Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai forecasts 8%

This is the full report. Condensed version here.

Perplexity response:

“Why the Strait of Hormuz won’t reopen overnight” – Energy Aspects (Insight)

• Date: 2 June 2026
• Description: Detailed oil/LPG shipping analysis and forward-looking assessment based on proprietary vessel tracking.
• Summary (relevant content): Energy Aspects estimates that as of 2 June, outbound flows of non-Iranian oil and LPG through Hormuz are under 10% of pre‑war levels, despite some headline‑grabbing individual transits.[1] It notes that 99 mb of crude, 37 mb of products and 279 kt of LPG remain stranded on 247 tankers in or around Hormuz, underscoring how far conditions remain from “normal.”[1] The report stresses that even if a U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) is signed, mines must be cleared, interim transit systems set up, and shipowners’ risk perceptions must change, so recovery is expected to be “slow, uneven and possibly incomplete.”[1]

“Strait of Hormuz traffic remains limited despite peace-deal talks” – Bloomberg via World Oil

• Date: 2 June 2026
• Description: Shipping/energy market report using ship‑tracking data and official statements.
• Summary: Bloomberg reports that only two inbound and two outbound commercial transits were observed over a recent 24‑hour period, showing traffic is still very limited.[3] Iran’s Tasnim agency simultaneously claimed 24 vessels transited in 24 hours with IRGC permission, illustrating that flows are heavily permission‑based and far below pre‑war norms.[3] The piece notes that 121 commercial ships have been rerouted due to the U.S. blockade of Iranian vessels, indicating ongoing broad disruption to Gulf trade.[3]
• “Iran and the US loosen their grip on the Strait of Hormuz despite attacks and twists in negotiations” – El País (English edition)

• Date: 4 June 2026
• Description: Political and security overview of evolving U.S.–Iran posture and ship movements.
• Summary: El País describes a “double blockade” by Tehran and Washington but notes that in the past two weeks ship traffic has become “noticeably higher,” albeit still far below pre‑war daily counts of 100+ ships.[5] It highlights that some vessels cross with IRGC permission, others under U.S. Navy escort, and some clandestinely with AIS transponders switched off.[5] The New York Times is cited as estimating that about 70 ships have been guided out since mid‑May under U.S. Navy recommendations, most off‑transponder, implying more traffic than public AIS data shows.[5]

“More ships are quietly slipping through Strait of Hormuz as…” – Fortune (with Bloomberg content)

• Date: 30 May 2026
• Description: Focus on clandestine transits, U.S. naval assistance, and the emerging “gray zone” reopening.
• Summary: Fortune reports that more tankers are transiting Hormuz with U.S. military guidance, some turning off AIS to avoid detection by Iran while using U.S. support to cross.[4] It emphasizes that the U.S. and Iran remain deadlocked on a deal to extend their ceasefire and fully reopen the strait, so current movements are ad‑hoc and risky.[4] Shipowners state that traffic has “picked up over the last week”, but from a very low base and far from an open, routine corridor.[4]

“Hormuz Escape Route Suggests Ships Navigate on Iran’s Terms” – EnergyNow (Bloomberg content)

• Date: March 2026
• Description: Early‑stage description of the Iranian‑controlled coastal “escape route” being quietly used by some tankers.
• Summary: The article recounts how a Pakistani tanker recently transited Hormuz by closely hugging the Iranian coast, suggesting a de facto Iran‑approved channel.[2] Analysts quoted say this creates a situation where the strait is not formally closed, but transit depends on political understandings with Tehran, giving Iran significant leverage.[2] JPMorgan notes this could entrench a system where commercial shipping is contingent on Iranian consent, undermining the idea of a fully open international waterway.[2]

“The State of the Strait: What Might Come Next in Hormuz” – International Crisis Group (visual explainer)

• Date: 2026 (post‑war, exact day not specified in snippet)
• Description: Strategic overview of the war in Iran and its impact on Hormuz shipping and global markets.
• Summary: Crisis Group notes that as of publication the strait remains closed to most traffic, with global economic costs mounting.[6] It outlines the sequence from the outbreak of the war in Iran, through reciprocal blockades, to ongoing diplomatic efforts.[6] The analysis discusses possible future scenarios, including partial reopening under heavy security, continued closure, or a negotiated phased reopening tied to broader conflict resolution.[6]

“Hormuz Live Vessel Traffic & Crude Oil Prices” – ShipFinder special page

• Date: Continuously updated; quotation refers to 1 June 2026
• Description: Live AIS‑based vessel‑traffic tracker and crude price snapshot focused on Hormuz.
• Summary: ShipFinder reports that daily transits through Hormuz remain “erratic,” citing 15 vessels (including 4 tankers) on 1 June under IRGC coordination, a fraction of historical norms.[7] The site consolidates daily counts for inbound and outbound vessels, indicating that flows are still sporadic and highly controlled.[7] It also tracks crude price reactions, showing markets still pricing in significant risk premium because of the incomplete reopening.[7]

(LNG‑related detail from same Energy Aspects insight)

• Date: 2 June 2026
• Description: Same report as #1, but this portion specifically addresses gas/LNG‑adjacent flows and structural changes.
• Summary: Energy Aspects notes 279 kt of LPG stranded and observes that even under an MoU, confidence-building will be gradual, implying slow normalization for gas‑related shipping as well.[1] It stresses that shipowners and traders view transit risks as too high “even in the early days after the strait reopens,” which would dampen early LNG/LPG traffic.[1] The report highlights that several Gulf producers are expanding pipeline routes that bypass Hormuz, indicating expectations of structurally lower reliance on the strait even post‑war.[1]

(Peace‑deal angle from the same Bloomberg/World Oil report)

• Date: 2 June 2026
• Description: Political context and talks over a U.S.–Iran peace deal and Hormuz reopening.
• Summary: Bloomberg notes “uncertainty over prospects for a U.S.–Iran peace deal”, which is directly affecting shipowners’ willingness to send vessels through Hormuz.[3] It reports that shipowners had recently become more optimistic after receiving guidance from the U.S. but that volumes have not yet followed in a major way.[3] The piece underscores that until a clear, durable agreement is reached, insurance, legal, and security risks will constrain traffic.[3]

(Negotiations and security incidents from El País piece)

