Russia-Ukraine War as of Feb. 5, 2026
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 39%
This is the full version of his forecast. Condensed version here.
Perplexity response:
10 Key Citations
1. Polymarket – Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by February 28, 2026
- Description: Real-time prediction market odds for ceasefire agreement by Feb 28, 2026
- Date: February 13, 2026
- Summary: Market is pricing a ceasefire agreement by February 28 at just 1% probability. The market requires an official, publicly announced and mutually agreed halt in military engagement constituting a general pause in the conflict. Territorial agreements or energy infrastructure ceasefires alone do not qualify. Resolution based on official announcements from both parties or wide consensus of credible media reporting.
2. MLQ.ai – Geopolitics Markets Brief
- Description: Aggregated prediction market and analyst forecasts for geopolitical events
- Date: February 12, 2026
- Summary: Ceasefire odds are forecast at 6% by March 31, 2026 and 44% by year-end 2026. This represents significantly higher probability for a full-year resolution compared to the near-term deadline. The brief aggregates multiple data sources including betting markets and analyst predictions.
3. The Kyiv Independent – Russia just laid out its Ukraine war endgame
- Description: Analysis of Russia’s negotiating position and territorial demands
- Date: February 2026 (recent)
- Summary: Putin’s June 2024 ceasefire demands remain unchanged: full withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, plus Crimea recognition. Some analysts suggest his stance may have narrowed to key areas in Donetsk only, but he has never formally retracted his original demands. A U.S.-developed 20-point framework has been delivered to Putin, but progress remains minimal.
4. The Week – Which side is winning the war in Ukraine?
- Description: Assessment of negotiating stances and major unresolved issues
- Date: February 2026 (recent)
- Summary: A peace deal “looks close except on everything that matters,” with major disagreements on Donbas control, security guarantees, and ceasefire efficacy. Ukraine countered Russia’s 28-point plan with its own 20-point framework proposing U.S./NATO security guarantees. Control of territory remains the central impasse.
5. Atlantic Council – Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end
- Description: Strategic analysis of Putin’s negotiating constraints
- Date: 2026 (recent)
- Summary: Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, but Putin has refused to follow suit. The analysis suggests Putin faces a strategic dilemma: unable to achieve military victory but politically unwilling to accept a ceasefire without maximalist territorial gains.
6. The Kyiv Independent – Additional negotiation analysis
- Description: Ukrainian leadership assessment of ceasefire prospects
- Date: February 11, 2026
- Summary: Oleksandr Merezhko, head of Ukraine’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee, dismissed negotiations as unlikely to succeed, stating “There is no point in paying attention to Lavrov’s statements. The main thing is Putin’s unwillingness to agree not only to a peace deal but even to a ceasefire.” Ukraine accepted a U.S. invitation for new talks with territorial issues expected to dominate.
7. Polymarket – Ukraine Peace Deal Predictions
- Description: Broader prediction market for any peace deal resolution
- Date: February 2026
- Summary: Separate markets exist for peace deal outcomes with varying timelines. The market structure distinguishes between ceasefire (temporary halt) and peace deal (formal resolution).
8. The Economist (via The Week)
- Description: Analysis of Trump administration’s initial negotiating framework
- Date: Early 2026
- Summary: The 28-point plan reveals Russia’s minimum requirement as occupying all of Donbas, including territory not yet taken by force. Plan includes limits on Ukraine’s military and exclusion from NATO or NATO peacekeeping on its soil.
9. Stimson Institute – Testing Assumptions About US Foreign Policy in 2026
- Description: Forecast of Ukraine’s military sustainability
- Date: February 2026
- Summary: Kelly Grieco forecasts that Ukraine can sustain a defensive posture against Russia with continued Western weapons supplies. This suggests analysts believe the military situation may remain stalemated rather than moving toward ceasefire.
10. The Week – Casualty projections
- Description: Estimates of combined Russian-Ukrainian casualties
- Date: February 2026
- Summary: At current rates, combined casualties could reach 2 million by spring 2026. Second round of high-level talks showed “little to show” and “scant sign of progress” toward ending the war entering its fifth year.
Current Assessment
Near-term prospects (by February 28): The 1% market probability reflects the extraordinarily low likelihood of a ceasefire within the next 15 days. No credible reporting suggests imminent agreement.
Mid-range prospects (by March 31): The 6% probability by March 31 indicates minimal expected movement in the following month-and-a-half, despite ongoing U.S.-mediated talks scheduled for February.
Full-year prospects (by December 31): The 44% probability by year-end represents a substantial increase, suggesting market participants view a ceasefire as achievable but not probable over the full remaining year. This represents an implied 38% cumulative probability increase from March 31 to year-end.
Key impediments:
- Putin’s unchanged demand for full territorial control of four oblasts plus Crimea recognition remains incompatible with Ukraine’s negotiating position
- Ukraine agreed to unconditional ceasefire in March 2025; Russia declined
- Major disagreements persist on security guarantees and future NATO membership
- Expert consensus from Ukrainian leadership assesses ceasefire prospects as minimal
- Russian negotiating strategy appears focused on formalization of alleged informal agreements rather than mutual concessions
Recent momentum: Second round of talks (referenced as occurring around February 11-12) showed minimal progress. The framework discussions represent tactical positioning rather than convergence toward agreement.
