Will the Strait of Hormuz reopen to all LNG traffic before 31st July 2026?

Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 7%

This is the full report. Condensed version here.

Perplexity response:

1. “The New Normal in Hormuz after 17 Weeks” – Post‑closure shipping conditions[1]
   Published: 29 June 2026[1]
   This maritime analysis video reviews how shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has evolved after more than four months of war‑related disruption, emphasizing that a true return to normal remains distant.[1] It reports that at least 80 naval mines are believed to be in the central shipping corridor, forcing traffic into constrained alternative channels.[1] It also notes that facilities were shut down or curtailed and are now being slowly ramped back up, with analysts stressing that the strait has not reached pre‑war operating conditions.[1]
2. “The New Normal in Hormuz after 17 Weeks” – LNG and regional energy impacts[1]
   Published: 29 June 2026[1]
   The same report highlights how countries such as Pakistan and India, which rely heavily on Persian Gulf oil, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas, are among the most affected by the closure and disruption.[1] It explains that shipping disruptions have had “massive impacts” on these economies because their energy supplies travel relatively short distances but are highly dependent on Hormuz.[1] The video also states that Middle East producers continue oil and LNG loadings despite ship attacks, underscoring that flows persist but under heightened risk and cost rather than fully halted, and that there has not been a “permanent closure” of the Strait of Hormuz.[1]
3. “The New Normal in Hormuz after 17 Weeks” – Mine threat, PGSA, and transit regime[1]
   Published: 29 June 2026[1]
   This segment focuses on the mine threat and the regulatory environment, noting that maritime authorities estimate at least 80 mines in Hormuz shipping lanes, complicating any full reopening.[1] It discusses the creation of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), which requires ships to complete paperwork and obtain approval before sailing through the strait, adding bureaucratic friction to physical risk.[1] The report describes the expansion of certain lanes into two‑way channels and observes that some ships have begun using the central corridor again without reported mine strikes, but emphasizes that overall risk and restrictions remain high.[1]
4. “Iran and Oman Clash Over Future of Strait of Hormuz” – Control of the strait and MoU to reopen[2]
   Published: 30 June 2026[2]
   This video explains that the Strait of Hormuz was previously responsible for about one‑fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows, underlining its centrality to world energy markets.[2] It reports that shipping has been disrupted since a U.S.–Israel attack on Iran and Iran’s retaliation, raising questions over who actually controls the waterway.[2] The report notes a memorandum of understanding signed on 18 June in which Tehran agreed to help reopen the strait, but stresses that implementation and control over traffic remain contentious.[2]
5. “Iran and Oman Clash Over Future of Strait of Hormuz” – Southern Oman route and mine‑avoidance[2]
   Published: 30 June 2026[2]
   This source describes an alternative shipping route inside Oman’s territorial waters, developed with support from the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to steer vessels away from areas suspected of containing sea mines in the main central corridor.[2] Under this plan, ships avoid the traditional central lane and instead use a southern track that keeps them in waters considered safer from mine threats.[2] The report notes that this alternative is itself generating political friction between Iran and Oman over control and transit conditions.[2]
6. “Iran and Oman Clash Over Future of Strait of Hormuz” – Demining politics and 60‑day moratorium[2]
   Published: 30 June 2026[2]
   The video states that the IMO believes more than 80 mines must be cleared before normal traffic can resume, making demining a prerequisite for full reopening.[2] It highlights that demining operations have become politically contested, with France and other actors drawn into disagreements over who leads and how it is conducted.[2] The report also mentions that Iran is seeking to control traffic flows during a 60‑day moratorium period and has attacked shipping transiting lanes not approved by Tehran, indicating continued operational hazards and political leverage.[2]
7. “Indus Waters Treaty Conference | 30th June 26” – Transit fees and shipping drop in Hormuz[3]
   Published: 30 June 2026[3]
   This conference coverage briefly reports that Oman has rejected transit fees proposed for ships passing through Hormuz, highlighting disputes over the cost structure of post‑war shipping.[3] It notes that shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has dropped following attacks, confirming a measurable decline in maritime flows through the chokepoint.[3] The mention of two IRGC members killed in western Iran reinforces the ongoing security volatility that underpins risks to commercial navigation.[3]
8. “Indus Waters Treaty Conference | 30th June 26” – Regional implications of Hormuz disruption[3]
   Published: 30 June 2026[3]
   The same source links the Hormuz shipping disruptions to broader regional debates over transit rights and fees in energy and water corridors, suggesting that the crisis is reshaping negotiations beyond the strait itself.[3] It implies that resistance to new transit fees and falling ship traffic could complicate any coordinated reopening or normalization scheme.[3] The combination of transit disputes and security incidents is presented as a barrier to rapid restoration of full commercial flows, including LNG shipments.[3]
9. “U.S. Cong Moves To Cut $3.3 BN Military Aid Amid War | WATCH” – U.S. policy response to the war[4]
   Published: 30 June 2026[4]
   This report covers moves in the U.S. Congress to cut $3.3 billion in military aid amid the ongoing war, framed by some lawmakers as a push to avoid funding “war criminals.”[4] While not directly about shipping, it illustrates the intensity of political backlash and the possibility of shifts in U.S. involvement in the conflict that affects Hormuz.[4] Changes in U.S. security posture and regional alliances could influence the pace and manner of efforts to secure and reopen the strait for energy traffic, including LNG.[4]
10. “Rabbi Calls IDF Chief ‘Accursed’…” – Israeli domestic tensions linked to the conflict[5]
    Published: 30 June 2026[5]
    This piece describes a political firestorm in Israel after a prominent rabbi publicly attacked the IDF chief of staff, reflecting deep domestic divisions over war policy.[5] These internal tensions could constrain or reshape Israeli decision‑making around the regional conflict, which indirectly affects Iran’s posture and security conditions in Hormuz.[5] The source underscores that the war is generating political instability that may prolong uncertainty around the strait’s security environment and thus the timeline for fully restoring LNG traffic.[5]

