Phillip Godzin‘s pgodzinai forecasts 5%
This is the full report. Condensed version here.
Perplexity response:
# Key Sources Summary
| # | Title & Source | Date | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | “Why Are There No Ships in the Strait of Hormuz” – YouTube | March 5, 2026 | Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has collapsed, with only one ship passing on March 3 compared to the normal 120 ships per day. The video discusses ongoing attacks against shipping infrastructure, depleted oil reserves requiring ship movement, and infrastructure damage to critical terminals and pipelines. Intelligence indicates continued military presence and posturing with reduced commercial traffic volumes as key limiting factors. |
| 2 | “IRGC’s Huge Hormuz Action Against U.S. & Its Allies: Global Oil Route Mined Despite Trump Threat” – Times of India | March 2026 | Iran has deployed naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz following escalations involving the United States and Israel. Intelligence sources indicate the mining is currently limited but could expand rapidly. The minelaying is disrupting oil and LNG shipments through a route that carries nearly one-fifth of global supply. |
| 3 | “US-Iran War: Hormuz Crisis Sparks Global Energy Shock As Iraq Oil” – WION | March 8, 2026 | The escalating conflict is causing a global energy shock as the Strait of Hormuz—which normally carries 20% of world oil and LNG supplies—experiences severe shipping disruptions. Iraq’s oil production has plunged with exports falling as tanker traffic stalls and storage tanks fill. Multiple Gulf producers are cutting output, pushing crude prices sharply higher. |
| 4 | “President Trump Tells Tankers Show Some Guts!” – YouTube | March 9, 2026 | Updates show virtually no traffic through the Strait of Hormuz with large anchorages forming east and south of the strait. Attacks on the Fujairah pipeline have driven ships away from critical fueling ports, and the Hosban-Fujairah pipeline remains essential but recently damaged. Potential closure of Saudi Arabia’s Yambu pipeline would create additional massive disruptions. |
| 5 | “Why Indian Shippers Are Suspending Services Despite Insurance” – YouTube | March 2026 | A 20-25% shortage exists in overall gas supply that is difficult to mitigate in the short term. The Indian government is reaching out to LPG and LNG suppliers globally to address the critical supply gap. |
| 6 | “US Military Attacks Iran’s Minelaying Boats in Strait of Hormuz” – WION | March 11, 2026 | The U.S. military destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying boats in the Strait of Hormuz on March 11, targeting vessels capable of deploying naval mines. The operation was aimed at protecting commercial shipping and preventing threats to maritime traffic. |
| 7 | “Hormuz Disruptions, US Navy Escort Plans (or lack of) and Impact” – YouTube | March 10, 2026 | Updates on March 10 show the first of several Chinese ships running outbound through the strait, with analysis of U.S. Navy escort plans and their effectiveness. |
| 8 | “Iran is ‘terrified’ by this: Victoria Coates” – Fox Business | March 2026 | Oil prices are surging and markets are selling off as Iran reportedly halts Strait of Hormuz traffic, creating severe market instability. |
Current Situation Analysis
Critical Status as of March 11-12, 2026:
The Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted with traffic at near-total collapse. On March 3, only one ship transited the strait compared to the normal 120 ships per day[1]. As of March 9-10, the video updates show “basically no traffic whatsoever” through the strait, with large vessel anchorages forming outside the chokepoint[4].
Military Escalation:
The U.S. military destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying boats on March 11, 2026, targeting vessels capable of deploying naval mines[6]. Iran has deployed naval mines in the strait, though intelligence sources indicate this deployment is “currently limited but could expand rapidly”[2]. This military action represents a significant escalation but has not yet restored traffic flows.
LNG Supply Impact:
The disruption is creating a 20-25% shortage in global gas supply that is “very difficult in a very short period of time to sort of mitigate”[5]. LNG tankers remain unable to move cargo through the strait, forcing suppliers like Qatar to consider shutting down LNG production facilities[4]. The Indian government is actively reaching out to global LNG suppliers to address critical shortfalls[5].
Infrastructure Damage:
Critical fueling and loading infrastructure has been damaged or threatened. The Fujairah pipeline—essential for global ship fueling—has been attacked, driving vessels away from the port[4]. The Hosban-Fujairah pipeline remains vulnerable, and potential attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Yambu pipeline could create additional “massive disruptions”[4].