Grok response:
- Kremlin says next round of peace talks on Ukraine is set for next week (Reuters, February 13, 2026): The Kremlin announced that the next round of US-brokered peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will occur next week. The location was not confirmed, though other reports specify Geneva on Feb 17-18.[1][2] No ceasefire has been declared, and recent Russian barrages on Ukrainian cities indicate ongoing hostilities.[3]
- Ukraine’s Zelenskiy: We have backed US peace proposals to get a deal done (Reuters, February 12, 2026): Zelenskiy stated Ukraine has supported US peace initiatives, including potential ceasefires on energy infrastructure. However, Russia has not reciprocated fully, despite some observance.[4][5] Broader ceasefire talks continue amid US pressure for a summer resolution.[6]
- Ukraine agrees to multi-tiered ceasefire enforcement plan with Russia (Reuters/FT, February 3, 2026): Ukraine agreed with Western partners on a plan to enforce any future ceasefire, with escalating responses to Russian violations. This includes coordinated measures but requires a ceasefire first, which has not occurred.[7] Russia shows little interest in halting fighting.[8]
- Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by end of 2026 (Polymarket, accessed February 13, 2026): Prediction market with $9M+ volume prices a full-year ceasefire at low-to-moderate probability (related markets ~30-40%). Resolves yes on official mutual halt by Dec 31, 2026; partial or framework deals insufficient.[9]
- Ukraine war ends in 2026 (Manifold Markets, accessed February 13, 2026): Market at 37% probability for formal ceasefire/peace by year-end, requiring 30-day halt. Low volume (Ṁ656); reflects crowd wisdom amid stalled talks.[10]
- Ukraine war briefing: Elections will be held only after ceasefire (The Guardian, February 12, 2026): Zelenskiy insists on security guarantees and ceasefire before elections. Ukraine secured $38B in 2026 military aid to sustain defense.[11][12]
- Vladimir Putin is trapped in a war he cannot win but dare not end (Atlantic Council, February 13, 2026): Putin rejects unconditional ceasefires Ukraine offered since 2025, sticking to territorial demands. Russia’s demands unchanged since June 2024: Ukrainian retreat from claimed oblasts.[13][14]
- NOELREPORTS: MP Kostenko says unlikely war ends in 2026 (X post, February 11, 2026): Ukrainian MP warns pause without guarantees allows Russian rearmament; Russia demands concessions. Occupation pace slow: 16% of Donetsk in all 2025.[15] End only via Russian internal crisis.[16]
- The Russian economy is finally stagnating (The Guardian, February 6, 2026): Wartime boom ends; growth slows, taxes rise, services squeezed amid war spending. “Deathonomics”: Mercenary army costs strain society (Ifri report, Feb 9, 2026).[17][18]
- Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by June 30, 2026 (Polymarket, February 13, 2026): Yes at 35% (Feb 8 data), volume $968k. March 31 market: $16M volume, low yes pricing (~5-10% implied from trades).[19][20]
As of February 13, 2026, no ceasefire or armistice has been officially declared between Russia and Ukraine, per major outlets like Reuters, BBC, NYT, AP, and Guardian—none report such an event since January 1.[1][4] Fighting persists: Russia launched barrages on Ukrainian cities February 12, amid cold weather exacerbating civilian suffering.[3] US-brokered talks advance to a third round February 17-18 in Geneva, with Russia sending envoy Medinsky (previously criticized by US); Ukraine/West prepare multi-tier enforcement for any deal, but Russia ties ceasefire to territorial concessions (e.g., Ukrainian withdrawal from parts of Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia per 2024 demands).[7][21][14]
Ukraine backs US proposals (e.g., energy strikes halt as de-escalation), but Zelenskiy conditions elections/referenda on ceasefire and guarantees; partial energy ceasefire partially observed by Russia since early February.[4][11][5] US pushes March deal/elections or summer end, but Ukrainian military/Rada skeptical: war unlikely to end/pause in 2026 without “black swan” like Russian collapse; slow Russian gains (e.g., ~0.3% Donetsk oblast/month pace).[22][15] Ukraine plans $38B Western aid for 2026 defense.[12]
Prediction markets reflect moderate skepticism: Polymarket end-2026 ceasefire ~30-40% implied (high volume $9-16M across dates); Manifold 37%; lower for Q1 (March 31 ~5-10%).[9][10] Russia’s economy stagnates (post-boom, higher taxes, war drains); relies on mercenaries/foreign recruits amid 1.2M casualties, but sustains via “deathonomics” (social costs of mercenary army, Ifri Feb 2026).[17][18] Putin trapped: cannot win outright, resists pause without gains.[13] No authoritative resolution source (major news) shows yes; talks indicate potential movement but persistent gaps on terms/guarantees.[23]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Anthropic Binary response:
Analysis: Ukraine Ceasefire/Armistice in 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of February 13, 2026, no ceasefire has been declared. Active hostilities continue with Russia launching barrages against Ukrainian cities as recently as February 12. The next round of U.S.-brokered talks is scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva.
