbound but no unrestricted international LNG noted. Traffic steady but low compared to pre-war 100+ daily. Blockade and warnings limit broader access.
[web:34] US Blockade of Iranian Ports | Strait of Hormuz traffic barely affected first day (The Daily Star)
Published: April 15, 2026
Strait traffic remains far below pre-war levels despite US blockade start. Industry sources confirm minimal change, with LNG passage halted. Updates as of April 15 show no normalization.

Current Status of Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic

As of April 16, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for international maritime traffic, particularly LNG tankers, due to the ongoing Iran war that began in late February 2026 with US-Israeli strikes.[2][3] Iran initially blocked the strait, followed by a US naval blockade on Iranian ports starting around April 13, which has not led to increased non-Iranian traffic.[4][5] Ship-tracking data from sources like Kpler, ISW, and Windward indicate daily transits at 10-15 vessels recently (e.g., 15 on April 15), mostly Iranian-linked tankers, compared to pre-war averages of over 100 merchant ships daily, with ~20% of global LNG previously flowing through.[6][7][1]

Recent Traffic Data and LNG-Specific Incidents

March 1 – April 15, 2026: Only 388 commodity carriers total, 255 oil/gas tankers (mostly Iranian), per France24 analysis.[8]
April 6: Two Qatar LNG tankers halted and turned back despite prior clearance; similar for Japanese LNG earlier.[9]
April 11: ISW tracker shows limited traffic, no LNG breakthroughs.[10]
April 15: Windward reports 15 transits, inbound tankers but no confirmed international LNG; US blockade minimally impacted already low flows.[6][11]
Pre-war (2025 EIA data): Strait handled ~20% global LNG, with peaks from Qatar/UAE; current flows near zero for non-Iranian LNG.[12]

A ceasefire around early April failed to reopen the strait fully, with traffic briefly rising to “highest in weeks” (e.g., April 7) but still <10% normal and no LNG normalization.[13][14] Iran issued protocols for “alternative routes” hugging its coast, but shippers report GPS jamming, mines, and warnings deterring use.[15][16][17]

War Context and Disruptions

The conflict escalated after US-Israeli strikes on Iran (March 2026), prompting Hormuz closure; Iran retaliated against Qatar LNG facilities indirectly.[18] Recent US blockade aims to pressure Iran but risks further LNG shortages, with global prices up and fertilizer/chemical exports halted (urea via Hormuz affected).[19][20] Trackers like HormuzTracker and MarineTraffic show stranded vessels and cautious tests (e.g., Chinese tankers April 9).[21][22]

Expert and Industry Views

Shipping firms seek “clarity” post-ceasefire but remain optimistic only cautiously; no major outlet reports full LNG reopening.[23][24] Analysts note US blockade backfire risks but highlight minimal traffic change.[25] Recent X posts (April 15-16) confirm closures persist, with tankers turning back.[26][27]

No major news (Reuters, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, etc.) has reported the strait “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” as of April 16; restrictions continue with no clear path to full access before May 1.[1][5]

Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]

Anthropic Binary response:

Reasoning

Current Situation Summary:
As of April 16, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for international LNG traffic. We are in approximately the 7th week of an active US-Israel-Iran war. Daily vessel transits are ~12-15 (vs. pre-war 100-138), with near-zero non-Iranian LNG passage. Key recent developments:

April 6: Qatar LNG tankers halted and turned back despite prior clearance
April 9: A ceasefire failed to meaningfully increase traffic; still <10% of normal
April 13: US imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports (escalation, not de-escalation)
April 15: Only 15 vessels transited; no confirmed international LNG
Iranian forces maintain mines, drones, GPS jamming, and fast-attack craft presence

What Would Need to Happen in 15 Days:

Comprehensive ceasefire/peace agreement signed AND implemented
Mine clearance operations completed (typically takes weeks to months)
Iran standing down all naval/military threats
Maritime insurance companies resuming coverage for LNG tankers
Removal of US blockade or its conditions met
Qatar and other LNG exporters resuming shipments