Shipping Economics:
Trump administration officials announced an escort plan to guarantee energy flows, but this has been “met with skepticism” regarding implementation details[1]. Shipping rates have more than doubled in two weeks, with costs to move crude from the U.S. Gulf to China reaching record levels equivalent to nearly 20% of WTI crude prices[1].
Path to Resolution Uncertainties:
The sources indicate that resumption of traffic could itself cause significant disruption: “once everything starts flowing, it’s going to cause chaos down the system for oil, for refined products, for gas”[1]. The presence of excess vessel capacity adds complexity to rapid normalization[1]. Military presence and continued posturing are expected to remain as limiting factors through the forecast period[1].
Grok response:
- Title: How the Strait of Hormuz closure affects global oil supply
Source: Reuters[1]
Published: March 11, 2026
Summary: The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, halting around a fifth of global oil and LNG supply through the chokepoint. Shipping data shows hundreds of vessels, including LNG carriers, stranded outside unable to enter. No normalization of traffic reported, with severe restrictions ongoing. - Title: Iran war has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil chokepoint
Source: AP News[2]
Published: March 12, 2026 (19 hours ago)
Summary: The war has closed the Strait, blocking oil and gas shipments including LNG. Governments are planning to unblock it, but Iranian forces continue attacks and threats. Traffic remains at historic lows with no LNG transits reported recently. - Title: Why it’s so hard to get oil through the Strait of Hormuz right now
Source: NBC News[3]
Published: March 12, 2026 (20 hours ago)
Summary: Iranian statements vow no oil or LNG passage for U.S. allies, with mines and attacks enforcing closure. Tanker and LNG traffic suspended since late February. Reopening efforts face high risks from ongoing conflict. - Title: Iran war leads to historic closing of the Strait of Hormuz
Source: TPR[4]
Published: March 11, 2026 (16 hours ago)
Summary: Unprecedented full closure since war start, unprecedented for LNG and oil shipping halt. No prior full blockades occurred. Current status severely restricted with zero reliable LNG traffic. - Title: 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis
Source: Wikipedia[5]
Published: March 12, 2026 (4 hours ago)
Summary: Crisis began February 28, 2026, with US-Israel strikes prompting Iranian retaliation and strait blockade. LNG and oil traffic halted, affecting 20% global supply. Ongoing as of March 12 with no reopening. - Title: Iran Update Morning Special Report, March 11, 2026
Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW)[6]
Published: March 11, 2026
Summary: Iran deployed naval mines in Strait, targeting commercial vessels including potential LNG carriers. Traffic heavily suppressed in Persian Gulf. No inbound/outbound normalization, restrictions severe. - Title: March 11, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily
Source: Windward.AI[7]
Published: March 11, 2026 (21 hours ago)
Summary: Transit activity through Strait heavily suppressed on March 10: only two outbound crossings, no inbound. Applies to oil and LNG tankers. Data confirms near standstill for international maritime traffic. - Title: Short-term energy outlook (EIA)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)[8]
Published: March 10, 2026
Summary: As of March 9, Strait of Hormuz effectively closed to most shipping traffic amid Iran war. Impacts global LNG trade, with about 20% historically transiting. No data on reopening; forecasts assume prolonged disruption. - Title: Tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz comes to a standstill
Source: Reuters[9]
Published: March 5, 2026
Summary: Shipping data shows hundreds of vessels, including LNG, outside Hormuz unable to reach ports. Blockade entered early days with traffic zeroed. Relevant to ongoing halt as of March 12. - Title: Hormuz Strait traffic tracking day ten: only 3 oil tankers passed, LNG …
Source: Longbridge[10]
Published: March 11, 2026 (1 day ago)
Summary: Blockade day ten: transiting vessels far below normal, minimal oil tankers, LNG traffic negligible. Puts pressure on global supply. No signs of full reopening for international LNG.