Key Facts:
- Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, but Putin refused
- Putin’s June 2024 demands remain unchanged: Full Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia, plus Crimea recognition
- U.S. pushing for summer resolution; Ukraine has $38B in defense aid for 2026
- Russian economy stagnating; combined casualties approaching 2 million
Prediction Market Analysis
| Date | Probability |
|---|---|
| By Feb 28, 2026 | ~1% |
| By March 31, 2026 | ~6-10% |
| By June 30, 2026 | ~35% |
| By Dec 31, 2026 | ~37-44% |
The markets show a clear pattern: very low near-term probability with substantial probability accumulating over the remaining ~10.5 months.
Critical Assumptions Analysis
Assumption 1: Putin maintains maximalist demands
- Evidence strongly supports this currently
- Economic pressures and military stalemate could eventually force flexibility
- Probability this assumption fails: ~25%
Assumption 2: Ceasefire requires meaningful territorial concessions
- Currently true, but external pressure could force a pause without resolution
- Probability this assumption fails: ~20%
Assumption 3: No “black swan” event (Russian internal crisis, major military reversal)
- Ukrainian MPs suggest this is the most likely path to ceasefire
- Probability of such an event: ~15%
Key Considerations
Factors favoring ceasefire:
- Extended timeline (10.5 months remaining)
- Active U.S.-mediated negotiations continuing
- Economic strain on Russia increasing
- Growing casualty toll creating pressure
- Ukraine has multi-tier enforcement plan ready
Factors against ceasefire:
- Putin consistently refuses ceasefire without territorial gains
- “Trapped” position: can’t win but won’t end war politically
- Major gaps on security guarantees and NATO
- Ukrainian leadership deeply skeptical
- Second round of talks showed “little progress”
Historical Calibration
The question asks about ANY ceasefire or armistice – a lower bar than a comprehensive peace deal. Even a temporary or regional ceasefire would resolve Yes.
However, accounting for:
- Historical overconfidence in forecasts
- Base rate of ~35% positive resolution in similar questions
- The persistent obstacles despite active negotiations
Final Probability Distribution
- By March 31: ~7%
- By June 30: ~28%
- By September 30: ~35%
- By December 31: ~40%
The conditional probability of ceasefire after March (given no ceasefire by then) remains substantial because:
- More time for economic pressure to build
- Multiple negotiation rounds possible
- Potential for unexpected events
- U.S. electoral/political pressure
Given the prediction market consensus (37-44%), active negotiations, extended timeline, but balanced against persistent obstacles and historical overconfidence, I estimate:
Probability: 40%
The extracted probability is: 40%
Anthropic Binary response:
Analysis: Ukraine Ceasefire/Armistice in 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of February 13, 2026, the Russia-Ukraine war continues with active hostilities. Russia launched barrages on Ukrainian cities as recently as February 12, 2026. While US-brokered negotiations are ongoing (third round scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva), there are fundamental disagreements on territory, security guarantees, and NATO membership.
Key Factors Against Resolution
- Putin’s Consistent Refusal: Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, but Putin has refused to reciprocate. His demands (full territorial control of four oblasts plus Crimea recognition) remain unchanged since June 2024.
- Persistent Fundamental Disagreements: Major issues remain unresolved:
- Territorial control (Russia demands areas it doesn’t occupy militarily)
- Security guarantees for Ukraine
- Future NATO membership
- Terms of ceasefire enforcement
- Expert Assessment: Ukrainian parliamentary foreign affairs committee head characterized negotiations as unlikely to succeed, citing “Putin’s unwillingness to agree not only to a peace deal but even to a ceasefire.”
- Recent Talks Show Minimal Progress: The second round of high-level talks showed “little to show” and “scant sign of progress.”
Key Factors Favoring Resolution
- Time Remaining: 10.5 months until resolution deadline provides substantial opportunity for developments.
- US Pressure: The Trump administration is actively pushing for resolution by summer 2026, creating external pressure on both parties.
- Russian Economic Pressure: Russia’s economy is stagnating, wartime boom is ending, and the “deathonomics” of mercenary army costs strain society.
- Lower Resolution Threshold: The question requires only a declared ceasefire or armistice, not a lasting peace deal or territorial agreement.
- Active Negotiations: Talks continue with a structured framework, despite slow progress.
