Map of the Strait of Hormuz. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hormuz_map.png
Phillip Godzin‘s pgodzinai forecasts 3%
This is the full report. Condensed version here.
Perplexity response:
# Planning and Analysis
To effectively assess whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to “all international maritime LNG traffic” by May 1, 2026 (22 days away), I need to evaluate:
- Current status of the ceasefire and its terms/duration
- Industry expert timelines for full restoration of normal operations
- Specific restrictions and conditions that might prevent “all international” traffic
- Outstanding uncertainties that could delay reopening
The provided search results contain 2 primary sources discussing the April 8, 2026 ceasefire announcement. Given the limited search results provided, here is the relevant information available:
Key Citations Summary
Citation 1: Marine Link – “Shippers Look For Clarity on Reopening Hormuz After US-Iran Ceasefire”
- Published: April 8, 2026
- Describes shipper caution following the ceasefire announcement; notes that a six-week conflict had brought traffic through the strait (handling ~20% of global oil and LNG shipments) to near-standstill. First vessels have begun transiting with Iranian permission, but major shipping companies remain cautious due to unclear terms and new requirements including military coordination and potential transit fees.
Citation 2: Euronews Business – “Shipping companies seek clarity on Strait of Hormuz reopening”
- Published: April 8, 2026
- Details that Hapag-Lloyd CEO Rolf Habben-Jansen stated it would take “at least six weeks” for the firm to regain fully normal operations, with approximately 1,000 merchant ships remaining stuck in the Persian Gulf. Describes the ceasefire as a “two-week period” with broader talks scheduled in Islamabad on Friday, and notes that Iran and Oman are expected to charge new transit fees.
Context for Forecasting
Critical Timeline Constraints:
The ceasefire is explicitly described as a two-week arrangement with talks continuing in Islamabad, meaning the initial window extends only to approximately April 22, 2026—nine days before the May 1 resolution date.[1][2]
Industry Expert Assessment:
Hapag-Lloyd’s CEO stated restoration to normal operations would require at least six to eight weeks, which would place full normalization around late May or early June 2026—beyond the May 1 deadline.[1][2]
Remaining Obstacles to “All International” Traffic:
- Military coordination requirements: Iran stated safe passage would require coordination with its Armed Forces, and Iranian coastguards warned that vessels transiting without permission would be “targeted and destroyed”[1]
- New transit fees: Both Iran and Oman are expected to charge fees, a departure from the previous toll-free status, requiring agreement on terms[2]
- Persistent uncertainty: Major operators Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd emphasized they cannot make operational decisions until full clarity on conditions is obtained[1][2]
- Approximately 1,000 vessels still stuck in the Persian Gulf, requiring extended time to clear[2]
Likelihood Assessment Indicators:
The resolution criteria require “all international maritime LNG traffic” to be “no longer halted or severely restricted.” The current evidence suggests that by May 1, 2026, traffic will likely remain under tightly regulated, restricted conditions rather than restored to unrestricted “all international” status, given the 6-8 week industry timeline and the fluid nature of ongoing negotiations.
Grok response:
- Title: Iran amplifies LNG shortage by blocking passages through Hormuz
Description: Article from Mining Weekly on Iran’s refusal to allow LNG carriers through the strait.
Published: April 7, 2026
Summary: Iran has yet to allow a single carrier loaded with liquefied natural gas (LNG) to pass through the Strait of Hormuz in weeks amid the ongoing war. Loaded LNG carriers are currently scattered around the Persian Gulf, either awaiting approval or not part of transit talks. This restriction has exacerbated global LNG shortages, with ship-tracking data showing over a dozen loaded LNG tankers idling in the area.[1] - Title: Strait of Hormuz traffic highest in weeks, but Qatar LNG vessels make U-turn
Description: Seeking Alpha report on recent traffic uptick but LNG setbacks.
Published: April 6, 2026
Summary: Vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz reached its highest level in weeks, but two Qatar LNG vessels aborted their transit and turned back. No LNG cargo has successfully passed since late February. This follows Iranian Revolutionary Guards halting the tankers despite prior clearance.[2] - Title: Is Strait of Hormuz Open Again? Maybe, but Few Ships Are Risking It
Description: New York Times analysis post-ceasefire on limited traffic.
Published: April 8, 2026
Summary: Despite a US-Iran ceasefire announcement, few ships are transiting the Strait of Hormuz, with maritime data showing minimal movement. Iran requires permissions and inspections, keeping traffic far below normal. No LNG vessels have been reported passing since the war began.[3] - Title: Strait of Hormuz ship traffic remains at standstill despite ceasefire
Description: ABC News report on post-ceasefire traffic data.