• Date: 4 June 2026
• Description: Additional details in the same El País article about attacks and negotiation “twists.”
• Summary: El País describes recent attacks and incidents that have intermittently interrupted negotiations, reinforcing shipowners’ perception of volatility.[5] It notes that despite the gradual “loosening,” the environment remains militarized, with both U.S. and Iranian forces closely involved in shipping movements.[5] The article suggests that any re‑tightening of blockades after incidents could quickly reverse recent incremental gains in traffic.[5]

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To support forecasting whether the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic before 31 July 2026, the key areas to track and how the current news fits are:

1. Definition of “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic”

• The question’s resolution depends on major news outlets reporting that LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted through Hormuz, not just that a few LNG cargoes got through under special arrangements.
• Current reporting consistently describes:
• Use of IRGC permissions, U.S. Navy escorts, and clandestine AIS‑off transits;[2][4][5]
• Traffic as “limited,” “erratic,” or “far below pre‑war levels”;[1][3][5][7]
• Ongoing double blockade (Iranian plus U.S. measures on Iranian vessels).[3][5][6]
• This indicates the present situation falls well short of an “open to all” status for LNG, and a resolution‑relevant “Yes” would likely require language like “Hormuz reopens” or “returns to normal traffic” in outlets such as Reuters, AP, Bloomberg, or major newspapers, explicitly referencing LNG/gas shipments.

2. Current level of traffic and how far it is from normal

• Aggregate flows vs pre‑war:
• Non‑Iranian outbound flows in May averaged 0.98 mb/d crude, 0.22 mb/d products, 0.10 mb/d LPG, versus 17.8 mb/d pre‑conflict, i.e. <10% of normal traffic.[1]
• Energy Aspects stresses that isolated transits “should not be confused with a meaningful recovery.”[1]
• Daily vessel counts:
• Bloomberg’s 2 June vessel‑tracking found just two inbound and two outbound commercial transits over one recent day.[3]
• ShipFinder indicates 15 vessels (4 tankers) on 1 June under IRGC coordination, calling daily transits “erratic.”[7]
• El País notes pre‑war some days saw 100+ ships a day, while current activity, though increased in the last two weeks, remains “far below” that benchmark.[5]
• LNG specifically:
• Public reporting so far focuses on crude, products, and LPG; LNG cargo data are scarcer in these snippets, but the structural picture is the same: gas‑related tankers are largely affected by the same security, insurance, and permissions regime described for oil/LPG.[1][3][5]
• For forecasting, these numbers imply that a full normalization is still distant, even if a recovery trend has started.

3. U.S.–Iran war status and negotiation dynamics

• The war in Iran and the associated blockades are the root cause of the LNG halt.[6]
• Ongoing developments:
• Crisis Group describes the strait as “closed to most traffic” at the time of its analysis, with global economic consequences mounting and diplomacy ongoing.[6]
• Bloomberg/World Oil notes uncertainty over prospects for a U.S.–Iran peace deal, which directly influences traffic and shipowner confidence.[3]
• El País highlights attacks and “twists” in negotiations, indicating a fragile, nonlinear diplomatic track.[5]
• A resolution‑relevant reopening is likely contingent on:
• A formal ceasefire or peace arrangement that includes explicit provisions on maritime security and mine clearance.
• Clear signaling by both Washington and Tehran that commercial shipping (including LNG) can proceed freely without case‑by‑case permissions.

4. Emerging patterns: controlled/conditional reopening rather than full openness

Current articles emphasize a controlled, conditional reopening rather than an all‑clear:

• Iran‑controlled “escape route”:
• A Pakistani tanker’s transit hugging the Iranian coast exemplifies a Tehran‑approved corridor; analysts argue this makes transit “increasingly depend on political understandings with Tehran.”[2]
• IRGC permissions and U.S. escorts:
• Iran’s Tasnim agency claims 24 vessels in 24 hours had IRGC permission to cross,[3] while El País reports that “the majority” of recent crossings are with IRGC permission and others with U.S. Navy escort.[5]
• Clandestine behavior:
• Fortune and El País describe ships turning off AIS and using U.S. military guidance to cross, outside normal transparent navigation patterns.[4][5]
• These patterns suggest that, in the near term, we are more likely to see:
• Managed, quota‑like flows under military or political control;
• Continued exclusion of risk‑averse owners, especially for high‑value LNG cargoes;
• A long delay before the strait is considered open “to all” traffic on commercial terms, as required for the question’s “Yes” outcome.

5. Shipping industry risk appetite, insurance and behavior

• Energy Aspects stresses that most shipowners, refiners, and traders still view transit risk as too high, even in the early days after any reopening, implying that volumes will lag behind political agreements.[1]
• U.S. guidance is helping some ships cross, and owners report traffic having “picked up”, but from a very low base and with substantial risk‑management measures.[4]
• For LNG specifically, factors to monitor include:
• War‑risk insurance premiums and whether major P&I (protection and indemnity) clubs resume ordinary cover for LNG transits.
• Whether the big LNG fleet operators (Qatari, Japanese, European) publicly confirm routine use of Hormuz again.
• Any mention in major outlets of “first LNG cargoes” resuming through Hormuz, followed by reports that flows are back to near‑normal.

6. Physical and operational constraints: mines, naval presence, and pipelines

• Energy Aspects outlines that even after a political deal, mine‑clearing operations, establishing an interim transit system, and convincing shippers of safety are necessary prerequisites.[1]
• Both U.S. and Iranian forces are heavily present and directly involved in managing crossings, which keeps the strait a militarized environment.[5]
• Several Gulf producers are developing or expanding pipelines that bypass Hormuz, signalling expectations that reliance on the strait will remain structurally lower than before the war.[1]
• For forecasting:
• A rapid, clean, full reopening by mid‑2026 would require unusually fast mine clearance and de‑escalation.
• Conversely, the more that bypass infrastructure becomes available, the less economic pressure there is to rush a full “open to all” LNG corridor.