Prediction Market Consensus
- Polymarket: 1% by February 28, ~6% by March 31, ~35% by June 30
- MLQ.ai aggregate: 44% by year-end 2026
- Manifold Markets: 37% for war ending in 2026
- Polymarket year-end: 30-40% implied ($9M+ volume)
Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities
Putin maintains maximalist negotiating stance (60% confidence this holds)
- If this fails (40%), ceasefire becomes significantly more likely
- Economic pressure, internal political dynamics, or exhaustion could shift this
No “black swan” events (Russian collapse, major military shift) (85% confidence)
- If unexpected event occurs (15%), could dramatically accelerate or derail negotiations
US mediation continues without breakthrough pressure (70% confidence)
- If US applies significantly more aggressive pressure (30%), could force movement
Timeline Analysis
Given the prediction market prices and underlying dynamics:
- By March 31: ~6% (near-term, minimal movement expected)
- By June 30: ~32% (mid-term, more time for developments)
- By December 31: ~38-42% (full year window, considering all factors)
Probability Calculation
The weighted prediction market consensus centers around 35-40%. My analysis of the underlying dynamics supports this range:
- Strong obstacles to agreement (Putin’s refusal, territorial gaps)
- But significant pressures and time for change
- Broad resolution criteria (any official ceasefire counts)
Accounting for my historical overconfidence and the 35% base rate for positive resolutions in similar forecasting competitions, I calibrate slightly below the market average.
Probability: 39%
The extracted probability is: 39%
GPT Binary response:
Anthropic Binary response:
Analysis: Ukraine Ceasefire/Armistice in 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of February 13, 2026, no ceasefire or armistice has been declared. Key factors:
Active Negotiations:
- Third round of US-brokered talks scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva
- Ukraine has backed US peace proposals, including energy infrastructure ceasefire
- A partial energy infrastructure ceasefire is being “partially observed” by Russia since early February
- US administration pushing for summer resolution
Major Impediments:
- Putin rejected Ukraine’s unconditional ceasefire offer from March 2025
- Russian demands unchanged since June 2024: full withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, plus Crimea recognition
- Ukrainian leadership (Merezhko) states Putin is unwilling to agree “not only to a peace deal but even to a ceasefire”
- Second round of talks showed “scant progress”
Prediction Market Consensus
| Timeframe | Market | Probability |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2026 | Polymarket | ~1% |
| March 31, 2026 | Aggregated | ~6% |
| June 30, 2026 | Polymarket | ~35% |
| End of 2026 | Multiple markets | 37-44% |
High-volume markets ($9-16M) converge around 30-44% for year-end resolution.
Timeline Analysis
Remaining time: ~10.5 months until resolution deadline
Probability distribution across periods:
- By March 31: ~6% (cumulative)
- By June 30: ~35% (cumulative)
- By December 31: ~40% (cumulative)
This suggests the bulk of probability mass is in Q2-Q4 2026, with most uncertainty weighted toward potential late-year developments.
Critical Assumptions That Could Alter Forecast
- Putin’s unwillingness to accept ceasefire without territorial gains (Base assumption: continues)
- Failure probability: ~25% (economic pressure, internal crisis could force change)
- Impact if wrong: Would substantially increase ceasefire probability
- Ukraine maintains leverage with Western support (Currently $38B in 2026 aid secured)
- Failure probability: ~15% (US or EU support could diminish)
- Impact if wrong: Could force Ukraine to compromise, increasing ceasefire odds
- No “black swan” events in Russia (political crisis, military collapse)
- Failure probability: ~15-20%
- Impact if wrong: Could dramatically accelerate negotiations
Base Rate Considerations
Historical conflicts of this intensity rarely resolve within a single calendar year after significant escalation. However:
- Unprecedented US diplomatic pressure
- Russian economic stagnation intensifying
- Both sides facing casualty pressures (potentially 2M total by spring)
Weighing Factors
For higher probability (>40%):
- Long time horizon provides substantial opportunity
- Active diplomatic engagement
- Partial energy ceasefires suggest some willingness for limited agreements
- Economic pressures mounting on Russia
For lower probability (<40%):
- Fundamental territorial gaps remain unbridged
- Putin has consistently refused even unconditional ceasefire
- Ukrainian officials express skepticism about 2026 resolution
- Historical precedent suggests conflicts of this scale don’t resolve quickly
Final Calibration
Given the strong consensus in high-volume prediction markets (~35-44%), the ongoing but stalled diplomatic activity, Putin’s consistent stance, and my tendency toward overconfidence, I align closely with market aggregates while slightly discounting for the clear pessimism in recent talks.
The resolution criteria require only that a ceasefire or armistice be “officially declared” (not that it hold), which is a somewhat lower bar than a lasting peace, but still requires both sides to announce agreement.
Probability: 38%
The extracted probability is: 38%
Gemini Binary response:
Reasoning Rationale
This forecast assesses the probability of an official ceasefire or armistice declaration between Russia and Ukraine before December 31, 2026. The situation is a dynamic stalemate characterized by high-intensity attritional warfare, active but largely fruitless diplomatic tracks, and significant economic pressures on both sides.
Arguments for a “Yes” Resolution (Ceasefire in 2026):
- Mutual Exhaustion and Economic Strain: The war is entering its fifth year, with staggering casualties estimated in the hundreds of thousands on both sides. This creates immense societal pressure. Russia’s economy, in particular, is showing significant strain. After a war-fueled boom, it is now stagnating, with low growth forecasts (0.8% for 2026), rising taxes, and squeezed public services. The reliance on a mercenary army creates further social and economic costs. This increasing pain could make a pause in fighting a necessity for Russia to stabilize its economy and consolidate forces.