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The latest late‑June 2026 reporting indicates that shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly disrupted, with mine threats, political disputes, and administrative controls all constraining commercial traffic.[1][2][3] There is no evidence in these sources that the strait has yet “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic” in a way that would meet the stated resolution criteria, and most expert commentary suggests that a full return to normal conditions is still some distance away.[1][2]

Current Status of Maritime and LNG Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz

Recent analyses emphasize that, although some shipping has resumed, Hormuz is operating under abnormal and restrictive conditions.[1][2] Maritime analysts report that while Middle East producers continue oil and LNG loadings, they are doing so in an environment of elevated risk, higher costs, and constrained route options, rather than under normal, free‑flowing conditions.[1] Shipping traffic is described as having dropped after attacks, and a significant portion of vessels must navigate alternative or narrower lanes to avoid suspected minefields in the central corridor.[1][2][3]

For LNG specifically, the strait historically carried a substantial share of global liquefied natural gas exports, especially from Gulf producers, and disruptions have had notable impacts on energy‑dependent countries like Pakistan and India.[1][2] These countries are singled out as particularly affected because their energy imports are heavily concentrated in Persian Gulf oil, natural gas, and LPG flows that rely on Hormuz.[1] The current situation involves continued loadings and some transits but with higher freight costs, more complex routing, and operational delays, which is not yet equivalent to a full reopening for all international LNG traffic.[1][2]

Physical and Operational Constraints: Mines, Demining, and New Transit Regimes

A central barrier to full reopening is the presence of naval mines in the main shipping channel.[1][2] The International Maritime Organization is reported to estimate that more than 80 mines need to be cleared before normal traffic can resume, underscoring that physical hazards remain substantial.[2] Analysts in one report believe the central part of the strait is mined, which has forced the development of alternative lanes and constrained where large tankers and LNG carriers can safely transit.[1]

Demining itself has become a political contest, with disagreements over who should oversee and conduct clearance operations.[2] One source notes that France and other actors are involved in disputes over demining responsibilities, which could slow or complicate coordinated action.[2] Until demining is completed and widely recognized as effective, major LNG shippers are likely to treat Hormuz as a high‑risk corridor, limiting traffic or insisting on alternative routes and insurance arrangements, especially for larger LNG vessels that have stricter safety requirements.