7. Quantitative indicators you may want to track going forward

To refine your forecast over time, the following quantitative indicators are particularly relevant:

• Daily vessel counts through Hormuz by type (crude, products, LPG, LNG, containers) from AIS‑based trackers like ShipFinder.[7]
• Share of pre‑war tonnage restored, especially for gas/LNG, relative to baselines like Energy Aspects’ 17.8 mb/d pre‑war oil flows and pre‑war LNG export volumes from Qatar and other Gulf producers.[1]
• Number of rerouted ships (currently 121 commercial vessels rerouted, per U.S. military officials).[3]
• War‑risk insurance rates and coverage status for LNG vessels in the Gulf.
• Any announcement from major LNG exporters/importers that their standard shipping patterns via Hormuz have resumed.

8. Qualitative triggers that would strongly signal a “Yes” outcome

Given the resolution criteria (“major news outlets report that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic”), you are looking for:

• Headlines or ledes in outlets such as Reuters, Bloomberg, AP, FT, WSJ, NYT, etc. along the lines of:
• “Strait of Hormuz reopens to global shipping / LNG tankers after peace deal.”
• “LNG shipments resume to near‑normal levels as U.S. and Iran lift blockades.”
• Explicit statements that:
• Blockades have been lifted and the strait is no longer closed or severely restricted for LNG, not just for some oil cargoes.
• Commercial LNG carriers from multiple countries are transiting without special permissions or military escorts.
• Confirmation from:
• Qatar and other LNG exporters that they have resumed regular LNG exports via Hormuz.
• Major shipowners that they have removed previous self‑imposed bans on routing LNG carriers through the strait.

9. Current trajectory and what recent updates suggest

• Recent trajectory:
• Over roughly the last two weeks, multiple sources describe a modest uptick in traffic, more ships crossing (including some tankers), and increased U.S. naval guidance.[1][3][4][5][7]
• Nevertheless, traffic remains “limited,” “erratic,” and heavily controlled, with large volumes of oil/LPG still stranded and most traffic patterns far from normal.[1][3][5][7]
• Implications for your forecast:
• The direction of change is toward gradual loosening, not tightening, which is a point in favor of a reopening by mid‑2026.
• However, multiple expert analyses (Energy Aspects, Crisis Group) explicitly warn that recovery will be slow, uneven, and possibly incomplete, and that even after formal agreements, shipping and insurance may lag.[1][6]
• Ongoing attacks and negotiation setbacks introduce a real possibility of reversals, complicating any expectation of a smooth, linear path to full reopening.[5]

10. Suggested monitoring strategy up to July 31, 2026

To support high‑quality forecasting on this question:

• Track diplomatic milestones:
• U.S.–Iran ceasefire extensions, any comprehensive peace deal, and any specific sections on maritime security or mine clearance.
• Monitor specialized energy/shipping analysis:
• Updates from Energy Aspects, Crisis Group, and major shipping consultancies on the pace of traffic normalization and risk perceptions.[1][6]
• Watch global media for key wording:
• Daily or weekly checks of Reuters, Bloomberg, AP, and major newspapers for phrases like “reopen,” “fully reopen,” “return to normal,” and “LNG shipments resume” regarding Hormuz.
• Use live data to cross‑check narrative:
• Regularly review AIS‑based services (like ShipFinder) for consistent, high, and diversified tanker traffic, including identifiable LNG carriers, rather than sporadic or escorted movements.[7]

All current sources agree that the Strait of Hormuz is not yet reopened in a way that would meet the question’s standard, and that while there is incremental loosening and more transits, substantial political, military, and operational steps remain before LNG traffic can be described as freely flowing for all international shippers.[1][3][4][5][6][7]

Grok response:

List of 10 Key Citations (most recent prioritized, with publication dates noted):

1. Wikipedia: 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis; last updated/crawled ~June 4, 2026)
   Shipping through the Strait has been largely blocked by Iran since February 28, 2026, following U.S.-Israeli strikes. Brief Iranian announcements of reopening (e.g., April 17) were quickly reversed, with traffic remaining minimal. The page details ongoing disruptions to ~20% of global LNG and oil flows.[1]
2. CNN: “94 days of paralysis: The Strait of Hormuz remains choked off” (cnn.com, published ~June 2, 2026)
   President Trump has claimed reopening is imminent, but shipping executives refuse to risk vessels without a definitive U.S.-Iran peace deal. Commercial traffic stays near standstill levels after 94 days, with ~2,000 ships stranded. Renewed fighting undermines any progress.[2]
3. Reuters: “Three oil, LNG tankers exit Hormuz with transponders off” (reuters.com, published May 28, 2026)
   A small number of vessels (including one LNG tanker) have exited “dark” (transponders off) in late May, heading to India/China, but overall oil and LNG traffic remains severely limited. The U.S.-Israeli war since Feb. 28 has curtailed normal flows (~125–140 daily passages pre-war). ~20,000 seafarers remain stranded.[3]
4. MobilityEnergy.com: “In all the darkness, traffic pulls Strait of Hormuz again” (mobilityenergy.com, published June 3, 2026)
   Some oil and LNG ships are attempting passage by turning off transponders to evade Iranian surveillance, marking a gradual trickle after months of near-zero traffic. This follows the Feb. 28 conflict start and persistent Iranian restrictions. Full normal operations remain absent.[4]
5. Investopedia: “Iran Says the Strait of Hormuz Will Stay Closed…” (investopedia.com, published ~June 1, 2026 / “3 days ago”)
   Iranian officials recently withdrew from peace talks and vowed to “completely block” the strait. Analyses differ on U.S. economic impacts, but the closure of this route for ~20% of global oil/LNG supply continues. No resolution to full reopening reported.[5]
6. Fortune: “The Strait of Hormuz is splitting into U.S. and Iranian lanes…” (fortune.com, published ~June 1, 2026 / “3 days ago”)
   Limited “dark” traffic is emerging amid intensified fighting, but the strait has been effectively shut for three months. ~2,000 ships remain trapped; insurance and risks deter normal LNG/oil transits. Diplomatic stalls persist.[6]
7. CSIS: “The Strait of Hormuz in 8 Charts” (csis.org, published April 22, 2026; data through early June referenced)
   Traffic has stayed at a fraction of pre-war levels since the March 2 effective closure (following Feb. 28 strikes). A brief April 17 reopening saw minimal successful transits before reversal. AIS data shows most vessels remain stuck in the Gulf.[7]
8. WTO Data Lab: Strait of Hormuz Trade Tracker (datalab.wto.org, published May 1, 2026)
   LNG shipments hit a near-complete halt (99% drop) since Feb. 28, with zero AIS-traceable passages in key periods. Crude oil saw 95% decline; even brief ceasefires/reopenings yielded no meaningful recovery. Outbound trade in energy remains paralyzed.[8]
9. Polymarket: “Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of June?” (polymarket.com, market active as of June 4, 2026)
   Current market implies ~84.5% probability of “No” (traffic not normalizing by June 30), based on Kpler/IMF PortWatch data showing only 5–10 daily transits vs. pre-crisis 100+. Geopolitical tensions and insurance issues sustain the low volumes.[9]
10. New York Times: “Reopening of Strait of Hormuz Still a Question Mark” (nytimes.com, published May 24, 2026)
    A U.S.-Iran “deal in principle” was announced, but details are absent and normal shipping resumption timing is unknown. Oil prices remain elevated amid uncertainty; experts note it could take significant time even with an agreement.[10]