Critical Assumptions & Their Failure Probabilities:

Assumption	Probability of Failure	Impact
No comprehensive peace deal in 15 days	~95-97% likely NO deal	Would prevent reopening
Mine clearing takes >15 days even after agreement	~98% true	Physical barrier to “all traffic”
US blockade continues or escalates	~85% likely	Prevents normalization

Timeline Analysis:

Probability of reopening by May 1 (15 days): ~2-3%
Probability of reopening by June 1 (45 days): ~8-12%
Probability of reopening by September 1 (4.5 months): ~20-30%

The early April ceasefire already demonstrated that even diplomatic breakthroughs don’t immediately translate to strait reopening. The US blockade starting April 13 represents an escalation, moving the situation further from resolution. The resolution criteria requires traffic to be “no longer halted or severely restricted” — an extremely high bar given physical obstacles (mines), ongoing military positioning, and insurance/commercial barriers.

Even if a miraculous diplomatic breakthrough occurred tomorrow (April 17), the physical and logistical requirements for full LNG reopening (mine clearing, insurance, commercial readiness) would almost certainly extend beyond May 1.

Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%

Anthropic Binary response:

Forecasting: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to LNG Traffic Before May 1, 2026

Situation Assessment

The evidence is overwhelmingly clear that the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted as of April 16, 2026:

Traffic at ~10% of pre-war levels: 12-15 vessels/day vs. 120-138 pre-war
LNG specifically halted: Qatar LNG tankers turned back as recently as April 6; no confirmed international LNG transits
Active military operations: US blockade of Iranian ports started ~April 13; Iranian mines, drones, GPS jamming persist
Failed ceasefire precedent: An early April ceasefire did NOT lead to reopening — traffic remained below 10% of normal
Only 15 days remain until resolution deadline

Key Assumptions and Their Failure Probabilities

Assumption 1: No comprehensive peace deal will be reached AND implemented in 15 days

A ceasefire already failed to reopen the strait. A new deal would need to be far more comprehensive, including mine clearance protocols and security guarantees.
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~4%

Assumption 2: Physical obstacles (mines, military assets) prevent rapid reopening even with political agreement

Mine clearance operations typically take weeks to months. Even if a deal were struck tomorrow, achieving “all international maritime LNG traffic” by May 1 is operationally near-impossible.
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~2%

Assumption 3: Maritime insurers and shipping companies won’t resume LNG transits without verified safety

War risk insurance, company policies, and crew safety concerns create additional lag even after military conditions improve.
Probability this assumption is wrong: ~3%

Timeline Analysis

Probability of full LNG reopening by May 1 (15 days): ~3%
Probability of full LNG reopening by June 1 (46 days): ~10%
Probability of full LNG reopening by September 1 (~5 months): ~25%
Probability of full LNG reopening by end of 2026: ~40%

Reasoning

The current trajectory is strongly against reopening. The conflict is escalating (US blockade), not de-escalating. A prior ceasefire failed. Physical barriers (mines) require extended clearance. No major news outlet reports progress toward reopening. The 15-day window is extremely short for the kind of dramatic military, diplomatic, and operational changes needed. Even an optimistic scenario (surprise peace deal in the next few days) would likely not result in “all international maritime LNG traffic” resuming before May 1 due to mine clearance, insurance, and operational logistics.

The only scenario yielding “Yes” would be an immediate, comprehensive peace deal with Iran voluntarily clearing mines and providing security guarantees, with shipping companies immediately resuming LNG transits — all within ~2 weeks. Given the failed ceasefire precedent and ongoing escalation, this is extremely unlikely.

Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%

Gemini Binary response:

Forecasting Rationale

1. Assessment of the Current Situation (as of April 16, 2026):
The Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed to international LNG traffic. All available evidence points to a state of severe restriction.