- Intensified Diplomatic Pressure: The United States is actively brokering talks, with a new trilateral round scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva. Reports suggest the U.S. is pushing for a resolution by the summer of 2026. While past talks have failed, the persistent high-level engagement and the return of seasoned negotiators like Vladimir Medinsky for Russia could signal a shift toward more substantive discussions beyond just security issues.
- Low Bar for Resolution: The question resolves “Yes” on an officially declared ceasefire, not a lasting peace. This could include a temporary, tactical, or regional halt to fighting that both sides find mutually beneficial for a period, even if they intend to resume hostilities later. Ukraine has previously shown willingness to de-escalate, such as by backing proposals to halt strikes on energy infrastructure.
- Prediction Market Consensus: High-volume prediction markets are a key indicator. Polymarket’s market for a ceasefire by year-end 2026 has over $9 million in volume, and its odds, combined with other markets, imply a probability in the 30-40% range. MLQ.ai, an aggregator, puts the odds at 44%. These markets suggest a significant, non-trivial possibility of a ceasefire.
Arguments Against a “No” Resolution (No Ceasefire in 2026):
- The Fundamental Impasse on Territory: This is the most significant obstacle. Russia’s official position, reiterated since June 2024, demands Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, plus recognition of Crimea as Russian. This is a non-starter for Kyiv. Ukraine insists any agreement must be based on current front lines at a minimum. Until one side dramatically alters its core territorial demands, a comprehensive agreement is nearly impossible.
- Putin’s Political Position: President Putin may be trapped in a conflict he cannot win militarily but dares not end without a tangible victory he can present to the Russian public. A ceasefire on current lines could be perceived as a failure, making a frozen conflict preferable to a politically risky peace. Russia has previously rejected Ukrainian proposals for an unconditional ceasefire and continues to state it will not agree to a halt in fighting before a comprehensive political settlement on its terms.
- Ukraine’s Sustained Defensive Capability: Ukraine has secured significant military aid for 2026 (around €35 billion or $38 billion) from its allies. This enables it to maintain a robust defensive posture, continue striking Russian assets, and resist pressure to accept a disadvantageous deal out of desperation. President Zelenskyy has been clear that security must come before politics and that he will not force an unfavorable deal on his people.
- Slow Military Progress Reduces Urgency for Russia: While costly, Russian forces are still making slow, grinding advances, gaining approximately 182 square miles in the last month. From Moscow’s perspective, this incremental progress, combined with the belief that Western resolve may eventually fracture, could incentivize continuing the war of attrition rather than agreeing to a ceasefire that solidifies a less-than-total victory.
Key Assumptions & Failure Probabilities
- Assumption: Russia’s maximalist territorial demands will remain its core, non-negotiable position throughout 2026.
- Probability of Failure: 25%. A severe military collapse, a domestic political crisis, or an acute economic shock could force Putin to drastically moderate his stance to salvage the situation. The stagnating economy is a key watchpoint. If this assumption fails, the probability of a ceasefire would increase dramatically.
- Assumption: The military front will remain a war of attrition without a decisive collapse of either side’s forces.
- Probability of Failure: 20%. An unexpected breakthrough by either side would fundamentally alter the calculus. A Russian collapse would make a ceasefire highly probable. A Ukrainian collapse would likely lead to a dictated peace, not a negotiated ceasefire. The current dynamic appears to be a costly stalemate.
- Assumption: Western military and financial support for Ukraine will remain robust enough through 2026 to prevent Kyiv from being forced into a ceasefire on Russian terms.
- Probability of Failure: 15%. Pledged aid for 2026 seems strong. However, political shifts in key allied nations could impact the speed of delivery or the commitment to future aid, increasing pressure on Ukraine.
Final Assessment
The primary barrier to a ceasefire remains the irreconcilable political objectives of the two sides, centered on territory. Russia’s leadership appears politically invested in achieving goals that Ukraine cannot accept. However, the mounting economic and human costs of the war create a powerful opposing force, pushing both sides toward at least a temporary cessation of hostilities.
Prediction markets place the likelihood around 40%, reflecting that a ceasefire is a plausible but not probable outcome. My analysis aligns with this but weights the political intractability, especially from Moscow’s side, as a slightly more powerful factor than the markets might be pricing in. The upcoming talks in Geneva are a notable event, but previous rounds have yielded little. Therefore, a forecast slightly below the market consensus is warranted. The probability is heavily back-loaded towards the second half of 2026, as the attritional costs will be much higher by then.
Probability: 38%
The extracted probability is: 38%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning (Brier-focused)
Resolution interpretation: “Resolves Yes if either a ceasefire or armistice is officially declared between Russia and Ukraine at any point in 2026, as reported by major news outlets.” I’m treating this as requiring a bilateral announced arrangement (not merely a unilateral Russian “ceasefire” declaration, and not just de facto reduction in attacks). A ceasefire can be partial/limited (e.g., a front-sector, air/energy, or maritime ceasefire) if it is presented as an official Russia–Ukraine ceasefire.