Current Context Summary (as of June 4, 2026):
The Strait remains effectively closed or severely restricted to international LNG traffic due to the ongoing Iran conflict that began February 28, 2026. Iran declared/ enforced closure around March 4; brief April reopening attempts failed quickly. Only sporadic “dark” (AIS-off) passages occur, with no reports of full reopening to all maritime LNG traffic. Negotiations continue but are stalled, with recent Iranian statements reaffirming closure. No major news outlets have reported a full reopening. Historical pre-conflict LNG flows through the strait were ~20% of global seaborne trade (~10.5–11.4 Bcf/d in early 2025 data).[11]

Recent updates (late May–early June 2026) show slight increases in risky dark transits but no normalization. Expert views (shipping firms, analysts) emphasize that sustained peace/insurance clarity is needed for full LNG resumption; Polymarket and data trackers indicate low near-term odds. No authoritative resolution source (e.g., specific port or maritime authority) shows normalized all-traffic LNG flows yet.

Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]

Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]

GPT Binary response:

The base case is still clearly No.

Why:

Current state is far from the resolution threshold.
The best, most recent sources — Bloomberg/World Oil, Reuters, Energy Aspects, CNN, Fortune/Bloomberg, El País — all describe the strait as still limited, erratic, heavily controlled, or effectively closed/severely restricted for normal commercial traffic. There are a few LNG/oil transits, but they are occurring via:

• IRGC permission,
• U.S. naval guidance/escort,
• AIS-off “dark” sailing,
• ad hoc political arrangements.
  That is not “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic.”

The resolution criterion is a high bar.
This is not asking whether some LNG tankers get through. It requires major outlets to report that the strait has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic — i.e., LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted.
A gray-zone regime with selective approvals, escorted convoys, or sporadic dark sailings almost certainly still resolves No.

There is very little time left.
From June 4 to July 31 is only about 8 weeks. To get to Yes, several things likely must happen in sequence:

• a durable U.S.–Iran political deal or ceasefire extension,
• maritime implementation details,
• at least partial security normalization / mine-clearance confidence,
• insurers and owners willing to send LNG carriers routinely,
• major outlets characterizing the situation as genuinely reopened.
  That is a lot of contingency for a short window.

The trend is positive, but from an extremely low base.
There is evidence of a modest uptick in traffic in late May / early June. That matters. It keeps this from being a near-zero forecast. But the same sources emphasize that flows remain a small fraction of normal, and experts explicitly warn recovery would be slow, uneven, and possibly incomplete even after a deal.

LNG is especially sensitive.
LNG cargoes are high-value, operationally specialized, and very insurance-sensitive. Even if some crude and LPG traffic resumes sooner under controlled conditions, LNG may lag. The question is specifically about all international maritime LNG traffic, not generic shipping.

Recency/weighting:

• I give the most weight to the June 2–4 reporting from Energy Aspects, Bloomberg, El País, and CNN, plus Reuters on May 28.
• I give less weight to broader background summaries and social-media-style aggregations unless they align with those sources.
• The consistent picture across the timely sources is: incremental loosening, but nowhere near full reopening.

A useful way to think about it:

• By end of June: low single digits.
• By July 31: still clearly below one-in-four.
• By late September: materially higher, because there is more time for diplomacy and operational cleanup.

Key assumptions that could most change this forecast:

1. Assumption: No durable political breakthrough arrives soon enough.
   Probability this assumption is wrong: about 25.
   If wrong, the forecast rises substantially.
2. Assumption: Even with a deal, shipping/insurance constraints will keep LNG traffic “severely restricted” through much of July.
   Probability this assumption is wrong: about 30.
   If insurers and major LNG operators move faster than expected, Yes becomes much more plausible.
3. Assumption: Resolvers will interpret the criterion strictly, not count a partially managed reopening as “open to all.”
   Probability this assumption is wrong: about 15.
   If major outlets call it “reopened” based on an official announcement even while traffic remains thin, the Yes odds are understated.

Netting this out, I want to stay meaningfully above near-zero because there is a visible loosening trend and a nontrivial chance of a political deal. But the default path remains continued restriction, and the resolution language is demanding.

Probability: 15%

The extracted probability is: 15%

GPT Binary response:

The key issue is that this question is not asking whether some LNG tankers will get through. It asks whether, before July 31, major news outlets will report that the Strait has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic, meaning LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted.

Right now, the evidence points strongly the other way:

• Multiple recent sources say traffic is still limited, erratic, permission-based, escorted, or clandestine.
• Energy Aspects says non-Iranian flows are still under 10% of pre-war levels and warns recovery will be slow, uneven, and possibly incomplete, even after an MoU.
• Bloomberg/Fortune/El País all describe a gray-zone partial loosening, not a normal commercial corridor.
• Reuters/CNN/social research indicate some LNG movement, but only in tiny numbers and often with AIS off, which is almost the opposite of “reopened to all.”
• Insurance, mine-clearing, naval deconfliction, and shipowner confidence are still major bottlenecks.

So the default path over the next 57 days is still No.

I think the cleanest way to model this is by scenario:

1. No durable political/security deal soon enough
   Most likely. Traffic remains ad hoc, militarized, and heavily restricted.
   In this scenario, a Yes resolution is very unlikely.
2. Partial deal / phased reopening
   Moderately plausible. This could increase traffic, including LNG, but still under escort, permissions, convoying, or high insurance barriers.
   This still may not satisfy “all international maritime LNG traffic.”
3. Durable deal + operational normalization fast enough
   Possible, but requires several things to go right quickly: ceasefire durability, demining/security arrangements, insurance reopening, shipowner confidence, and outlet language strong enough to say the strait has reopened to LNG traffic broadly.
   This is the main path to Yes, but it is a fairly demanding chain.