The Strait of Hormuz, a vital chokepoint for approximately 20% of global LNG trade, has been effectively closed to international maritime traffic—including LNG carriers—since late February 2026 due to the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war.[5][8] Iran declared the strait closed on February 28, deploying mines, attacking vessels, and vowing to prevent passage for adversaries, leading to a near-total halt in shipments.[11][6] Major news outlets like Reuters, AP, and NBC consistently report traffic at historic lows: tanker transits down 90-97%, with LNG specifically suspended by oil majors and traders amid attack risks.[1][2][12]
As of March 11-12, 2026, the latest maritime intelligence shows suppressed activity: only 2 outbound crossings on March 10 (none inbound), three cargo ships struck by projectiles on March 11, and 13-16 total attacks since war start.[7][13] Isolated transits occurred (e.g., Indian and Saudi tankers), but these are exceptional, risky “chicken runs” not indicative of normalized LNG traffic; Iranian leadership reiterated closure as leverage on March 12.[14][15] U.S. officials discuss escorts, but none implemented; President Trump urged tankers to proceed without guarantees, while CSIS notes even Chinese ships denied passage.[16][17]
No major news reports indicate reopening or lifting of severe restrictions before May 2026; instead, updates emphasize escalation with mines, strikes, and vows to maintain blockade “as long as war continues.”[18] EIA’s March 10 outlook confirms effective closure to most traffic, projecting supply shocks without short-term resolution.[8] Historical context: prior threats never fully materialized, but current data (e.g., Bloomberg trackers) shows unprecedented standstill for LNG/oil.[19]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning
Current Situation (March 12, 2026):
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since ~February 28, 2026, due to the US-Israel-Iran war. LNG traffic is essentially zero, with total vessel transits down 90-97% from normal (~1-3 ships vs. 120/day). Iran has deployed naval mines, attacked vessels, and publicly vowed to maintain the blockade. US military has destroyed mine-laying boats but has not restored traffic.
Resolution Requirements:
The question resolves YES only if LNG traffic is “not halted or severely restricted through May 31, 2026.” This is a very high bar: traffic must not only resume but remain essentially normal through the end of May.
Key Assumptions to Test:
- The war continues for at least several more weeks (~90% likely). Active military conflicts between major powers rarely end in days. Even optimistic ceasefire scenarios require diplomatic negotiations that take weeks.
- Even after a ceasefire, mine clearance and normalization take weeks to months (~95% likely). Historical precedent: post-1991 Gulf War mine clearing took months. Insurance normalization adds additional delay. LNG carriers require the highest safety standards.
- Iran maintains capability and willingness to disrupt traffic through the forecast period (~85% likely given current escalation trajectory and Iran’s strategic leverage).
Timeline Analysis:
- P(war ends by April 1): ~7% → P(full LNG normalization by May 31 | ceasefire by Apr 1): ~40%
- P(war ends April 1–May 1): ~15% → P(normalization by May 31 | ceasefire Apr–May): ~20%
- P(war ends May 1–31): ~10% → P(normalization by May 31 | ceasefire in May): ~3%
- P(war continues past May 31): ~68% → P(Yes) = 0%
Composite estimate:
P(Yes) ≈ (0.07 × 0.40) + (0.15 × 0.20) + (0.10 × 0.03) + (0.68 × 0.00) ≈ 0.028 + 0.030 + 0.003 = ~6.1%
Additional downward adjustment:
- “All international maritime LNG traffic” is an extremely high bar—even partial restrictions or discrimination against certain flag states would fail this criterion
- The requirement is continuous (“through May 31”), not just a snapshot
- Historical base rate: no precedent for rapid reopening after full wartime closure with active mining
Upward adjustment consideration:
- Strong economic incentives for all parties to restore traffic
- US military superiority could force partial reopening
- But these don’t overcome the structural barriers within 2.5 months
Probability: 5%
The extracted probability is: 5%
GPT Binary response:
The best current read is that Yes is possible, but still clearly less likely than No.
Key points driving the forecast:
- Current state is near-total closure/severe restriction. The freshest and most credible sources here are Reuters, AP, NBC, EIA, and ISW from March 10-12. They all point the same way: LNG traffic is effectively halted, vessel transits are at historic lows, mines and attacks are ongoing, and there is no sign yet of normalized passage.
- The resolution bar is fairly high. This is not asking whether a few tankers or escorted vessels can get through. It resolves Yes only if international LNG traffic is not halted or severely restricted by May 31. That means broad practical reopening, not token movement.