Traffic Volume: Daily vessel transits are down by approximately 90% from the pre-war baseline of 100-138 vessels to just 10-15 vessels per day. This minimal traffic consists overwhelmingly of Iranian-affiliated vessels.
LNG-Specific Blockade: International LNG tankers, particularly from major exporters like Qatar, have been explicitly blocked or have retreated after attempting transit. There are no reports of any successful international LNG transits since the conflict escalated.
Active Military Conflict: The situation is not a passive blockade but an active war zone, now in its seventh week. Iran is employing mines, GPS jamming, and drone threats, while the U.S. has instituted its own naval blockade of Iranian ports. This creates a high-risk environment that insurers and shipping companies are avoiding.

2. Analysis of the Path to a “Yes” Resolution:
For the strait to reopen to “all international maritime LNG traffic” and be “no longer… severely restricted” by May 1, 2026 (a 15-day window), an extraordinary and rapid series of events would need to unfold:

Comprehensive Ceasefire/Peace Agreement: A durable political resolution to the US-Israel-Iran war would be a prerequisite.
Military De-escalation & Guarantees: Both the US and Iran would need to lift their respective blockades and provide credible security guarantees to international shipping.
Mine Clearance and Safety Verification: The strait would need to be swept for mines and declared safe, a process that takes time.
Resumption of Insurance Coverage: Maritime insurers, who have effectively red-lined the area, would need to restore coverage at reasonable premiums.
Traffic Normalization: LNG fleets would have to be re-routed, and traffic would need to resume at a scale that could no longer be described as “severely restricted.”

3. Key Factors Influencing the Forecast:

Extremely Short Timeline: A 15-day window is exceptionally short for resolving a major international conflict and its complex logistical aftermath. The default assumption in forecasting is that the immediate future will resemble the present, and the present is a state of severe disruption.
Failed Precedent: A ceasefire in early April failed to reopen the strait meaningfully. Despite a diplomatic effort, traffic remained under 10% of normal, and LNG did not resume. This is a powerful signal that even a halt in fighting does not immediately translate to commercial reopening.
High Bar of Resolution Criteria: The criteria demand a reopening for “all international maritime LNG traffic” and an end to “severe” restrictions. The passage of a single symbolic LNG tanker would be insufficient to meet this threshold.

4. Identification and Weighting of Assumptions:

Primary Assumption: The core assumption is that there is no secret, imminent peace deal that will be announced and implemented in the next 15 days. The probability of this assumption failing (i.e., a surprise peace deal materializes) is the primary source of any upside probability. Given the lack of any supporting intelligence or rumors of de-escalation, the probability of this assumption failing is very low.
Secondary Assumption: I assume the resolution will be judged on a substantive return to normalcy, not a minor technicality. The phrasing “no longer…severely restricted” supports this, making a “Yes” resolution based on one or two ships passing highly unlikely.

Conclusion:
The path to reopening the Strait of Hormuz in the next 15 days is fraught with military, political, and logistical obstacles that are nearly insurmountable in such a short timeframe. The state of active conflict, the demonstrated failure of a recent ceasefire to restore traffic, and the high bar set by the resolution criteria all point overwhelmingly toward a “No” resolution. The probability, while not absolute zero to account for unforeseeable “black swan” diplomatic events, is extremely low.

Probability: 3%

The extracted probability is: 3%

Anthropic Binary response:

Reasoning and Analysis

Current Situation Summary

As of April 16, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is in the midst of severe disruption due to the ongoing US-Israel-Iran war, now in its 7th week. The key data points:

Traffic collapse: Daily transits at 12-15 vessels vs. pre-war baseline of 120-138 vessels/day (~90% drop)
LNG specifically blocked: Qatar LNG tankers halted and turned back as recently as April 6; Japanese LNG tankers similarly failed; non-Iranian LNG traffic is essentially zero
Recent escalation: US enacted a naval blockade of Iranian ports starting ~April 13 — an escalation, not de-escalation
Failed ceasefire: A 14-day truce around early April did NOT lead to meaningful reopening; traffic remained <10% of normal
Physical hazards persist: Mines, drones, fast-attack craft, GPS jamming all documented in the strait
No major outlet reports any path to imminent reopening