A useful cross-check: even prediction-market style evidence on a less immediate traffic normalization question is already strongly leaning No for the end of June. Extending to July 31 raises the probability, but not by enough to get near even odds, especially given this question’s stricter wording.

Timeframe comparison

My rough internal timeline:

• By June 30: about 10–12
• By July 31: about 17
• By September 30: about 30–35

That pattern fits the current situation: some chance of diplomatic movement, but the operational and commercial normalization needed for “all international maritime LNG traffic” likely lags any political breakthrough.

Assumptions most likely to be wrong and most decision-relevant

1. Assumption: No durable U.S.–Iran maritime deal arrives quickly enough.
   Chance this assumption is wrong: 35
   If wrong, the forecast rises materially.
2. Assumption: Even with a deal, LNG traffic will still be too restricted/fragile for major outlets to call it reopened to all.
   Chance this assumption is wrong: 30
   If wrong, Yes becomes much more plausible.
3. Assumption: Resolution language will be interpreted strictly, not loosely.
   Chance this assumption is wrong: 25
   If outlets use looser “reopening” language despite escorts/permissions, that helps Yes.

Those failure modes stop this from being a single-digit forecast. But taken together, they still do not overcome the strong current default of continued severe restriction.

Probability: 17%

The extracted probability is: 17%

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Anthropic Binary response:

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to All International Maritime LNG Traffic

Current Situation Assessment (as of June 4, 2026)

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026 following the start of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. Key facts:

• Traffic levels: Currently at 5-10% of pre-war levels (~15 vessels daily vs. 100+ pre-war)
• LNG specifically: Near-complete halt (~99% drop according to WTO data)
• Current transits: Only sporadic “dark” (AIS-off) passages with U.S. Navy guidance or IRGC permission
• Ships stranded: ~2,000 commercial vessels, ~20,000 seafarers
• Diplomatic status: Iran recently withdrew from peace talks and reaffirmed intent to “completely block” the strait
• Polymarket: ~84.5% probability that traffic won’t normalize by end of June

Timeline Analysis

Time remaining: ~57 days (approximately 8 weeks)

For resolution to YES, we would need:

1. A comprehensive U.S.-Iran peace deal or ceasefire (estimated 3-4 weeks minimum to negotiate)
2. Mine clearance operations (experts cite weeks to months)
3. Establishment of interim transit systems
4. Shipowner/insurer confidence restoration
5. Major news outlets reporting the strait is “reopened to ALL international LNG traffic”

Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

Assumption 1: Diplomatic negotiations will remain stalled or progress slowly

• Failure probability: ~15%
• Impact if wrong: Could accelerate timeline significantly, but still leaves operational hurdles

Assumption 2: Even with a deal, operational reopening requires weeks-to-months

• Failure probability: ~10%
• Impact if wrong: Could make July 31 deadline achievable

Assumption 3: The resolution requires truly open traffic, not just increased flows

• Failure probability: ~5%
• Impact if wrong: Current gradual loosening trajectory might eventually suffice

Base Rate Considerations

• Maritime chokepoint closures historically take months to years to fully resolve
• The question requires “ALL international maritime LNG traffic” – a high bar
• Expert analysis (Energy Aspects, Crisis Group) explicitly warns recovery will be “slow, uneven, possibly incomplete”
• Brief April 17 reopening attempt reversed quickly, demonstrating fragility

Probability Calculation

Path 1: Diplomatic breakthrough + rapid implementation

• P(significant breakthrough by ~June 30): ~15%
• P(rapid operational implementation in July | breakthrough): ~25%
• P(major outlets declare “reopened to all LNG” | above): ~50%
• Combined: ~2%

Path 2: Gradual de-escalation reaches threshold

• Given recent Iranian statements and current trajectory
• P(gradual reopening reaches “all traffic” threshold by July 31): ~3%

Path 3: Unexpected events accelerating reopening

• ~3%

Factors Against Resolution

• Recent Iranian withdrawal from talks and closure reaffirmation
• Only 5-10% of normal traffic currently flowing
• Physical constraints (mines, military presence)
• Insurance/risk barriers for LNG carriers (high-value cargo)
• Expert consensus on slow recovery timeline
• Limited time (8 weeks) for all necessary steps

Factors For Resolution

• Some gradual loosening trend observed in late May
• U.S. Navy providing guidance for some transits
• Economic pressure on both sides to resolve
• Unpredictable nature of diplomatic breakthroughs

Adjusting for historical overconfidence and the very high bar set by “all international maritime LNG traffic,” combined with the severely restricted current state and limited remaining time:

Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%

---

Anthropic Binary response:

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz LNG Traffic Reopening

Current Situation Assessment

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to normal international LNG traffic since February 28, 2026, following the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran war. Based on the research:

• Traffic levels: Currently at <10% of pre-war levels (17.8 mb/d pre-conflict vs. ~1 mb/d now)
• Daily vessel counts: 2-15 vessels observed recently vs. 100+ ships per day pre-war
• LNG specifically: WTO data shows 99% drop in LNG shipments
• Nature of current traffic: Permission-based (IRGC or U.S. Navy escorts), many ships operating “dark” with AIS off
• Ships stranded: ~2,000 ships and ~20,000 seafarers remain stranded

Resolution Criteria Analysis

The question requires “reopened to ALL international maritime LNG traffic” – meaning traffic is “no longer halted or severely restricted.” This is a high bar. Current traffic patterns are definitionally “severely restricted” given:

• Permission-based transits only
• Double blockade (Iranian + U.S. measures)
• Most traffic clandestine/dark

Critical Assumptions & Their Probabilities of Failure

A comprehensive peace deal will NOT be reached within 8 weeks (~85% confident)

• Iran recently withdrew from talks
• Ongoing attacks interrupt negotiations
• If wrong: Still need implementation time

Physical constraints require months, not weeks (~90% confident)

• Mine-clearing operations necessary
• Security infrastructure needed
• Energy Aspects explicitly states recovery will be “slow, uneven”