Operationally, shipping has also been subject to new regulatory and logistical constraints.[1][2] The creation of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority introduces bureaucratic approval processes for transiting ships, requiring paperwork and explicit authorization.[1] There are references to expanded two‑way channels and some ships beginning to use the central corridor again without recorded mine strikes, but analysts still stress heightened risk and the absence of a full return to pre‑war traffic flows.[1] Freight rates for tankers in the region have reportedly spiked, with some benchmarks approaching nine times normal levels, illustrating the economic impact of these hazards and restrictions.[1]

Political and Security Dynamics Affecting Reopening

The war in Iran and broader regional conflict remain the key drivers of disruption.[2][3][4][5] Shipping in Hormuz has been disrupted since a U.S.–Israel attack on Iran and Iran’s subsequent retaliation, and Iranian forces have targeted vessels transiting lanes not approved by Tehran.[2] Iran’s reported 60‑day moratorium period, during which it seeks to control traffic flows, signals a deliberate use of the strait as leverage in the conflict.[2]

A memorandum of understanding signed on 18 June between Iran and the United States is said to include Tehran’s agreement to help reopen the waterway.[2] However, the same reporting frames this as a complex political process rather than an imminent technical fix, with disputes over control, security guarantees, and alternative routes still unresolved.[2] Oman’s rejection of proposed transit fees adds another layer of negotiation, as fee structures and control of the southern route inside Omani waters become contentious issues.[2][3]

Broader political developments show a conflict environment that remains unstable. U.S. congressional moves to cut $3.3 billion in military aid amid accusations that “war criminals mustn’t get dollars” point to contested support for regional military actors, which could alter the security architecture around the strait.[4] In Israel, domestic political upheaval, including attacks on the IDF chief by influential religious figures, reflects internal divisions over war policy.[5] These tensions could prolong or complicate any comprehensive settlement, thereby affecting timelines for robust de‑escalation and secure reopening of Hormuz for all LNG traffic.

Alternative Routes and Partial Adaptation

To mitigate risks, regional and global actors are exploring or expanding alternative transit options. One key development is the southern route through Omani territorial waters, designed to keep ships away from suspected minefields in the central corridor.[2] This route, supported by the IMO, offers a safer path but is constrained by political disagreements between Iran and Oman and may not be suitable for all vessel types, especially the largest LNG carriers.[2]

Some Gulf producers can partially bypass Hormuz via existing pipeline infrastructure—such as overland routes to the Red Sea or pipelines into the UAE or Saudi Arabia—though these options do not fully replace the strait’s capacity, particularly for LNG cargoes that require specialized terminals and shipping chains. These adaptations suggest that the global system is coping through diversification rather than by restoring full, free‑flowing traffic through Hormuz. As a result, while some energy flows continue and may even increase along alternative paths, the strait itself remains a bottleneck under constrained conditions.

Indicators Relevant to Resolution

The resolution criteria specify that the question resolves “Yes” only if, before 31 July 2026, major news outlets report that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic and that traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted. In practical terms, this would likely involve widely reported statements that demining of the central corridor has been completed, that security incidents have subsided, and that standard commercial LNG shipping routes through Hormuz have resumed at or near pre‑war levels. It would also require evidence that regulatory barriers—such as extraordinary approval regimes or moratorium‑related controls—have been lifted or substantially relaxed.

As of the latest sources from late June 2026, there is no such reporting.[1][2][3] Instead, expert commentary stresses that “a return to ‘normal’ is still far on the horizon,” highlighting mines, contested demining, political disputes over control and transit fees, and continuing attacks on unauthorized shipping lanes.[1][2][3] The existence of a recent MoU and gradual adaptation (including alternative routes and some resumed central‑corridor transits) indicates incremental movement toward increased traffic, but not yet toward the kind of unrestricted, widely recognized reopening that the resolution criteria require.[1][2]

For monitoring going forward, the most relevant signals would include:

• Public announcements by the IMO, regional navies, or the PGSA declaring mine clearance and safe reopening of standard shipping lanes.[1][2]
• Major news reports that LNG carriers are regularly and safely transiting the central Hormuz corridor under normal commercial conditions, with freight rates stabilizing and special approval regimes scaled back.[1][2]
• Political developments such as durable ceasefires, implementation of the Iran–US MoU on reopening, and resolved disputes between Iran and Oman over routing and fees, which would underpin long‑term security for LNG traffic.[2][3][4][5]

These developments—rather than short‑term tactical shifts—would be necessary to satisfy the requirement that the Strait of Hormuz has genuinely reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic.