What Would Need to Happen in 15 Days

For YES resolution, all of these would need to occur before May 1:

A comprehensive ceasefire or peace agreement
Iran standing down military assets in/around the strait
Mine clearance operations (historically takes weeks to months)
Maritime insurance companies reinstating coverage for LNG tankers
Shipping companies deploying LNG vessels and completing transits
Major news outlets confirming the strait is “no longer halted or severely restricted”

Key Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

Assumption	Probability of Failure	Impact
No comprehensive peace deal in 15 days	~5% chance a deal happens	Would be necessary but not sufficient
Physical reopening takes weeks even after political resolution	~10% chance of rapid clearance	Mine clearance alone is a multi-week process
Resolution criteria (“all international maritime LNG traffic”) is a very high bar	~5% chance partial reopening counts	Criteria explicitly says “no longer halted or severely restricted”

Timeline Analysis

Within 15 days (by May 1): Requires near-miraculous convergence of political resolution + physical clearance + industry response. ~2%
Within 3 months (by July 2026): More plausible if conflict ends soon. ~15-25%
Within 1 year (by April 2027): Historical precedent suggests eventual resolution. ~50-65%

Combined Assessment

P(YES) ≈ P(political resolution in 15 days) × P(physical reopening possible in remaining time) × P(meets strict “all LNG traffic” criteria)
≈ 0.05 × 0.15 × 0.50 ≈ 0.4% (Carolyn‘s note: The correct answer is 0.375%)

Adjusting upward slightly for unknown-unknowns (sudden Iranian capitulation, dramatic diplomatic breakthrough), but noting the recent US escalation (blockade) works strongly against this.

The default trajectory is continued severe restriction through May 1, with overwhelming evidence supporting this baseline.

Probability: 2%
The extracted probability is: 2%

GPT Binary response:

The case for No is strong because the resolution bar is high and the time window is very short.

What must happen for Yes: before May 1, major news outlets must report that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic, meaning LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted.
Current state is nowhere close to that bar: the latest cited reporting shows traffic still at roughly 10-15 vessels/day versus a prewar baseline above 100/day, with LNG traffic especially impaired. Reuters, Bloomberg-adjacent summaries, Al Jazeera, France24, Windward, and others all describe continuing severe restriction, failed LNG transits, and continued deterrents from mines, warnings, blockade dynamics, and insurer/shipping caution.
Ceasefire evidence cuts against quick normalization: there was already a ceasefire/truce episode in early April, and it did not produce meaningful reopening. That is important: a key “good news” catalyst has already been tested and found insufficient.
LNG is the hardest segment to restart: even if some tankers move, “all international maritime LNG traffic” implies broad restoration, not a few pilot passages or Iranian-linked shipping. LNG requires shipowner, insurer, naval-security, and port-chain confidence. Those frictions usually lag politics.
Only 15 days remain: for a Yes, you likely need a rapid sequence of: durable de-escalation, practical maritime safety arrangements, de-mining or credible corridor assurance, insurer acceptance, and then media characterization as full reopening. That is possible, but compressed.

How I weight the evidence:

Highest weight: Reuters Apr 6/9, April 14-15 shipping/tracker summaries, Windward/ISW/Kpler-type traffic data, because they are recent and directly about actual traffic.
Medium weight: Bloomberg/NPR/industry commentary on why ceasefire has not reopened traffic.
Lower weight: broader policy analysis pieces, because they are less directly tied to the resolution trigger.

Base-rate / timing view:

Maritime chokepoint reopenings during active conflict often occur in phases: partial tests, escorted passages, limited national exemptions, then broader commercial return. The question needs something closer to the final stage, and in under two weeks.
If this question were instead “some international LNG traffic resumes,” the odds would be meaningfully higher. But “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” is much stricter.