Insurance/shipping industry won’t accept “open” traffic without clear guarantees (~88% confident)

• Shipowners explicitly cited as refusing risk without definitive peace deal
• War-risk premiums still elevated

Timeline Analysis

• Time remaining: ~57 days (8 weeks)
• Polymarket: ~84.5% probability traffic WON’T normalize even by June 30
• Expert views: Energy Aspects, Crisis Group emphasize gradual recovery even post-agreement

Probability Scenarios

Scenario	Probability	Resolution
Status quo/slow improvement	75%	NO
Diplomatic breakthrough but incomplete implementation	17%	NO
Full reopening achieved	8%	YES

Key Factors Limiting YES Probability

1. High resolution bar: “ALL international maritime LNG traffic” – not partial reopening
2. Physical constraints: Even with a deal tomorrow, mine-clearing and transit system establishment take weeks/months
3. Current trajectory: Incremental loosening, not normalization
4. Commercial behavior lag: Shipowners and insurers require sustained confidence before resuming normal operations
5. Diplomatic volatility: Negotiations characterized by “twists” and setbacks

Factors Supporting YES Probability

1. Some positive momentum: Traffic has “picked up” in recent weeks
2. Economic pressure: Global economic costs mounting could accelerate diplomacy
3. 8 weeks is not trivial: Some possibility of rapid developments
4. Uncertainty about private negotiations: Public information may lag actual progress

Cross-Validation

• Polymarket at ~15.5% YES for June 30 normalization
• Our July 31 deadline adds ~4 weeks, but the base case remains similar
• Expert consensus strongly suggests slow recovery timeline

Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%

---

Anthropic Binary response:

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz LNG Reopening by July 31, 2026

Current Situation Assessment

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to normal commercial traffic since approximately February 28 – March 4, 2026, following the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran conflict. Key facts:

• Current traffic at <10% of pre-war levels: Energy Aspects reports non-Iranian flows at 0.98 mb/d vs 17.8 mb/d pre-conflict
• Highly restricted navigation: Ships require IRGC permission OR U.S. Navy escort; many transit “dark” (AIS off)
• Massive stranded inventory: 99 mb crude, 37 mb products, 279 kt LPG, ~2,000 ships trapped
• Diplomatic stalls: Iran recently withdrew from peace talks; no comprehensive deal finalized
• Polymarket implies ~84.5% probability traffic won’t normalize even by June 30

Resolution Criteria Analysis

The question requires “all international maritime LNG traffic” to be “no longer halted or severely restricted”. This is a high bar requiring:

1. A comprehensive peace agreement/ceasefire
2. Mine clearing operations completed
3. Both U.S. and Iranian blockades lifted
4. Insurance and commercial risk normalized
5. Ships transiting freely without special permissions or escorts

The current permission-based, escort-dependent system clearly fails this test.

Timeline Constraints (57 days remaining)

For “Yes” resolution, the following sequence must complete before July 31:

1. Peace deal finalized (currently stalled, recent setbacks)
2. Mine clearing (historically takes weeks-months)
3. Insurance/confidence restoration (lags political agreements by weeks)
4. Traffic normalization (gradual process)

Energy Aspects explicitly states recovery will be “slow, uneven, and possibly incomplete” even after an agreement.

Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

1. Rapid peace deal by early-mid July (~10-15% probability): Required to allow time for physical/commercial normalization. Current trajectory shows stalled talks, recent Iranian withdrawal.
2. Accelerated mine clearing and security establishment (~5-10% conditional probability): Historical precedent suggests weeks-months; no evidence of pre-positioned clearance capability.
3. Rapid commercial confidence restoration (~15-20% conditional probability): Even with political deal, shipowners, insurers, and traders indicate they view transit risk as “too high even in early days after reopening.”

Combined probability path: Even if peace deal signs (~12%) × mine clearing succeeds quickly (~10%) × commercial confidence restores (~20%) = ~0.2%

Alternative Scenarios

• Gradual acceptance scenario: Traffic increases enough that media declares “effective reopening” – unlikely given resolution requires “ALL” traffic and “no longer severely restricted”
• Breakthrough diplomacy: Possible but would still require physical execution time
• Current trajectory continuation: Most likely – continued limited, controlled traffic

Base Rate Considerations

• Similar maritime chokepoint restorations historically take months after political resolution
• Post-conflict maritime normalization typically requires sustained confidence-building
• The 57-day window is insufficient for the multi-step process required

Confidence Assessment

The research is highly consistent across multiple sources (Energy Aspects, Bloomberg, Reuters, CSIS, WTO tracker, Polymarket). No credible analyst or data source suggests full normalization is imminent. The structural, physical, and commercial barriers are substantial and well-documented.

Given:

• Only ~8 weeks remaining
• Current state far from resolution threshold
• Sequential dependencies must all succeed
• Expert consensus of slow, incomplete recovery
• Recent negative diplomatic developments

Probability: 5%
The extracted probability is: 5%

GPT Binary response:

The base case is still clearly No.

Why:

1. Current state is far from the resolution threshold.
   The latest high-quality sources all say traffic is still limited, erratic, permission-based, escorted, or clandestine, not broadly open. Energy Aspects says non-Iranian outbound oil/LPG flows are still under 10% of pre-war levels and warns that even after a U.S.–Iran MoU, recovery would be slow, uneven, and possibly incomplete. Reuters/Bloomberg-style reporting shows only small numbers of ships transiting, sometimes “dark,” sometimes under IRGC permission or U.S. naval guidance. That is not “reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic.”
2. The resolution criterion is stricter than “some LNG ships get through.”
   It requires major outlets to report that the strait has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic, meaning LNG traffic is no longer halted or severely restricted. A gray-zone system of selective approvals, escorted convoys, AIS-off passages, or an Iranian-coast “escape route” likely does not qualify.
3. The time window is short: about 8 weeks.
   For a Yes, several things likely need to happen in sequence:

• a durable political agreement or at least robust de-escalation,
• maritime security arrangements acceptable to both sides,
• mine-clearing / route-safety work,
• insurance and legal clarity,
• shipowner willingness to send LNG carriers routinely,
• enough actual LNG movement that major media describe the strait as reopened to all LNG traffic.
  That stack of prerequisites is a lot to accomplish by July 31.