- LNG is harder to restart than generic shipping. Even if some oil tankers resume, LNG carriers are especially risk-sensitive because of cargo hazards, insurance costs, charterer caution, and terminal/schedule disruption. “Some ships moving” is not enough.
- There are only about 80 days left. Short time horizons favor the status quo. To get to Yes, several things have to happen quickly: attacks suppressed, mines cleared or contained, insurers and operators regain confidence, and major outlets stop describing the route as severely restricted.
- But there is meaningful pressure to reopen. The strait is too economically important to leave shut if the U.S. and partners can help it. The U.S. has already struck mine-laying boats. So a nontrivial reopening chance exists, especially if there is a ceasefire, partial settlement, or effective naval escort regime.
How I’m weighting scenarios:
- Conflict stays hot through much of the period; traffic remains halted/severely restricted
This is the base case. Recent evidence strongly supports it. - Partial reopening: some escorted or exceptional transits occur, but conditions still count as severe restriction
This feels quite plausible and still resolves No. - Broad reopening by May 31
Requires either:
- a relatively fast de-escalation/ceasefire plus cleanup and confidence restoration, or
- a successful military suppression/escort regime that convinces commercial LNG shipping to resume at non-severely-restricted levels.
That third scenario is real, but it needs several linked steps to go right within a short window.
Useful timeline check:
- By end of March: very low chance of qualifying reopening.
- By end of April: meaningfully higher, but still minority.
- By May 31: higher again, but still below even odds.
- On a longer horizon like end-2026, I’d be much more optimistic than for this question’s window.
The assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast:
- Assumption 1: The war/blockade dynamic persists long enough to keep traffic heavily disrupted.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 35%.
If wrong, Yes becomes much more plausible. - Assumption 2: Even if direct attacks decline, insurance/commercial risk aversion will keep LNG traffic severely restricted through May.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 40%.
If wrong, reopening could happen faster than expected. - Assumption 3: Major news outlets will require broad normalization, not just a handful of escorted sailings, before describing LNG traffic as no longer severely restricted.
Chance this assumption is wrong: about 20%.
If wrong, the resolution standard is easier to clear.
Overall, the combination of:
- very bad current conditions,
- the high bar for “reopen,”
- LNG-specific caution,
- and the short deadline
keeps me on the No side, though not overwhelmingly.
Probability: 24%
The extracted probability is: 24%
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning: Will the Strait of Hormuz Reopen to All International Maritime LNG Traffic Before May 2026?
Current Situation Assessment (March 12, 2026)
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since ~February 28, 2026, due to the US-Israel-Iran war. Key facts:
- Traffic collapsed 90-97% from normal (~120 ships/day to 1-3)
- LNG traffic is essentially zero; major traders have suspended operations
- Iran has deployed naval mines and attacked vessels (13-16 attacks since war start)
- Critical infrastructure (Fujairah pipeline, terminals) has been damaged
- US destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying boats on March 11 but hasn’t reopened traffic
- No ceasefire negotiations reported; Iran reiterates closure as wartime leverage
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires LNG traffic to be “not halted or severely restricted through May 31, 2026” — this is an extremely high bar requiring near-full normalization, not just partial resumption.
Key Pathways to YES Resolution
Path 1: Rapid war termination + fast normalization
- Wars rarely end within 2-3 months of outbreak, especially with the current escalation trajectory
- Even if a ceasefire occurred in March/April, mine clearance historically takes weeks to months
- Post-conflict insurance normalization and shipping confidence rebuilding adds further delay
- P(war ends by April) ≈ 15-20%; P(full LNG normalization within months of ceasefire) ≈ 25-35%
- Combined: ~5%
Path 2: US military escorts normalize “all” LNG traffic
- Trump’s escort proposals met with widespread skepticism
- Mines make escorts insufficient for insurance underwriting
- LNG carriers are high-value targets; operators extremely risk-averse
- P ≈ 3-5%
Path 3: Iran voluntarily reopens as diplomatic gesture
- Contradicts current Iranian strategy of using closure as leverage
- P ≈ 2%
Critical Assumptions to Test
- The war continues through most of the forecast period (~80% likely) — If wrong, opens possibility but doesn’t guarantee normalization
- Mine clearance requires extended time post-conflict (~85% likely) — Even rapid demining takes weeks; “all LNG traffic” requires insurance normalization
- Iran maintains willingness/ability to enforce closure (~75% likely) — US strikes may degrade capability, but Iran has demonstrated resilience
Accounting for Uncertainty
- The situation is unprecedented (first full closure of Hormuz)
- There’s ~2.5 months until deadline, which is short for conflict resolution + normalization
- Default trajectory strongly suggests continued disruption
- My historical overconfidence bias suggests I should be cautious about assigning even moderate probability
Overall Assessment
The combined probability across all pathways, accounting for overlap and the extremely demanding resolution criteria (“all international maritime LNG traffic” + “not severely restricted”), is very low. The current trajectory shows escalation, not de-escalation, and even optimistic scenarios struggle to achieve full normalization within the timeframe.