Key assumptions that could most change the forecast:

Assumption: No sudden comprehensive maritime deal emerges in the next two weeks.
Chance this assumption is wrong: 15%.
If wrong, odds rise substantially.
Assumption: Even with political de-escalation, operational/insurance barriers prevent full LNG normalization before May 1.
Chance this assumption is wrong: 20%.
This is the biggest practical bottleneck.
Assumption: Major outlets will use the phrase/meaning of full reopening only if restrictions are genuinely no longer severe.
Chance this assumption is wrong: 10%.
If media use looser language, the Yes chance is a bit higher.

Rough timeline sense:

By about one week from now: very low.
By May 1: still low, but not negligible.
By June 1: materially higher than by May 1, because the current obstacle is mostly short-horizon compression.

Putting it together, I think the most likely outcome is continued severe restriction through the deadline, with maybe some incremental vessel movement but not a full “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” judgment from major outlets.

Probability: 6%

The extracted probability is: 6%

GPT Binary response:

The base case is strongly No over the next 15 days.

Why:

The most recent reporting says the Strait is still operating at a tiny fraction of normal traffic: roughly 10-15 vessels/day versus a prewar baseline around 120-138/day.
Multiple recent sources specifically indicate that international LNG traffic has not resumed normally. Qatar LNG tankers were turned back on April 6, and as of April 15 there was still no evidence of unrestricted international LNG passage.
A recent ceasefire already failed to produce meaningful reopening. Reuters/Bloomberg-style reporting describes traffic as still near standstill even after the truce.
The resolution bar is fairly high: not just “some ships got through,” but that major outlets report the Strait has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic, meaning traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted. That likely requires not only a political decision, but enough operational confidence from navies, insurers, shipowners, and LNG exporters to treat passage as broadly open.
With mines, warnings/protocols, GPS disruption, and the added complication of a US blockade of Iranian ports, even a sudden diplomatic improvement would not automatically produce a “fully reopened” headline within days.

Time matters a lot here. If there were several months left, the odds would be materially higher. But with only about two weeks remaining, the default state has to dominate.

Useful timeline check:

Reopen by about April 22: very low, around 2-3%
Reopen by May 1: somewhat higher, but still low because there are only two more weeks for a major military/diplomatic reversal plus practical normalization
Reopen by June 1: much higher than the May 1 number, because there is time for ceasefire implementation, demining, and insurer confidence to rebuild

Key assumptions that could most change the forecast:

No imminent comprehensive de-escalation deal

Assumption: there will not be a sudden agreement that simultaneously removes Iranian restrictions and makes the US blockade irrelevant or lifted for commercial transit.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 15%
If wrong, the forecast rises substantially.

Operational normalization takes longer than a political announcement

Assumption: even if leaders announce reopening, LNG traffic will still not be judged by major outlets as fully reopened to all international traffic before May 1.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 25%
This is the biggest source of “hidden Yes” risk.

Resolution wording will be interpreted strictly

Assumption: “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” will require broad, credible reopening, not just isolated escorted transits.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 20%
If outlets use looser language after a partial breakthrough, Yes becomes more plausible.

Putting that together: current conditions are far from the threshold, the window is extremely short, and even positive developments would need to be both rapid and operationally convincing. I therefore land in the high-single-digits rather than near-zero, mainly to allow for tail-risk diplomatic breakthroughs and looser media characterization.

Probability: 8%

The extracted probability is: 8%

GPT Binary response:

The case for No is strong because the bar is high, the time left is very short, and the current state is still far from the resolution threshold.

Key points I’m weighting most:

Very little time remains: only about two weeks.
Current traffic is still deeply abnormal: recent reporting puts total Strait traffic around 10-15 vessels/day, versus 100+ daily prewar, with LNG especially constrained.
LNG is not merely reduced; it appears effectively still blocked for normal international movement: Reuters and others report Qatar LNG tankers turning back, no unrestricted international LNG passages, and post-ceasefire traffic still well below 10% of normal.
A ceasefire already failed to produce reopening: that is important. It suggests the problem is not just headline diplomacy, but also mines, routing controls, inspections/protocols, naval coercion, insurance, and shipowner risk tolerance.
Resolution wording is demanding: not “some LNG got through,” but that the Strait has “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic,” meaning traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted. That likely requires clear, broad media reporting of normalization, not a few escorted exceptions.