1) Base rate / priors
- Large interstate wars often end via negotiated pauses, but this specific war has shown repeated failure to convert talks into bilateral ceasefires, even when one side (Ukraine) indicates willingness for an unconditional ceasefire and the other side refuses.
- Still, we have a full remaining year (from mid-Feb) and a live diplomatic track; “officially declared” ceasefires can occur even without durable settlement.
Given the above, my prior for “some officially declared bilateral ceasefire/armistice occurring sometime in the remaining ~10.5 months” starts around the mid-30s to low-40s.
2) Current-state evidence (as of 2026-02-13)
Evidence pushing probability down:
- No current ceasefire; fighting remains active with recent barrages.
- Multiple credible analyses and Ukrainian officials emphasize Putin’s unwillingness to accept even a ceasefire absent major territorial/political concessions.
- The central impasse (territory + security guarantees) remains “close except on everything that matters,” suggesting continued deadlock.
- Prediction markets for near-term ceasefire are extremely low (e.g., ~1% by Feb 28; ~single digits by March 31), consistent with a low immediate hazard rate.
Evidence pushing probability up:
- Talks are scheduled (Reuters: next round next week). The existence of recurring negotiations plus US pressure meaningfully increases the chance of at least a limited mutually declared ceasefire over a 10+ month horizon.
- Russia’s economic stagnation / strain indicators and force-composition issues (e.g., reliance on mercenaries) weakly increase incentives for a pause—though this is not decisive because regimes can persist under strain.
- Markets for year-end 2026 are substantially higher (roughly 30–40% on Polymarket-like definitions; ~44% in an aggregated brief). Since this question’s definition may be slightly broader than some market definitions (allowing partial ceasefires), that would usually push up—but the bilateral/official requirement keeps it from inflating too much.
Net: I weight the “impasse + demonstrated refusal” heavily, but also respect that a lot can happen in 10.5 months and that limited ceasefires are politically easier than a full armistice.
3) Scenario decomposition (remaining 2026)
- No bilateral official ceasefire/armistice in 2026 (Status quo continues): persistent fighting + failed talks.
- Limited bilateral ceasefire declared (energy/air/maritime/front-sector) but not a full war-wide armistice: plausible if US/Europe brokers a narrow, monitorable package.
- Broader ceasefire/armistice declared: requires either meaningful concessions, a big battlefield shift, or a strong external enforcement/guarantee mechanism.
My distribution puts most “Yes” mass on the limited ceasefire pathway rather than a Korean-style armistice.
4) Time-slicing (cumulative probabilities)
Given markets and current momentum, I expect a low hazard in Q1, rising later if military/economic pressures accumulate and diplomacy iterates:
- By 2026-03-31: 7%
- By 2026-06-30: 20%
- By 2026-09-30: 31%
- By 2026-12-31: 42% (matches final forecast)
(For context only: by end-2027 I’d put this around the mid-50s, reflecting that many such wars eventually reach some declared pause.)
5) Key assumptions & how they could be wrong
1) Assumption: Putin continues to reject any bilateral ceasefire that doesn’t lock in major territorial/political gains.
- Probability this assumption is wrong: 30% (internal pressure, external deals, or a tactical decision to pause could shift this).
- If wrong, “Yes” probability jumps substantially.
2) Assumption: Ukraine’s leadership will not accept a ceasefire package seen as dangerously permissive (no credible guarantees / allows Russian rearmament).
- Probability wrong: 25% (war-weariness, aid conditionality, or political change could alter thresholds).
- If wrong, increases chance of a limited ceasefire.
3) Assumption: No major military discontinuity (sudden collapse/breakthrough) forces a ceasefire.
- Probability wrong: 20% (hard to forecast; tails matter).
- If wrong, could push either toward a ceasefire (to freeze gains / avert collapse) or toward intensified fighting; on balance it raises “Yes.”
I’ve moderated away from overconfidence by keeping the final probability below a “coin flip,” despite meaningful year-end market odds and ample time remaining.
Probability: 42%
The extracted probability is: 42%
GPT Binary response:
Framing and base rate
The question resolves Yes if at any point in 2026 there is an officially declared ceasefire or armistice between Russia and Ukraine, reported by major outlets. That’s a lower bar than a full peace deal, but still requires (i) mutuality and (ii) an explicit declaration (not just de‑facto lulls, informal “understandings,” or unilateral pauses).
A reasonable outside-view base rate for stalemated interstate wars under heavy external mediation is that a temporary ceasefire/armistice within ~1 year is plausible but not the default. I start from something like ~35–40% as a generic prior for “a mutually declared ceasefire occurs within the next 10–11 months” in a protracted conflict with active talks—but then update with current incentives.
Key evidence and updates
1) Negotiations exist, but core bargaining gaps remain wide (downward pressure).