Published: April 9, 2026
Summary: Traffic through the Strait remains effectively at a standstill 24 hours after Iran conditionally lifted its blockade. Marine tracking shows no significant increase, with hundreds of vessels still queued. LNG traffic specifically shows zero transits in recent days.[4] - Title: Shippers seek clarity on Hormuz passage as Iran issues warnings
Description: Reuters on shipping industry caution after ceasefire.
Published: April 8, 2026
Summary: Daily shipping traffic has fallen to less than 10% of historical averages since the war’s start, with shippers awaiting clear signals on safe passage. Iranian radio warnings demand Sepah navy permission for transits. No unrestricted LNG flow has resumed.[5] - Title: Hormuz Stays Blocked for Now as Hundreds of Ships Seek Escape
Description: Bloomberg update on post-ceasefire blockages.
Published: April 8, 2026
Summary: The Strait remained largely blocked even after the ceasefire, with only three ships observed leaving the region. Hundreds of tankers and gas carriers are stranded in the Persian Gulf. Iran has imposed conditions including tolls and inspections, preventing full reopening.[6] - Title: Hormuz crisis: 220 vessels transited waterway in March, tankers dominate as LNG traffic drops to zero
Description: News24Online on March transit statistics.
Published: April 3, 2026
Summary: Only 220 vessels transited the Strait in March, dominated by tankers, while LNG traffic fell to zero—the first such month on record. This compares to pre-war averages of over 3,000 monthly transits. Stranded LNG cargoes from Qatar continue to impact global markets.[7] - Title: No LNG Ships Passed Through Hormuz in March, Trackers Say
Description: Wall Street Journal citing TankerTrackers.com data.
Published: April 1, 2026
Summary: Not a single LNG tanker departed via the Strait of Hormuz during March 2026, per ship-tracking analysis. This halt represents about 20% of global LNG trade. Pre-war daily transits averaged dozens of LNG carriers.[8] - Title: Iran halts two Qatar LNG tankers it previously cleared to transit Strait of Hormuz
Description: Reuters on specific LNG incidents.
Published: April 6, 2026
Summary: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards halted two Qatar LNG tankers near the Strait despite prior US-mediated clearance. The vessels retreated, marking continued restrictions. No loaded LNG has transited since the February war onset.[9] - Title: UAE Energy Minister: Strait of Hormuz access restricted, not open
Description: X post from Hormuz Watch citing UAE official statement.
Published: April 9, 2026
Summary: UAE Energy Minister Sultan Al Jaber stated the Strait is restricted and controlled, not fully open; conditional passage does not equate to free access. Over 400 tankers, 34 LPG, and 19 LNG vessels remain trapped. Traffic data confirms minimal exits, none for LNG.[10]
Current Status and Recent Developments
The Strait of Hormuz has been largely closed or severely restricted to commercial shipping, particularly LNG tankers, since late February 2026 following the outbreak of the US-Israel-Iran war, when Iranian forces declared it closed and attacked vessels.[11][12] Pre-war, the strait handled about 20% of global LNG trade, with dozens of LNG carriers transiting daily; in March 2026, zero LNG transits were recorded, and this persists into April with no loaded LNG carriers passing despite a fragile US-Iran ceasefire announced around April 7-8.[8][7] As of April 9, 2026, marine traffic data from sources like MarineTraffic and TankerTrackers.com shows daily transits at 4-12 vessels (mostly bulk carriers or select oil tankers), a fraction of the normal 100-140, with over 426 oil tankers, 34 LPG carriers, and 19 LNG vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf.[13][14]
A two-week ceasefire tied to strait access has led to cautious optimism, but implementation falters: Iran demands vessel inspections, Sepah navy permissions, and reported tolls (up to $2M per tanker in cryptocurrency), while recent Israeli strikes in Lebanon prompted further halts.[5][15] Qatar LNG vessels cleared then turned back on April 6, and no LNG has exited post-ceasefire; shipping firms report radio warnings and U-turns.[9][16] The US White House claims the strait is open, but major outlets like Reuters, Bloomberg, NYT, and ABC describe it as still blocked or restricted, with traffic at multi-week highs but “standstill” levels—no reports confirm “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” without severe restrictions.[4][6]
Historical and Statistical Context
- Pre-war baselines (2025 data): ~21 million b/d oil, 10-11 Bcf/d LNG through Hormuz; ~3,000-4,000 monthly vessel transits.[17]
- March 2026: 220 total transits (51% liquid tankers), 0 LNG; 70-91% below normal.[7][18]