Probability: 5%
The extracted probability is: 5%
Anthropic Binary response:
Reasoning
Current Status (March 12, 2026):
- The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since ~February 28, 2026
- An active US-Israel-Iran war is ongoing with no ceasefire in sight
- Iran has deployed naval mines; traffic down 90-97% from normal
- LNG traffic specifically is suspended by all major operators
- Iranian leadership reiterated closure on March 12 as war leverage
- US military actions (destroying mine-laying boats) have not restored traffic
- Critical infrastructure (Fujairah pipeline, terminals) damaged
What Must Happen for YES Resolution:
The question requires that LNG traffic be “not halted or severely restricted” through May 31, 2026. This demands:
- War must end or Iran’s naval capabilities must be fully neutralized
- Mines must be cleared (historically takes weeks to months; post-Gulf War clearing took 3+ months)
- Infrastructure must be repaired
- Insurance markets must normalize (weeks of lag)
- LNG carriers must resume regular transit
- All of this must hold continuously through May 31
Timeline Analysis:
- Probability war ends by April 1: ~8%
- Probability war ends by May 1: ~20-25%
- Probability war continues past May 31: ~50-60%
- Even if war ended tomorrow, full mine clearing + infrastructure repair + insurance normalization + resumption of unrestricted LNG traffic would likely take 2-4 months
Critical Assumptions (and failure probabilities):
| Assumption | P(Wrong) | Impact if Wrong |
|---|---|---|
| War continues through at least mid-April | ~15% | Even if wrong, normalization timeline still very tight |
| Mine clearing requires 4+ weeks post-hostilities | ~10% | Faster clearing could help, but insurance/infrastructure lag remains |
| “Not severely restricted” means near-normal flow | ~5% | Looser interpretation could help marginally |
Compound Probability:
Even in the most optimistic scenario chain (war ends by early April × rapid mine clearing × quick insurance normalization × sustained unrestricted traffic through May 31), the joint probability is very low. Each step has low individual probability, and they must all occur sequentially.
The base case — continued conflict or at minimum severe lingering restrictions — overwhelmingly dominates.
Probability: 4%
The extracted probability is: 4%
Gemini Binary response:
An expert analysis of the situation regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to LNG traffic indicates a very low probability of resolution before May 31, 2026. This forecast is based on a careful evaluation of the current military conflict, logistical hurdles, and the short timeframe available.
Reasoning for Forecast
- Prevailing State of Conflict: As of March 12, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed due to an active war involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. Traffic has collapsed from a daily average of 120 vessels to nearly zero. Iran has deployed naval mines and has militarily enforced the blockade, with ongoing attacks against shipping infrastructure. Conflicts of this magnitude, involving direct military exchanges between nations, rarely resolve within a short period of 11 weeks. The resolution of the conflict is a prerequisite for any meaningful reopening of the strait.
- Logistical and Safety Hurdles: Even if a ceasefire were declared immediately, the process of making the strait safe for commercial traffic is complex and time-consuming.
- De-mining: The confirmed presence of naval mines requires extensive and meticulous clearing operations by specialized military assets. This process itself can take weeks or months to ensure a channel is completely safe.
- Insurance and Risk Aversion: LNG carriers are high-value assets with volatile cargo. The shipping and insurance industries would be extremely risk-averse following a period of active conflict. They would likely await a sustained period of proven stability and potentially require sovereign guarantees or military escorts, which are not yet established, before resuming normal operations.