Why it is not near zero:

In wartime chokepoints, things can change discontinuously.
There is clear economic pressure from Qatar and global gas markets.
A rapid political/military deal plus naval guarantees could, in principle, lead outlets to describe the strait as reopened even before traffic fully normalizes numerically.

But for a Yes by May 1, several things likely need to happen almost at once:

meaningful de-escalation or a more durable deal,
practical removal or mitigation of operational threats,
insurer/shipowner confidence returning fast enough for LNG traffic to resume,
major outlets characterizing the result as a reopening to all international LNG traffic.

That is a narrow path in 15 days.

My most decision-relevant assumptions:

The conflict/blockade environment will not de-escalate enough before May 1 to permit normal LNG passage.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 15%.
Even if politics improve, mines/insurance/risk protocols will keep LNG traffic severely restricted through May 1.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 35%.
Resolvers will require clear evidence of broad reopening, not isolated or convoyed LNG transits.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 20%.

Rough scenario split:

Status quo / continued severe restriction: 72%
Partial improvement, but not enough for resolution: 20%
Rapid full reopening meeting the wording: 5%
Ambiguous media framing produces a Yes despite incomplete normalization: 3%

That gets me to a low single-digit-to-high single-digit Yes probability. Given the short horizon, current evidence, and my desire to avoid overconfidence, I land near the middle of that range.

Probability: 8%

The extracted probability is: 8%

All predictions: [2, 3, 3, 3, 6, 8, 8]
Filtered predictions: [3, 3, 6]

Median reasoning:
Forecasting Rationale

Traffic Volume: Daily vessel transits are down by approximately 90% from the pre-war baseline of 100-138 vessels to just 10-15 vessels per day. This minimal traffic consists overwhelmingly of Iranian-affiliated vessels.
LNG-Specific Blockade: International LNG tankers, particularly from major exporters like Qatar, have been explicitly blocked or have retreated after attempting transit. There are no reports of any successful international LNG transits since the conflict escalated.
Active Military Conflict: The situation is not a passive blockade but an active war zone, now in its seventh week. Iran is employing mines, GPS jamming, and drone threats, while the U.S. has instituted its own naval blockade of Iranian ports. This creates a high-risk environment that insurers and shipping companies are avoiding.

Comprehensive Ceasefire/Peace Agreement: A durable political resolution to the US-Israel-Iran war would be a prerequisite.
Military De-escalation & Guarantees: Both the US and Iran would need to lift their respective blockades and provide credible security guarantees to international shipping.
Mine Clearance and Safety Verification: The strait would need to be swept for mines and declared safe, a process that takes time.
Resumption of Insurance Coverage: Maritime insurers, who have effectively red-lined the area, would need to restore coverage at reasonable premiums.
Traffic Normalization: LNG fleets would have to be re-routed, and traffic would need to resume at a scale that could no longer be described as “severely restricted.”

3. Key Factors Influencing the Forecast:

Extremely Short Timeline: A 15-day window is exceptionally short for resolving a major international conflict and its complex logistical aftermath. The default assumption in forecasting is that the immediate future will resemble the present, and the present is a state of severe disruption.
Failed Precedent: A ceasefire in early April failed to reopen the strait meaningfully. Despite a diplomatic effort, traffic remained under 10% of normal, and LNG did not resume. This is a powerful signal that even a halt in fighting does not immediately translate to commercial reopening.
High Bar of Resolution Criteria: The criteria demand a reopening for “all international maritime LNG traffic” and an end to “severe” restrictions. The passage of a single symbolic LNG tanker would be insufficient to meet this threshold.