- Early April peaks: Traffic hit “multi-week high” ~April 4-6 (e.g., 12 vessels/day), but dropped post-ceasefire disputes; April 8: 4 ships (no oil/LNG).[19][20]
Expert views from shipping analysts (Kuehne+Nagel, Argus Media) and officials (UAE Minister) emphasize uncertainty: “conditional passage is not passage,” with normalization potentially taking weeks/months; no authoritative source (e.g., EIA weekly chokepoints, updated March) reports full LNG resumption as of latest data.[10][21] Recent X updates (April 9) confirm ongoing queues and restrictions, with no movement toward unrestricted LNG access reported by major outlets.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning
Current Situation (April 9, 2026):
- Zero LNG tankers have transited the Strait of Hormuz since late February 2026
- A fragile two-week ceasefire was announced April 7-8, but as of today, the strait remains effectively blocked
- Only ~4 ships passed on April 8 — none oil or LNG
- 19 LNG vessels are confirmed stranded in the Persian Gulf
- Iran’s Revolutionary Guards specifically halted two cleared Qatar LNG tankers on April 6
- UAE Energy Minister explicitly stated: “conditional passage is not passage” — the strait is “restricted, not open”
Resolution Requirements vs. Reality:
The question requires “all international maritime LNG traffic” to be “no longer halted or severely restricted.” This is a very high bar. Even if some LNG vessels begin transiting, the requirement is for unrestricted, normalized flow — confirmed by major news outlets.
Key Obstacles Within 22 Days:
- Iran requires Sepah navy permission, inspections, and crypto-denominated transit fees (~$2M/tanker) — these are severe restrictions by definition
- The ceasefire is only a two-week arrangement (ending ~April 22), with broader talks just beginning in Islamabad
- Hapag-Lloyd CEO estimates 6-8 weeks minimum for full normalization (late May/early June)
- ~1,000 merchant ships creating massive backlog
- Iran has specifically targeted LNG traffic even more than oil — zero LNG transits in March vs. 220 total vessel transits
Critical Assumptions That Could Alter Forecast:
- Rapid diplomatic breakthrough (e.g., comprehensive deal within days): ~5% probability — negotiations are just starting, and Iran’s demands (fees, inspections) are structural, not temporary
- US military action forces strait open: ~3% probability — this would risk escalation and is contrary to the ceasefire approach
- Iran unilaterally drops all restrictions on LNG: ~2% probability — LNG has been specifically weaponized as leverage; no incentive to release it freely
Timeline Analysis:
- By May 1 (22 days): ~4% — virtually no path to full unrestricted LNG access
- By June 1 (53 days): ~15% — aligns with industry 6-8 week timeline, but conditioned on successful negotiations
- By August 1 (114 days): ~35% — more realistic for full normalization if diplomacy succeeds
Base Rate Consideration:
Historical maritime blockades/closures (e.g., Suez 2021, various Gulf incidents) typically take weeks to months to fully resolve even after the triggering crisis ends. The combination of active wartime demands, new fee structures, and inspection regimes makes rapid full reopening essentially unprecedented.
Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%
Gemini Binary response:
Reasoning for Forecast:
- Current Status and Strict Resolution Criteria: As of April 9, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for all maritime traffic, and specifically, it is completely halted for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers. No loaded LNG vessel has transited the strait since the war began in late February. The resolution criteria require the strait to be “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” and “no longer…severely restricted.” The conditions currently imposed by Iran—requiring military coordination for passage, conducting inspections, and levying new transit fees—constitute severe restrictions when compared to the pre-war norm of free passage. The statement by the UAE Energy Minister on April 9 confirms this, noting the strait is “restricted and controlled, not open.”
- Timeline Mismatch: The resolution window closes on May 1, 2026, a mere 22 days from today. This is a very short timeframe for a significant geopolitical and logistical shift. A fragile two-week ceasefire was announced around April 8, but its primary purpose is to facilitate further talks. Even if these talks are successful, the timeline for practical implementation is much longer. The CEO of Hapag-Lloyd, a major shipping operator, estimated it would take “at least six to eight weeks” for his firm to regain fully normal operations, a timeframe that extends well beyond the May 1 deadline. This expert opinion from a key stakeholder is a strong indicator that a rapid return to unrestricted traffic is not anticipated.