1. There is some positive movement, but from a very low base.
   Traffic has “picked up” in recent days, and a few LNG/oil transits have occurred. That matters. It means the probability is not near zero. Economic pressure to restore flows is intense, and a surprise diplomatic breakthrough is plausible. But the best current reporting still describes the system as controlled and exceptional, not normal or broadly open.
2. Base-rate intuition also pushes downward.
   Chokepoint reopenings during active conflict, especially with mines, insurers, naval escorts, and mutual blockades involved, usually do not go from near-paralysis to “open to all” in a matter of weeks. Political declarations often come earlier than commercial normalization.

A rough decomposition:

• Chance of a meaningful U.S.–Iran maritime/diplomatic breakthrough by July 31: about 35%
• Conditional on that, chance it translates into a genuine, reportable reopening for all international LNG traffic within the same window: about 30%
• Chance of de facto reopening without a full breakthrough: about 4%

This gives something in the low teens overall.

Key assumptions that could be wrong:

1. Assumption: resolution standards will be interpreted strictly, not loosely.
   If major outlets start calling the strait “reopened” after only limited escorted LNG transits, my forecast is too low.
   Probability this assumption is wrong: 25%
2. Assumption: operational barriers (mines, insurance, shipowner risk aversion) will remain binding even after any deal.
   If these unwind faster than analysts expect, reopening could happen quicker.
   Probability this assumption is wrong: 20%
3. Assumption: diplomacy remains fragile and does not produce a durable agreement very soon.
   If there is a sudden strong deal under economic pressure, odds rise materially.
   Probability this assumption is wrong: 30%

Cross-check on nearby timelines:

• By June 30: about 6%
• By July 31: about 14%
• By September 30: about 28%

So my forecast is that a full, resolution-grade reopening before the end of July is possible, but still distinctly unlikely.

Probability: 14%

The extracted probability is: 14%

Gemini Binary response:

As an expert superforecaster, my goal is to provide the most accurate probability based on a careful analysis of the available data and underlying drivers, while being mindful of uncertainty and potential biases.

Reasoning Rationale

1. Current Situation is Far from Resolution: As of June 4, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed to normal international maritime traffic, especially for high-value LNG carriers. All available research confirms this. Traffic is described as less than 10% of pre-war levels, “erratic,” and dependent on military escorts, clandestine “dark” transits, or explicit permission from Iranian forces. This state is the definition of “severely restricted” and is the baseline from which any change must be measured.
2. High Bar for a “Yes” Resolution: The resolution criteria are stringent. A “Yes” requires major news outlets to report that the strait has reopened to all international maritime LNG traffic and is no longer halted or severely restricted. This implies a return to a state of normalcy where commercial vessels can transit based on commercial decisions, without needing special military or political clearance. A few escorted or clandestine passages, or a partial, controlled reopening, would almost certainly not meet this standard.
3. A Multi-Stage Problem with a Tight Deadline: For the strait to reopen by July 31, 2026 (a 57-day window), a sequence of challenging events must occur in rapid succession:
   • Political Breakthrough: A durable U.S.-Iran peace deal or memorandum of understanding (MoU) must be finalized and signed. Current negotiations are described as fragile, with “twists” and intermittent attacks undermining progress.
   • Operational Implementation: Even with a political deal, there are significant physical and logistical hurdles. These include mine-clearing operations, the demilitarization of the transit corridor, and the establishment of new, trusted security protocols.
   • Commercial Confidence: The shipping and insurance industries, which are highly risk-averse, must be convinced that the strait is safe again. Experts note that shipowners’ confidence will lag behind political agreements, and they will be hesitant to risk multi-billion dollar LNG carriers until safety is assured.
4. Expert Analysis Points to a Slow Recovery: Multiple specialized sources explicitly warn that the reopening process will be “slow, uneven and possibly incomplete.” The analysis from Energy Aspects is particularly compelling, noting that even after a deal, it will take time to clear mines, set up transit systems, and for shipowners’ risk perceptions to change. This expert consensus strongly argues against a rapid, full reopening within the next seven and a half weeks.
5. Quantitative Indicators & Market Data: Current traffic is a fraction of the pre-war norm of over 100 ships per day. Recent reports of 4 to 15 transits in a 24-hour period highlight the immense gap that needs to be closed. While a prediction market gives a 15.5% chance of normalization by June 30, this seems optimistic given the depth of the challenges and may not fully account for the “implementation lag” or the high bar of the resolution criteria specific to this question. The extra month until July 31 increases the chances, but the fundamental, sequential barriers remain.

Key Assumptions & Probabilities

My forecast rests on two core assumptions whose failure would drastically alter the outcome:

1. A comprehensive political deal will not be fully implemented by the deadline. The probability of this assumption being incorrect (i.e., a deal is signed and fully implemented very quickly) is low, estimated at ~15%. The fragility of talks and the number of stakeholders makes a swift, clean resolution unlikely.
2. The lag between a political deal and a commercially viable, fully open strait is significant (weeks to months). The probability of this assumption being incorrect (i.e., reopening is near-instantaneous post-deal) is also low, estimated at ~20%. The logistical and trust-building hurdles documented in the research are substantial.

The path to a “Yes” requires both of these low-probability assumptions to be wrong. The combined probability is therefore very low. A simple multiplicative model (P(Deal & Swift Implementation) = 15% * 20% = 3%) suggests a forecast in the low single digits.

Final Forecast

Taking all factors into account, the probability of a political deal, full operational implementation, and a restoration of commercial confidence for all LNG traffic—all being completed and reported by major news outlets by July 31, 2026—is extremely low. While a diplomatic surprise is never impossible, the series of dependent conditions makes a “Yes” resolution a significant outlier event against the current trajectory and expert analysis.