Recent reporting and analyses emphasize that the war “looks close except on everything that matters”: territory, security guarantees, and enforcement. Russia’s stated conditions remain maximalist (withdrawal from claimed oblasts, Crimea recognition, limits on Ukraine/NATO), while Ukraine’s demands (credible security guarantees, no forced territorial concessions) are fundamentally incompatible. This pattern historically supports many talks, few mutually declared ceasefires.
2) Near-term market odds are extremely low (strong downward for Q1; modest information for full-year).
Polymarket pricing of ~1% by Feb 28 and low single digits by March 31 matches the observable reality: no sign of an imminent mutual halt. However, markets show material probability by year-end (roughly 30–40% for “ceasefire” products with stricter definitions). Because this question’s criterion is somewhat broader (a ceasefire could be regional/limited if mutually declared), I adjust the full-year probability upward relative to those stricter markets.
3) War endurance on both sides (mixed).
- Ukraine appears able to sustain defense through 2026 with substantial Western support (reducing urgency to accept a bad ceasefire).
- Russia’s economy stagnating and reliance on mercenaries/foreign recruits could increase pressure for a pause, but history suggests authoritarian systems can sustain costly wars longer than outsiders expect—especially when leadership frames outcomes as existential.
4) Active mediation and repeated talk rounds (upward pressure, but not decisive).
A scheduled next round of US-brokered talks in mid-February indicates continuing diplomatic “surface area.” Even if a comprehensive settlement is unlikely, diplomacy increases chances of a narrower ceasefire (e.g., limited geographic scope, specific weapons categories, or time-limited halt) that still satisfies the resolution if explicitly declared by both sides.
Scenario decomposition (through Dec 31, 2026)
I find it helpful to split into mutually exclusive pathways:
1) Comprehensive ceasefire/armistice (whole-front or de facto armistice) driven by US/EU pressure + Russian acceptance of a pause without full demands met: ~30%
2) Limited-but-official ceasefire (regional, time-limited, or category-limited but clearly labeled a ceasefire and mutually declared): ~10%
3) “Accidental” political shock leading to a declared pause (leadership/elite crisis, sudden battlefield collapse, etc.) that produces a mutually declared ceasefire/armistice within 2026: ~5%
Total: ~45%
Time-sliced probabilities (to keep myself honest)
Given the strong evidence against imminence, most probability mass sits in mid-to-late 2026.
- By March 31, 2026: 7%
- By June 30, 2026: 24%
- By September 30, 2026: 34%
- By December 31, 2026: 45%
(These are cumulative; they imply that if it happens in 2026, it’s more likely after spring.)
Key assumptions that could be wrong (and would swing the forecast)
1) Assumption: Putin will not accept a ceasefire without major territorial/political concessions.
- Probability this assumption is wrong: 30%
- Effect if wrong: big increase (ceasefire becomes much likelier, possibly >60%).
2) Assumption: Ukraine/partners will not accept a ceasefire that lacks credible enforcement/security guarantees.
- Probability this assumption is wrong: 25%
- Effect if wrong: moderate increase (more room for a “bad but stoppable” ceasefire).
3) Assumption: No decisive battlefield breakthrough occurs that reduces willingness to pause (e.g., one side perceives imminent advantage and rejects ceasefire).
- Probability this assumption is wrong: 25%
- Effect if wrong: could decrease odds (a side “playing for win” delays ceasefire), though in some collapse scenarios it could increase odds via forced armistice.
Balancing these, and correcting for my tendency toward overconfidence, I land near the mid‑40s rather than >50.
Probability: 45%
The extracted probability is: 45%
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 84, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 74, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
TimeoutError
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 84, in fetch_gpt_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, grok_report, adjacent_markets_research, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 74, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
TimeoutError
All predictions: [38, 38, 39, 40]
Filtered predictions: [38, 39]
Median reasoning:
Analysis: Ukraine Ceasefire/Armistice in 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of February 13, 2026, the Russia-Ukraine war continues with active hostilities. Russia launched barrages on Ukrainian cities as recently as February 12, 2026. While US-brokered negotiations are ongoing (third round scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva), there are fundamental disagreements on territory, security guarantees, and NATO membership.
Key Factors Against Resolution
- Putin’s Consistent Refusal: Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, but Putin has refused to reciprocate. His demands (full territorial control of four oblasts plus Crimea recognition) remain unchanged since June 2024.
- Persistent Fundamental Disagreements: Major issues remain unresolved:
- Territorial control (Russia demands areas it doesn’t occupy militarily)
- Security guarantees for Ukraine
- Future NATO membership
- Terms of ceasefire enforcement
Expert Assessment: Ukrainian parliamentary foreign affairs committee head characterized negotiations as unlikely to succeed, citing “Putin’s unwillingness to agree not only to a peace deal but even to a ceasefire.”
Recent Talks Show Minimal Progress: The second round of high-level talks showed “little to show” and “scant sign of progress.”
Key Factors Favoring Resolution
- Time Remaining: 10.5 months until resolution deadline provides substantial opportunity for developments.
- US Pressure: The Trump administration is actively pushing for resolution by summer 2026, creating external pressure on both parties.