- Logistical Hurdles: There is a significant backlog of vessels, including at least 19 LNG carriers, stranded in the Persian Gulf. Clearing this queue and restoring normal shipping schedules would take weeks, even under ideal conditions with full trust and no restrictions. The fact that traffic remains at less than 10% of its normal volume, even after the ceasefire announcement, highlights the depth of the disruption.
- Key Assumptions and Probabilities:
- Assumption 1: The current Iranian-imposed conditions will be considered “severe restrictions,” preventing a ‘Yes’ resolution even if a few LNG ships pass. The contrast with pre-war freedom of navigation is stark, making it highly probable that major news outlets will continue to describe the situation as restricted. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~3%.
- Assumption 2: A comprehensive diplomatic breakthrough that removes all restrictions will not be achieved and implemented within 22 days. Given the complexity of the conflict, the fragility of the current ceasefire, and the demonstrated willingness of Iran to use the strait as leverage (e.g., halting previously cleared Qatari tankers), a complete and trusted resolution in such a short period is extremely unlikely. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~5%.
Conclusion:
The path to a “Yes” resolution requires a rapid and complete reversal of the current situation. This would involve a successful diplomatic agreement leading to the removal of all Iranian-imposed restrictions, the immediate restoration of trust among international shippers, and the logistical capacity to clear a significant portion of the LNG carrier backlog—all within 22 days. The available evidence, from on-the-ground traffic data to expert industry timelines, overwhelmingly suggests this is not feasible. The most probable outcome is that the strait will remain, at best, partially open under restrictive conditions, which does not meet the high bar set by the resolution criteria. Therefore, the probability of a “Yes” resolution is very low.
Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning
Current Situation Assessment
As of April 9, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has seen zero LNG transits since late February 2026 — over 6 weeks of complete LNG blockade. Key data points:
- March 2026: 0 LNG transits (first time ever), only 220 total vessel transits vs. 3,000-4,000 normal
- April 6: Qatar LNG tankers cleared then halted by IRGC and forced to turn back
- April 8-9: Only 4 ships passed through total; no LNG vessels among them
- 19 LNG carriers remain stranded in the Persian Gulf
Ceasefire Reality Check
The April 7-8 ceasefire has not meaningfully changed the situation:
- It’s a fragile two-week arrangement (expires ~April 22, nine days before deadline)
- Iran imposes inspections, IRGC permissions, and cryptocurrency tolls (~$2M/tanker)
- Israeli strikes in Lebanon have already prompted further halts
- UAE Energy Minister explicitly stated: “conditional passage is not passage”
- Post-ceasefire traffic is at “standstill” levels per ABC, Bloomberg, Reuters, NYT
Industry Expert Timeline
Hapag-Lloyd CEO estimates at least 6-8 weeks for normalization — placing full restoration around late May/early June at the absolute earliest, well past May 1.
Resolution Criteria Bar
The question requires “all international maritime LNG traffic” to be “no longer halted or severely restricted.” This is an extremely high bar — not partial resumption, not conditional passage, but effectively full reopening.
Key Assumptions That Could Alter Forecast
- A dramatic peace breakthrough forces immediate full reopening (~3% chance): Even in this scenario, logistics and clearing 1,000+ stuck vessels would take weeks.
- US military forces the strait open unilaterally (~2% chance): Would escalate conflict rather than “reopen to all” traffic safely.
- Iran makes a sudden strategic decision to fully lift all restrictions including LNG (~2% chance): Iran has specifically targeted LNG as leverage; this is their strongest negotiating card.
Timeline Analysis
- By April 15 (6 days): ~1% chance of full LNG reopening
- By May 1 (22 days): ~3% chance
- By June 1 (53 days): ~10-15% chance
- By August 1 (114 days): ~25-35% chance
The probability distribution is heavily back-loaded given the structural obstacles.
Final Assessment
Every indicator points to this being extremely unlikely within 22 days: zero current LNG flow, active IRGC blocking of LNG specifically, fragile short-term ceasefire, industry timelines far exceeding the deadline, and an extremely high resolution bar requiring unrestricted access for “all” international LNG traffic.
Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning and Analysis
Current Situation (April 9, 2026)
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to LNG traffic since late February 2026 due to the Iran war. Key data points:
- Zero LNG transits recorded in March 2026 (first ever such month)
- Zero LNG transits in April so far, despite a ceasefire announced April 7-8
- 19 LNG vessels stranded in the Persian Gulf
- Daily vessel transits at 4-12 ships vs. normal 100-140 (all types)
- Iran actively blocking LNG specifically (turned back Qatar LNG tankers on April 6 despite prior clearance)
Ceasefire Assessment
The April 7-8 ceasefire is a two-week arrangement, expiring ~April 22 — nine days before the May 1 deadline. Even this limited ceasefire has failed to open LNG traffic:
- Iran requires military permissions, inspections, and cryptocurrency tolls (~$2M/tanker)
- Iranian coastguards warn unauthorized vessels will be “targeted and destroyed”
- UAE Energy Minister explicitly states: “conditional passage is not passage”
- Israeli strikes in Lebanon have prompted further halts
Industry Timeline
Hapag-Lloyd CEO estimates at least 6-8 weeks for normalization — placing full reopening around late May/early June at the earliest, well past May 1. This assumes unrestricted access begins immediately, which it hasn’t.
Critical Assumptions That Could Alter Forecast
- Diplomatic breakthrough allowing unrestricted LNG transit within days — Probability: ~5%. Iran has specifically targeted LNG as leverage; no indication of imminent policy reversal.
- Even with political will, logistics permit “reopened to all” status by May 1 — Probability: ~5-10%. With 1,000+ stranded vessels, insurance concerns, and industry estimates of 6-8 weeks, this is nearly impossible on this timeline.
- Ceasefire holds and expands to cover the full period — Probability: ~25-30%. The ceasefire is fragile, only 2 weeks, and regional escalation risks remain high.
Timeline Probability Distribution
- By April 15: ~1% (no signs of progress)
- By May 1: ~3% (ceasefire fragile, logistics impossible)
- By June 1: ~12% (if ceasefire holds and expands)
- By August 1: ~30% (broader diplomatic resolution possible)
- By December 2026: ~50% (significant time for resolution)
Synthesis
For YES resolution, we need major news outlets reporting the strait is “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” with traffic “no longer halted or severely restricted.” As of today, traffic is at zero for LNG, the ceasefire is fragile and doesn’t cover LNG, Iran is actively blocking LNG carriers, and industry says normalization takes 6-8+ weeks from the point of unrestricted access (which hasn’t begun). The probability of all necessary conditions aligning in 22 days is extremely low.
Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%
Task failed with error: ‘choices’
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 84, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 74, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 70, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 121, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
text = chat_completion[“choices”][0][“message”][“content”]~~~^^^^^^^^^^^
KeyError: ‘choices’
Task failed with error: ‘choices’
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 84, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 74, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 70, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 121, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
text = chat_completion[“choices”][0][“message”][“content”]~~~^^^^^^^^^^^
KeyError: ‘choices’
Task failed with error: ‘choices’
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 84, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 74, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, *self.kwargs) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 70, in run_sync return future.result(timeout=180) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 456, in result return self.__get_result() ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 401, in __get_result raise self._exception File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.11.15/x64/lib/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run result = self.fn(self.args, **self.kwargs)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/openai_service.py”, line 121, in get_gpt_binary_prediction
text = chat_completion[“choices”][0][“message”][“content”]~~~^^^^^^^^^^^
KeyError: ‘choices’
All predictions: [3, 3, 3, 3]
Filtered predictions: [3, 3]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning for Forecast:
- Current Status and Strict Resolution Criteria: As of April 9, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for all maritime traffic, and specifically, it is completely halted for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers. No loaded LNG vessel has transited the strait since the war began in late February. The resolution criteria require the strait to be “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” and “no longer…severely restricted.” The conditions currently imposed by Iran—requiring military coordination for passage, conducting inspections, and levying new transit fees—constitute severe restrictions when compared to the pre-war norm of free passage. The statement by the UAE Energy Minister on April 9 confirms this, noting the strait is “restricted and controlled, not open.”
- Timeline Mismatch: The resolution window closes on May 1, 2026, a mere 22 days from today. This is a very short timeframe for a significant geopolitical and logistical shift. A fragile two-week ceasefire was announced around April 8, but its primary purpose is to facilitate further talks. Even if these talks are successful, the timeline for practical implementation is much longer. The CEO of Hapag-Lloyd, a major shipping operator, estimated it would take “at least six to eight weeks” for his firm to regain fully normal operations, a timeframe that extends well beyond the May 1 deadline. This expert opinion from a key stakeholder is a strong indicator that a rapid return to unrestricted traffic is not anticipated.