Grok response:

Current situation (as of July 2, 2026): The Strait of Hormuz remains disrupted due to the ongoing 2026 Iran war (which began February 28, 2026), with Iran imposing restrictions, attacks, and occasional closure announcements in retaliation to US/Israeli actions. LNG traffic (primarily Qatari) was largely halted or severely restricted for months, though a June 17, 2026 US-Iran MOU/deal included provisions for reopening without tolls for 60 days and lifting the US blockade.[1][2]

Partial recovery has occurred since mid-June, with some Qatari LNG tankers transiting (e.g., four ballast carriers on June 22 via the Iranian route—the first since the war began) and overall vessel traffic rebounding modestly (e.g., 24 inbound/17-19 outbound on July 1 per Windward data). However, volumes remain far below pre-war levels (~100+ daily crossings), a US blockade is still noted as active in trackers, security risks persist, and Iran has issued conflicting closure statements amid talks. No major outlets have reported a full reopening to all international maritime LNG traffic.[3][4]

Ongoing US-Iran talks (as recent as July 1) focus on implementation, with the strait as a key sticking point; full normalization could take weeks/months even with a deal. LNG-specific flows show early signs of resumption but remain limited.[5]

10 key recent citations:

1. 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis (Wikipedia) – Encyclopedia entry updated through early July 2026. Summarizes the crisis as ongoing since Feb. 28, 2026 (4+ months), with traffic largely blocked by Iran via warnings, attacks, and mines; pre-war ~20% of global LNG transited; partial deal efforts noted but no full resolution.[1]
2. Hormuz tanker traffic unchanged after US-Iran deal (Argus Media, June 15, 2026) – Market news on post-deal shipping. Reports no significant change in vessel traffic via AIS data immediately after the June deal announcement; shipowners awaiting further details/signed agreement on June 19.[2]
3. Tanker traffic through Hormuz picks up after slower flows… (Reuters, June 22, 2026) – Shipping analysis. Notes four Qatari LNG tankers (Wadi Al Sail, Mekaines, Al Sadd, Mesaimeer) entering via Iranian route (first since war start), plus other tankers; traffic slowly increasing despite Iran’s weekend closure announcement.[3]
4. Strait of Hormuz Reopening… Forecast (LinkedIn post referencing deal, ~June 28, 2026) – Discussion of the exact question. Highlights June 17-18 MOU for reopening without tolls for 60 days + blockade lift; notes tentative signs but idling vessels and wait-and-see approach.[6]
5. Strait of Hormuz | Windward Daily Intelligence (Windward, July 2, 2026 data as of July 1) – Real-time tracker. Shows 24 inbound/17-19 outbound transits on July 1 (43 total); explicitly flags “US BLOCKADE ACTIVE”; LNG category noted but no pre-war volumes.[4]
6. More vessels transit Hormuz, Qatar-linked LNG tankers return (Reuters, June 23, 2026) – Follow-up data report. Details seven ballast QatarEnergy-controlled LNG tankers entering the Gulf (June 11-22, first since Feb. 28 strikes); three VLCCs exiting; early sign of gas shipping resumption.[7]
7. Hormuz disruption to stall 2026 LNG trade… (Reuters, June 30, 2026) – Shell outlook. States disruptions could keep global LNG trade flat in 2026 if flows normalize in next three months; ~1/5 of monthly LNG supply shut in since conflict; growth expected 2027+.[8]
8. Tracking traffic in the Strait of Hormuz… (CNN, June 18, 2026) – Live tracker. Notes slow pickup (e.g., 34-45 crossings recently vs. pre-war ~100); MOU calls for immediate commercial traffic start and best efforts to restore pre-war levels by July 19.[9]
9. Iran shuts Hormuz strait… (Al Jazeera, June 11, 2026) – Report on mid-June escalation. Covers Iran’s announcement of complete closure to tankers/commercial ships in response to US strikes; conflicting US claims some ships still passing.[10]
10. US and Iran hold separate meetings… (AP News, ~July 1, 2026) – Recent diplomacy update. Discusses talks in Qatar/Switzerland on implementation; interim deal aims to open strait but differences remain over routes, fees, and control; notes 1/5 of oil/gas normally passes.[5]

No authoritative source (e.g., major outlets or trackers) confirms full reopening to all international LNG traffic as of July 2. Partial LNG movements exist, but restrictions, risks, and sub-normal volumes persist.