- High Bar for Resolution: The resolution criteria specify that LNG traffic must not be “halted or severely restricted.” This implies a return to a state of normalcy and reliability. Isolated, high-risk transits or even a heavily escorted convoy system would likely still be considered a “severe restriction” compared to the normal flow of traffic. As of mid-March, not even ships from nations with positive relations with Iran, such as China, have been guaranteed passage.
- Insufficient Timeframe: The core of this forecast is the extremely short window between today (March 12) and the resolution date (May 31). For a “Yes” resolution, the following sequence must occur:
- A decisive end to hostilities or a political settlement where Iran relinquishes control of the strait.
- The complete and verified clearing of all naval mines and other direct threats.
- A restoration of confidence among shippers and insurers, leading to the resumption of regular LNG traffic.
It is highly improbable that this entire chain of events could conclude in under three months. The default condition is that the strait remains closed, and the path to reopening is long and complex. While an unforeseen, rapid event—such as a sudden political collapse in Iran or a decisive, overwhelming military operation to secure the strait—cannot be entirely ruled out, its probability remains very low.
Therefore, the forecast heavily favors the “No” outcome, as the current state of a severe, war-induced blockade is unlikely to be fully reversed within the specified timeframe.
Probability: 3%
The extracted probability is: 3%
GPT Binary response:
The strongest evidence, and the most recent, points to a current state of near-complete closure for LNG traffic through Hormuz. Reuters, AP, NBC, EIA, and ISW all describe the strait as effectively closed or heavily suppressed as of March 10-12, with mines, direct attacks, and almost no normal transit activity. I weight those sources much more heavily than commentary videos or secondary summaries.
The key forecasting point is that the resolution standard is fairly strict. This is not asking whether a few ships might dash through, or whether one country’s escorted vessels might attempt transit. It resolves Yes only if international maritime LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted by May 31, as major news outlets describe it. That is a much higher bar than “some movement resumes.”
So the default path from here is still No. If nothing materially changes, it stays closed/severely restricted and resolves No.
For Yes, several things likely must all happen within about 11 weeks:
- The military threat must drop substantially:
either a ceasefire/de-escalation, or a decisive enough suppression of Iranian mining/missile/drone capability. - Maritime security must become credible:
mine clearance, escorts, and proof that ships can pass repeatedly without losses. - Insurers, shipowners, and LNG operators must believe it:
commercial traffic does not normalize just because a government says “the route is open.” LNG cargoes are high-value, and shipowners are especially sensitive to residual war risk. - Major news coverage must shift:
by late May, outlets would need to describe LNG traffic as effectively resumed rather than “still restricted.”
That chain is possible, but it is a demanding sequence.
Base-rate and analogy considerations push me toward caution. The best analogy is not a short engineering disruption like the Ever Given; it is a wartime maritime threat environment more like the Red Sea crisis, where even strong navies struggled to restore normal commercial confidence quickly. Hormuz is more strategically vital and likely to attract a stronger US-led response, which raises reopening odds, but the asymmetry remains: attackers need only preserve enough threat to keep insurers and carriers wary.
Counterarguments that raise the Yes probability:
- The economic incentive to reopen is enormous.
- Qatar LNG exports are too important for many countries to tolerate a long closure.
- The US has already struck mine-laying boats, suggesting active efforts to restore passage.
- Ceasefires in high-cost regional wars can happen abruptly.
But the time window is still short, and the resolution threshold is high.
My rough timeline view:
- Reopen by April 1: very low
- Reopen by May 1: still low, but materially higher if diplomacy accelerates
- Reopen by May 31: modest but clearly below 50
- Reopen by late 2026: much more likely than by May 31
The assumptions most likely to be wrong, and most important:
- Assumption: the conflict/threat environment remains severe through much of spring.
Chance this is wrong: 35%
If wrong, reopening odds rise sharply. - Assumption: isolated escorted transits will not satisfy the resolution standard.
Chance this is wrong: 20%
If the market/source interpretation proves looser than I expect, Yes becomes more plausible. - Assumption: insurance and commercial normalization will lag military improvements.
Chance this is wrong: 30%
If carriers return faster than expected after a security shift, Yes odds rise meaningfully.