Probability: 5%

The extracted probability is: 5%

All predictions: [5, 5, 8, 8, 14, 15, 17]
Filtered predictions: [8, 8, 14]

Median reasoning:

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to All International Maritime LNG Traffic

Current Situation Assessment (as of June 4, 2026)

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026 following the start of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. Key facts:

• Traffic levels: Currently at 5-10% of pre-war levels (~15 vessels daily vs. 100+ pre-war)
• LNG specifically: Near-complete halt (~99% drop according to WTO data)
• Current transits: Only sporadic “dark” (AIS-off) passages with U.S. Navy guidance or IRGC permission
• Ships stranded: ~2,000 commercial vessels, ~20,000 seafarers
• Diplomatic status: Iran recently withdrew from peace talks and reaffirmed intent to “completely block” the strait
• Polymarket: ~84.5% probability that traffic won’t normalize by end of June

Timeline Analysis

Time remaining: ~57 days (approximately 8 weeks)

For resolution to YES, we would need:

1. A comprehensive U.S.-Iran peace deal or ceasefire (estimated 3-4 weeks minimum to negotiate)
2. Mine clearance operations (experts cite weeks to months)
3. Establishment of interim transit systems
4. Shipowner/insurer confidence restoration
5. Major news outlets reporting the strait is “reopened to ALL international LNG traffic”

Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

Assumption 1: Diplomatic negotiations will remain stalled or progress slowly

• Failure probability: ~15%
• Impact if wrong: Could accelerate timeline significantly, but still leaves operational hurdles

Assumption 2: Even with a deal, operational reopening requires weeks-to-months

• Failure probability: ~10%
• Impact if wrong: Could make July 31 deadline achievable

Assumption 3: The resolution requires truly open traffic, not just increased flows

• Failure probability: ~5%
• Impact if wrong: Current gradual loosening trajectory might eventually suffice

Base Rate Considerations

• Maritime chokepoint closures historically take months to years to fully resolve
• The question requires “ALL international maritime LNG traffic” – a high bar
• Expert analysis (Energy Aspects, Crisis Group) explicitly warns recovery will be “slow, uneven, possibly incomplete”
• Brief April 17 reopening attempt reversed quickly, demonstrating fragility

Probability Calculation

Path 1: Diplomatic breakthrough + rapid implementation

• P(significant breakthrough by ~June 30): ~15%
• P(rapid operational implementation in July | breakthrough): ~25%
• P(major outlets declare “reopened to all LNG” | above): ~50%
• Combined: ~2%

Path 2: Gradual de-escalation reaches threshold

• Given recent Iranian statements and current trajectory
• P(gradual reopening reaches “all traffic” threshold by July 31): ~3%

Path 3: Unexpected events accelerating reopening

• ~3%

Factors Against Resolution

• Recent Iranian withdrawal from talks and closure reaffirmation
• Only 5-10% of normal traffic currently flowing
• Physical constraints (mines, military presence)
• Insurance/risk barriers for LNG carriers (high-value cargo)
• Expert consensus on slow recovery timeline
• Limited time (8 weeks) for all necessary steps

Factors For Resolution

• Some gradual loosening trend observed in late May
• U.S. Navy providing guidance for some transits
• Economic pressure on both sides to resolve
• Unpredictable nature of diplomatic breakthroughs

Adjusting for historical overconfidence and the very high bar set by “all international maritime LNG traffic,” combined with the severely restricted current state and limited remaining time:

Probability: 8%

=== Forecast Result ===

{
“probability_yes”: 0.1,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}

=== Reasoning ===

Analysis: Strait of Hormuz Reopening to All International Maritime LNG Traffic

Current Situation Assessment (as of June 4, 2026)

The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since late February 2026 following the start of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. Key facts:

• Traffic levels: Currently at 5-10% of pre-war levels (~15 vessels daily vs. 100+ pre-war)
• LNG specifically: Near-complete halt (~99% drop according to WTO data)
• Current transits: Only sporadic “dark” (AIS-off) passages with U.S. Navy guidance or IRGC permission
• Ships stranded: ~2,000 commercial vessels, ~20,000 seafarers
• Diplomatic status: Iran recently withdrew from peace talks and reaffirmed intent to “completely block” the strait
• Polymarket: ~84.5% probability that traffic won’t normalize by end of June

Timeline Analysis

Time remaining: ~57 days (approximately 8 weeks)

For resolution to YES, we would need:

1. A comprehensive U.S.-Iran peace deal or ceasefire (estimated 3-4 weeks minimum to negotiate)
2. Mine clearance operations (experts cite weeks to months)
3. Establishment of interim transit systems
4. Shipowner/insurer confidence restoration
5. Major news outlets reporting the strait is “reopened to ALL international LNG traffic”

Critical Assumptions and Failure Probabilities

Assumption 1: Diplomatic negotiations will remain stalled or progress slowly

• Failure probability: ~15%
• Impact if wrong: Could accelerate timeline significantly, but still leaves operational hurdles

Assumption 2: Even with a deal, operational reopening requires weeks-to-months

• Failure probability: ~10%
• Impact if wrong: Could make July 31 deadline achievable

Assumption 3: The resolution requires truly open traffic, not just increased flows

• Failure probability: ~5%
• Impact if wrong: Current gradual loosening trajectory might eventually suffice

Base Rate Considerations

• Maritime chokepoint closures historically take months to years to fully resolve
• The question requires “ALL international maritime LNG traffic” – a high bar
• Expert analysis (Energy Aspects, Crisis Group) explicitly warns recovery will be “slow, uneven, possibly incomplete”
• Brief April 17 reopening attempt reversed quickly, demonstrating fragility

Probability Calculation

Path 1: Diplomatic breakthrough + rapid implementation

• P(significant breakthrough by ~June 30): ~15%
• P(rapid operational implementation in July | breakthrough): ~25%
• P(major outlets declare “reopened to all LNG” | above): ~50%
• Combined: ~2%

Path 2: Gradual de-escalation reaches threshold

• Given recent Iranian statements and current trajectory
• P(gradual reopening reaches “all traffic” threshold by July 31): ~3%

Path 3: Unexpected events accelerating reopening

• ~3%

Factors Against Resolution

• Recent Iranian withdrawal from talks and closure reaffirmation
• Only 5-10% of normal traffic currently flowing
• Physical constraints (mines, military presence)
• Insurance/risk barriers for LNG carriers (high-value cargo)
• Expert consensus on slow recovery timeline
• Limited time (8 weeks) for all necessary steps

Factors For Resolution

• Some gradual loosening trend observed in late May
• U.S. Navy providing guidance for some transits
• Economic pressure on both sides to resolve
• Unpredictable nature of diplomatic breakthroughs

Adjusting for historical overconfidence and the very high bar set by “all international maritime LNG traffic,” combined with the severely restricted current state and limited remaining time:

Probability: 8%

End