- Russian Economic Pressure: Russia’s economy is stagnating, wartime boom is ending, and the “deathonomics” of mercenary army costs strain society.
- Lower Resolution Threshold: The question requires only a declared ceasefire or armistice, not a lasting peace deal or territorial agreement.
- Active Negotiations: Talks continue with a structured framework, despite slow progress.
Prediction Market Consensus
- Polymarket: 1% by February 28, ~6% by March 31, ~35% by June 30
- MLQ.ai aggregate: 44% by year-end 2026
- Manifold Markets: 37% for war ending in 2026
- Polymarket year-end: 30-40% implied ($9M+ volume)
Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities
Putin maintains maximalist negotiating stance (60% confidence this holds)
- If this fails (40%), ceasefire becomes significantly more likely
- Economic pressure, internal political dynamics, or exhaustion could shift this
No “black swan” events (Russian collapse, major military shift) (85% confidence)
- If unexpected event occurs (15%), could dramatically accelerate or derail negotiations
US mediation continues without breakthrough pressure (70% confidence)
- If US applies significantly more aggressive pressure (30%), could force movement
Timeline Analysis
Given the prediction market prices and underlying dynamics:
- By March 31: ~6% (near-term, minimal movement expected)
- By June 30: ~32% (mid-term, more time for developments)
- By December 31: ~38-42% (full year window, considering all factors)
Probability Calculation
The weighted prediction market consensus centers around 35-40%. My analysis of the underlying dynamics supports this range:
- Strong obstacles to agreement (Putin’s refusal, territorial gaps)
- But significant pressures and time for change
- Broad resolution criteria (any official ceasefire counts)
Accounting for my historical overconfidence and the 35% base rate for positive resolutions in similar forecasting competitions, I calibrate slightly below the market average.
Probability: 39%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.385,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Analysis: Ukraine Ceasefire/Armistice in 2026
Current Situation Assessment
As of February 13, 2026, the Russia-Ukraine war continues with active hostilities. Russia launched barrages on Ukrainian cities as recently as February 12, 2026. While US-brokered negotiations are ongoing (third round scheduled for February 17-18 in Geneva), there are fundamental disagreements on territory, security guarantees, and NATO membership.
Key Factors Against Resolution
- Putin’s Consistent Refusal: Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire in March 2025, but Putin has refused to reciprocate. His demands (full territorial control of four oblasts plus Crimea recognition) remain unchanged since June 2024.
- Persistent Fundamental Disagreements: Major issues remain unresolved:
- Territorial control (Russia demands areas it doesn’t occupy militarily)
- Security guarantees for Ukraine
- Future NATO membership
- Terms of ceasefire enforcement
Expert Assessment: Ukrainian parliamentary foreign affairs committee head characterized negotiations as unlikely to succeed, citing “Putin’s unwillingness to agree not only to a peace deal but even to a ceasefire.”
Recent Talks Show Minimal Progress: The second round of high-level talks showed “little to show” and “scant sign of progress.”
Key Factors Favoring Resolution
- Time Remaining: 10.5 months until resolution deadline provides substantial opportunity for developments.
- US Pressure: The Trump administration is actively pushing for resolution by summer 2026, creating external pressure on both parties.
- Russian Economic Pressure: Russia’s economy is stagnating, wartime boom is ending, and the “deathonomics” of mercenary army costs strain society.
- Lower Resolution Threshold: The question requires only a declared ceasefire or armistice, not a lasting peace deal or territorial agreement.
- Active Negotiations: Talks continue with a structured framework, despite slow progress.
Prediction Market Consensus
- Polymarket: 1% by February 28, ~6% by March 31, ~35% by June 30
- MLQ.ai aggregate: 44% by year-end 2026
- Manifold Markets: 37% for war ending in 2026
- Polymarket year-end: 30-40% implied ($9M+ volume)
Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities
Putin maintains maximalist negotiating stance (60% confidence this holds)
- If this fails (40%), ceasefire becomes significantly more likely
- Economic pressure, internal political dynamics, or exhaustion could shift this
No “black swan” events (Russian collapse, major military shift) (85% confidence)
- If unexpected event occurs (15%), could dramatically accelerate or derail negotiations
US mediation continues without breakthrough pressure (70% confidence)
- If US applies significantly more aggressive pressure (30%), could force movement
Timeline Analysis
Given the prediction market prices and underlying dynamics:
- By March 31: ~6% (near-term, minimal movement expected)
- By June 30: ~32% (mid-term, more time for developments)
- By December 31: ~38-42% (full year window, considering all factors)
Probability Calculation
The weighted prediction market consensus centers around 35-40%. My analysis of the underlying dynamics supports this range:
- Strong obstacles to agreement (Putin’s refusal, territorial gaps)
- But significant pressures and time for change
- Broad resolution criteria (any official ceasefire counts)
Accounting for my historical overconfidence and the 35% base rate for positive resolutions in similar forecasting competitions, I calibrate slightly below the market average.
Probability: 39%
End