After accounting for those upside paths, I still think the base case is that Hormuz remains halted or severely restricted for LNG through late May. The hurdle is simply too high to make Yes the likelier outcome.
Probability: 21%
The extracted probability is: 21%
GPT Binary response:
The key issue is the resolution standard, not just whether a few ships squeeze through. This resolves Yes only if major outlets are describing international maritime LNG traffic through Hormuz as no longer halted or severely restricted by May 31. So isolated escorted passages, or a handful of “test” LNG runs, probably would not be enough.
Why the base case is still No:
- As of March 11-12, the best recent reporting is uniformly bad: Reuters, AP, NBC, EIA, ISW, and maritime-intel sources all describe an effective shutdown or near-total collapse in traffic, including LNG.
- There are only about 80 days left. For a Yes, several things would have to happen fast:
- Iranian attacks/mining/interdiction must stop or be suppressed,
- any mines must be cleared,
- insurers, shipowners, and crews must regain enough confidence to resume normal LNG movements,
- traffic must recover enough that major outlets stop calling it “severely restricted.”
- Those are sequential bottlenecks, not parallel ones. Even if the military situation improves, commercial normalization often lags.
- Recent analogs like Red Sea shipping show that even with major naval protection, trade can remain heavily disrupted for a long time. Here the threat environment appears worse: state conflict, mines, missile/drone risk, and damaged supporting infrastructure.
Why Yes is still live:
- The economic incentive to reopen Hormuz is enormous.
- The U.S. has already begun directly targeting mine-laying capacity.
- If there is a ceasefire or a sharp degradation of Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, reopening could happen surprisingly quickly relative to current expectations.
- Gulf LNG exporters and importers have massive incentives to push for escorted corridors or a negotiated reopening.
My time-path estimate:
- Reopened by April 1: about 4%
- Reopened by May 1: about 11%
- Reopened by May 31: about 18%
- Reopened by August 31: about 38%
The assumptions most likely to be wrong and most impactful:
- Assumption: the conflict remains intense enough through May to keep insurers and LNG operators away.
Chance this assumption is wrong: 30%
If wrong, odds rise materially. - Assumption: even after de-escalation, mine-clearing/security assurance/commercial restart will take weeks and keep traffic “severely restricted.”
Chance this assumption is wrong: 25%
If wrong, reopening can happen faster than I’m modeling. - Assumption: resolution will be interpreted strictly — broad normalization, not token or heavily escorted LNG passages.
Chance this assumption is wrong: 20%
If a looser interpretation is used, Yes becomes more likely.
Overall, the short timeline plus the stringent “not severely restricted” threshold dominate. The modal outcome is still that Hormuz remains effectively closed or heavily constrained for LNG through the resolution date, even if some marginal traffic resumes.
Probability: 18%
The extracted probability is: 18%
All predictions: [3, 4, 5, 5, 18, 21, 24]
Filtered predictions: [5, 5, 18]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning: Will the Strait of Hormuz Reopen to All International Maritime LNG Traffic Before May 2026?
Current Situation Assessment (March 12, 2026)
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since ~February 28, 2026, due to the US-Israel-Iran war. Key facts:
- Traffic collapsed 90-97% from normal (~120 ships/day to 1-3)
- LNG traffic is essentially zero; major traders have suspended operations
- Iran has deployed naval mines and attacked vessels (13-16 attacks since war start)
- Critical infrastructure (Fujairah pipeline, terminals) has been damaged
- US destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying boats on March 11 but hasn’t reopened traffic
- No ceasefire negotiations reported; Iran reiterates closure as wartime leverage
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires LNG traffic to be “not halted or severely restricted through May 31, 2026” — this is an extremely high bar requiring near-full normalization, not just partial resumption.