- Logistical Hurdles: There is a significant backlog of vessels, including at least 19 LNG carriers, stranded in the Persian Gulf. Clearing this queue and restoring normal shipping schedules would take weeks, even under ideal conditions with full trust and no restrictions. The fact that traffic remains at less than 10% of its normal volume, even after the ceasefire announcement, highlights the depth of the disruption.
- Key Assumptions and Probabilities:
- Assumption 1: The current Iranian-imposed conditions will be considered “severe restrictions,” preventing a ‘Yes’ resolution even if a few LNG ships pass. The contrast with pre-war freedom of navigation is stark, making it highly probable that major news outlets will continue to describe the situation as restricted. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~3%.
- Assumption 2: A comprehensive diplomatic breakthrough that removes all restrictions will not be achieved and implemented within 22 days. Given the complexity of the conflict, the fragility of the current ceasefire, and the demonstrated willingness of Iran to use the strait as leverage (e.g., halting previously cleared Qatari tankers), a complete and trusted resolution in such a short period is extremely unlikely. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~5%.
Conclusion:
The path to a “Yes” resolution requires a rapid and complete reversal of the current situation. This would involve a successful diplomatic agreement leading to the removal of all Iranian-imposed restrictions, the immediate restoration of trust among international shippers, and the logistical capacity to clear a significant portion of the LNG carrier backlog—all within 22 days. The available evidence, from on-the-ground traffic data to expert industry timelines, overwhelmingly suggests this is not feasible. The most probable outcome is that the strait will remain, at best, partially open under restrictive conditions, which does not meet the high bar set by the resolution criteria. Therefore, the probability of a “Yes” resolution is very low.
Probability: 3%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.03,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning for Forecast:
- Current Status and Strict Resolution Criteria: As of April 9, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains severely restricted for all maritime traffic, and specifically, it is completely halted for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carriers. No loaded LNG vessel has transited the strait since the war began in late February. The resolution criteria require the strait to be “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” and “no longer…severely restricted.” The conditions currently imposed by Iran—requiring military coordination for passage, conducting inspections, and levying new transit fees—constitute severe restrictions when compared to the pre-war norm of free passage. The statement by the UAE Energy Minister on April 9 confirms this, noting the strait is “restricted and controlled, not open.”
- Timeline Mismatch: The resolution window closes on May 1, 2026, a mere 22 days from today. This is a very short timeframe for a significant geopolitical and logistical shift. A fragile two-week ceasefire was announced around April 8, but its primary purpose is to facilitate further talks. Even if these talks are successful, the timeline for practical implementation is much longer. The CEO of Hapag-Lloyd, a major shipping operator, estimated it would take “at least six to eight weeks” for his firm to regain fully normal operations, a timeframe that extends well beyond the May 1 deadline. This expert opinion from a key stakeholder is a strong indicator that a rapid return to unrestricted traffic is not anticipated.
- Logistical Hurdles: There is a significant backlog of vessels, including at least 19 LNG carriers, stranded in the Persian Gulf. Clearing this queue and restoring normal shipping schedules would take weeks, even under ideal conditions with full trust and no restrictions. The fact that traffic remains at less than 10% of its normal volume, even after the ceasefire announcement, highlights the depth of the disruption.
- Key Assumptions and Probabilities:
- Assumption 1: The current Iranian-imposed conditions will be considered “severe restrictions,” preventing a ‘Yes’ resolution even if a few LNG ships pass. The contrast with pre-war freedom of navigation is stark, making it highly probable that major news outlets will continue to describe the situation as restricted. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~3%.
- Assumption 2: A comprehensive diplomatic breakthrough that removes all restrictions will not be achieved and implemented within 22 days. Given the complexity of the conflict, the fragility of the current ceasefire, and the demonstrated willingness of Iran to use the strait as leverage (e.g., halting previously cleared Qatari tankers), a complete and trusted resolution in such a short period is extremely unlikely. Probability this assumption is incorrect: ~5%.
Conclusion:
The path to a “Yes” resolution requires a rapid and complete reversal of the current situation. This would involve a successful diplomatic agreement leading to the removal of all Iranian-imposed restrictions, the immediate restoration of trust among international shippers, and the logistical capacity to clear a significant portion of the LNG carrier backlog—all within 22 days. The available evidence, from on-the-ground traffic data to expert industry timelines, overwhelmingly suggests this is not feasible. The most probable outcome is that the strait will remain, at best, partially open under restrictive conditions, which does not meet the high bar set by the resolution criteria. Therefore, the probability of a “Yes” resolution is very low.
Probability: 3%
End