4. Identification and Weighting of Assumptions:

Primary Assumption: The core assumption is that there is no secret, imminent peace deal that will be announced and implemented in the next 15 days. The probability of this assumption failing (i.e., a surprise peace deal materializes) is the primary source of any upside probability. Given the lack of any supporting intelligence or rumors of de-escalation, the probability of this assumption failing is very low.
Secondary Assumption: I assume the resolution will be judged on a substantive return to normalcy, not a minor technicality. The phrasing “no longer…severely restricted” supports this, making a “Yes” resolution based on one or two ships passing highly unlikely.

Probability: 3%

=== Forecast Result ===

{
“probability_yes”: 0.04,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}

=== Reasoning ===
Forecasting Rationale

Traffic Volume: Daily vessel transits are down by approximately 90% from the pre-war baseline of 100-138 vessels to just 10-15 vessels per day. This minimal traffic consists overwhelmingly of Iranian-affiliated vessels.
LNG-Specific Blockade: International LNG tankers, particularly from major exporters like Qatar, have been explicitly blocked or have retreated after attempting transit. There are no reports of any successful international LNG transits since the conflict escalated.
Active Military Conflict: The situation is not a passive blockade but an active war zone, now in its seventh week. Iran is employing mines, GPS jamming, and drone threats, while the U.S. has instituted its own naval blockade of Iranian ports. This creates a high-risk environment that insurers and shipping companies are avoiding.

Comprehensive Ceasefire/Peace Agreement: A durable political resolution to the US-Israel-Iran war would be a prerequisite.
Military De-escalation & Guarantees: Both the US and Iran would need to lift their respective blockades and provide credible security guarantees to international shipping.
Mine Clearance and Safety Verification: The strait would need to be swept for mines and declared safe, a process that takes time.
Resumption of Insurance Coverage: Maritime insurers, who have effectively red-lined the area, would need to restore coverage at reasonable premiums.
Traffic Normalization: LNG fleets would have to be re-routed, and traffic would need to resume at a scale that could no longer be described as “severely restricted.”

3. Key Factors Influencing the Forecast:

Extremely Short Timeline: A 15-day window is exceptionally short for resolving a major international conflict and its complex logistical aftermath. The default assumption in forecasting is that the immediate future will resemble the present, and the present is a state of severe disruption.
Failed Precedent: A ceasefire in early April failed to reopen the strait meaningfully. Despite a diplomatic effort, traffic remained under 10% of normal, and LNG did not resume. This is a powerful signal that even a halt in fighting does not immediately translate to commercial reopening.
High Bar of Resolution Criteria: The criteria demand a reopening for “all international maritime LNG traffic” and an end to “severe” restrictions. The passage of a single symbolic LNG tanker would be insufficient to meet this threshold.

4. Identification and Weighting of Assumptions:

Primary Assumption: The core assumption is that there is no secret, imminent peace deal that will be announced and implemented in the next 15 days. The probability of this assumption failing (i.e., a surprise peace deal materializes) is the primary source of any upside probability. Given the lack of any supporting intelligence or rumors of de-escalation, the probability of this assumption failing is very low.
Secondary Assumption: I assume the resolution will be judged on a substantive return to normalcy, not a minor technicality. The phrasing “no longer…severely restricted” supports this, making a “Yes” resolution based on one or two ships passing highly unlikely.

Probability: 3%

End

Will the Strait of Hormuz reopen to all LNG traffic before May 2026?

Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 3%

Perplexity response:

Analysis of Available Information

Summary of Provided Sources

Current Status Assessment

Critical Gaps in Available Information

Grok response:

Current Status of Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic

Recent Traffic Data and LNG-Specific Incidents

War Context and Disruptions

Expert and Industry Views

Anthropic Binary response:

Reasoning

Anthropic Binary response:

Forecasting: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to LNG Traffic Before May 1, 2026

Situation Assessment

Key Assumptions and Their Failure Probabilities

Timeline Analysis

Reasoning

Gemini Binary response:

Anthropic Binary response:

Reasoning and Analysis

Current Situation Summary

What Would Need to Happen in 15 Days

Key Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

Timeline Analysis

Combined Assessment

GPT Binary response:

GPT Binary response:

GPT Binary response:

=== Forecast Result ===

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