Key Pathways to YES Resolution
Path 1: Rapid war termination + fast normalization
- Wars rarely end within 2-3 months of outbreak, especially with the current escalation trajectory
- Even if a ceasefire occurred in March/April, mine clearance historically takes weeks to months
- Post-conflict insurance normalization and shipping confidence rebuilding adds further delay
- P(war ends by April) ≈ 15-20%; P(full LNG normalization within months of ceasefire) ≈ 25-35%
- Combined: ~5%
Path 2: US military escorts normalize “all” LNG traffic
- Trump’s escort proposals met with widespread skepticism
- Mines make escorts insufficient for insurance underwriting
- LNG carriers are high-value targets; operators extremely risk-averse
- P ≈ 3-5%
Path 3: Iran voluntarily reopens as diplomatic gesture
- Contradicts current Iranian strategy of using closure as leverage
- P ≈ 2%
Critical Assumptions to Test
- The war continues through most of the forecast period (~80% likely) — If wrong, opens possibility but doesn’t guarantee normalization
- Mine clearance requires extended time post-conflict (~85% likely) — Even rapid demining takes weeks; “all LNG traffic” requires insurance normalization
- Iran maintains willingness/ability to enforce closure (~75% likely) — US strikes may degrade capability, but Iran has demonstrated resilience
Accounting for Uncertainty
- The situation is unprecedented (first full closure of Hormuz)
- There’s ~2.5 months until deadline, which is short for conflict resolution + normalization
- Default trajectory strongly suggests continued disruption
- My historical overconfidence bias suggests I should be cautious about assigning even moderate probability
Overall Assessment
The combined probability across all pathways, accounting for overlap and the extremely demanding resolution criteria (“all international maritime LNG traffic” + “not severely restricted”), is very low. The current trajectory shows escalation, not de-escalation, and even optimistic scenarios struggle to achieve full normalization within the timeframe.
Probability: 5%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.09333333333333334,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning: Will the Strait of Hormuz Reopen to All International Maritime LNG Traffic Before May 2026?
Current Situation Assessment (March 12, 2026)
The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since ~February 28, 2026, due to the US-Israel-Iran war. Key facts:
- Traffic collapsed 90-97% from normal (~120 ships/day to 1-3)
- LNG traffic is essentially zero; major traders have suspended operations
- Iran has deployed naval mines and attacked vessels (13-16 attacks since war start)
- Critical infrastructure (Fujairah pipeline, terminals) has been damaged
- US destroyed 16 Iranian mine-laying boats on March 11 but hasn’t reopened traffic
- No ceasefire negotiations reported; Iran reiterates closure as wartime leverage
Resolution Criteria Analysis
The question requires LNG traffic to be “not halted or severely restricted through May 31, 2026” — this is an extremely high bar requiring near-full normalization, not just partial resumption.
Key Pathways to YES Resolution
Path 1: Rapid war termination + fast normalization
- Wars rarely end within 2-3 months of outbreak, especially with the current escalation trajectory
- Even if a ceasefire occurred in March/April, mine clearance historically takes weeks to months
- Post-conflict insurance normalization and shipping confidence rebuilding adds further delay
- P(war ends by April) ≈ 15-20%; P(full LNG normalization within months of ceasefire) ≈ 25-35%
- Combined: ~5%
Path 2: US military escorts normalize “all” LNG traffic
- Trump’s escort proposals met with widespread skepticism
- Mines make escorts insufficient for insurance underwriting
- LNG carriers are high-value targets; operators extremely risk-averse
- P ≈ 3-5%
Path 3: Iran voluntarily reopens as diplomatic gesture
- Contradicts current Iranian strategy of using closure as leverage
- P ≈ 2%
Critical Assumptions to Test
- The war continues through most of the forecast period (~80% likely) — If wrong, opens possibility but doesn’t guarantee normalization
- Mine clearance requires extended time post-conflict (~85% likely) — Even rapid demining takes weeks; “all LNG traffic” requires insurance normalization
- Iran maintains willingness/ability to enforce closure (~75% likely) — US strikes may degrade capability, but Iran has demonstrated resilience
Accounting for Uncertainty
- The situation is unprecedented (first full closure of Hormuz)
- There’s ~2.5 months until deadline, which is short for conflict resolution + normalization
- Default trajectory strongly suggests continued disruption
- My historical overconfidence bias suggests I should be cautious about assigning even moderate probability
Overall Assessment
The combined probability across all pathways, accounting for overlap and the extremely demanding resolution criteria (“all international maritime LNG traffic” + “not severely restricted”), is very low. The current trajectory shows escalation, not de-escalation, and even optimistic scenarios struggle to achieve full normalization within the timeframe.
Probability: 5%
End
